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I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORY 
In the early hours of Friday, April 15, 2011, a group of nearly one hundred citizens of the 
rural Mexican community of Cherán (state of Michoacán), armed only with sticks and stones, 
violently attacked a group of drug cartel-sponsored illegal loggers that passed through their 
community. During the attack nine vehicles were set on fire, and three loggers were captured, 
beaten, and tortured by members of the community.1 Later that year, the inhabitants of Cherán 
expelled law enforcement authorities from the state to create their own Policía Comunitaria 
(community police) that, to this day, polices the community and the surrounding forests. 2,3 
This, however, is not the only case in which citizens have organized to attempt to enforce 
the law outside the purview of the state. In the Xochimilco neighborhood of Mexico City, for 
example, a sign posted by a group of vigilante neighbors reads: 
Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you we will not take you to the authorities... we will 
lynch you!4 
Four thousand miles south, in Santa Fe, Argentina, an almost identical banner warns those 
crossing the Los Hornos neighborhood about the presence of a similar vigilante organization.5  
Indeed, over the last decade we have seen citizens associating with their neighbors to 
confront common and organized criminals in countries as diverse as Guatemala (Handy, 2004), 
Brazil (Barbara, 2015), México (Melgar, 2013), Bolivia (Goldstein, 2003, 2004), Argentina (El País, 
                                                     
1 Ultimately, the alleged loggers were freed by the population after negotiations with the neighboring community of 
Capacuaro (a town from which some of the loggers originated). 
2 The situation deteriorated to such an extent, that seven months after the events of April 15, 2011, the citizens of the 
town voted for the abolition of the party system and the institution of an autonomous government elected and designed 
by uses and customs (i.e., in the way the indigenous population of the area, allegedly, had done it before the 
institutionalization of the Mexican sytem). Since then, the community has banned the installation of voting stations for 
both state and national elections and is completely restructuring its government.  
3 Research for this chapter was done with the approval of Vanderbilt’s Institutional Review Board (#131366) 
4 Reforma (2013). Translation is mine. http://www.zocalo.com.mx/seccion/articulo/te-vamos-a-linchar-advierten-
vecinos-a-ladrones-1357372715. 
5“Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you we will not take you to the police station... we will lynch you!” 
Translation is mine. El Día (2014). http://pasado.eldia.com/edis/20140401/Te-vamos-linchar-advierten-vecinos-
ladrones-cartel-20140401184011.htm. 
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2014), and Peru (BBC Mundo, 2004).6 Not surprisingly, over the last ten years there has been an 
increase in media and public attention to vigilantism around the world (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Trend in the Search for the Term “Vigilante” in Google 
 
 
Source: Google Trends, August 2015. Google asigns the highest number of searches a value of 100 
and reports relative levels with respect to this point.  
 
Although groups seeking to fight crime directly often justify their actions, this type of 
behavior can carry human and economic costs for both victims and victimizers. Not only do citizens 
spend economic and social resources in the formation of anti-criminal organizations, they can also 
incur opportunity costs, as they have to invest their time and effort policing their own community 
(Bates, Greif, & Singh, 2002). Moreover, when confronting criminals, vigilantes risk their own 
physical wellbeing, and they can put the lives of innocent citizens at risk. As Hine (1998) points out, 
since crime deterrence is, at least in part, a function of the probability of capture7 and the severity of 
sanctions, vigilantes have incentives to maximize the severity of sanctions in order to reduce the 
amount of policing that they conduct. Thus, this kind of action can severely compromise the rights 
and lives of those who, justifiably or not, are accused of committing a crime.  
More relevant to politics, citizens’ attempts to enforce the law collectively and independently 
of the state (what I call Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement [ECLE]) may pose a direct challenge 
                                                     
6 Anonymous official source (the extension of this database is part of this project). 
7 Influenced by the amount of investment in policing. 
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to the state. Specifically, this phenomenon challenges the extent in which the government holds the 
monopoly over the coercive use of violence, a feature that Weber (1919), in his foundational work, 
Politics as a Vocation, considered as the founding pillar of the state.  
In light of the social and political relevance of the phenomenon, the general research 
question that this project seeks to address is: Under what circumstances do citizens engage in 
Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement? In the rest of this chapter I review some of the theoretical 
approaches that have been brought to bear in the study of ECLE. Then, building on this literature I 
propose a novel explanation. I argue that in conditions in which citizens distrust law enforcement, 
high levels of social capital are more likely to increase the probability that citizens will engage in 
ECLE. In the final section of this chapter, I present the general outline of the four empirical 
chapters to follow.  
Antecedents  
Although most of the recent interest on ECLE has been triggered by the recent surge of 
self-defense movements in rural and urban Latin America8, it is impossible to offer a complete view 
of the antecedents to my study without referring to the early literature on the topic. The first studies 
on vigilantism can be traced to scholarly interest on vigilante and mob-violence in the southern and 
western United States at the beginning of the 20th century (see for example Allen, 2004; Cutler, 
1907; Raper, 2003).9 Among early scholars, ECLE was seen as an expression of cultural values, 
group conflict, or as a form of social control. 
                                                     
8 Curacao and Brazil lead the world as the countries in which citizens most often search for the term vigilante.   
9 It is important to note that, although the concepts of lynching and vigilantism relate to ECLE, the overlap is far from 
perfect. Lynching, for instance, has been defined as “a collective act, punitive, anonymous, spontaneous or organized, 
with different levels of ritualization, which uses physical violence towards individuals who, presumably, have broken a 
legal or a virtual (instituted by the community) norm and that are considerably outnumbered” (Díaz-Fuentes, 2004) 
under this definition, lynching can be a manifestation of ECLE, however both concepts do not overlap perfectly. For 
instance, note that lynching requires the use of violence while ECLE can either be expressed violently or through 
relatively peaceful actions (building roadblocks, implementation of civic fines, etc.). Conversely, note that ECLE requires 
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Group Conflict  
Due to the context in which extrajudicial mob-executions frequently appeared at the dawn 
of the 20th century (e.g., in the segregated South of United States) early literature on the topic studied 
extralegal collective law enforcement attempts exclusively as an expression of group conflict or 
hatred (Olzak, 1990). Scholars of this school contend that rapid social changes can trigger group 
competition, motivating citizens to form extralegal organizations seeking to castigate transgressions 
by competing ethnic or social groups.   
For example, in their now classic study, Hovland and Sears (1940) found evidence showing 
that, as the cotton crisis in the South worsened, the number of lynchings against African Americans 
also increased (Hepworth & West, 1988; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007). Similarly, other authors 
have found an association between rapid religious, political, and demographic change and the 
emergence of vigilante violence (Bagozzi, 1977; Inverarity, 1976; Tyson, 2013; Wasserman, 1977). 
Although this framework has provided a fruitful guide to understand the emergence of mob-
violence in the southern United States and in other highly segregated societies, it is only of limited 
utility for understanding the emergence of extra-legal collective law enforcement in societies with 
high levels of crime the absence of state-sanctioned segregation, as is the case of Latin America.  
While on some occasions violent attempts to apprehend and punish alleged criminals in 
Latin America are racially motivated, this happens only in the minority of cases. Indeed, researchers 
studying vigilantes’ self-reported intentions in Latin America have found that in the majority of the 
cases attackers describe their actions to be a response to high levels of crime. Further, rather than 
the attackers and the attacked belonging to clearly different groups, those studying vigilante violence  
                                                                                                                                                                           
the perception that a legal norm has been violated while lynching does not. While ECLE emerges, by definition, form 
the transgression of the law, lynching can emerge from the perceived transgression of moral or informal norms. 
Vigilantism is often used to refer to “the undertaking of law enforcement in a community without legal authority” 
(Vigilante, Oxford 2015). Although this concept is much closer to ELCE, it captures the action of individual vigilantes 
while ECLE only refers to collective actions. For a more thorough conceptual discussion of the concept of vigilantism 
and collective vigilantism, see Chapter IV.   
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have found that, for the most part, those attacked tend to be co-ethnic males living in the same 
neighborhood as the attackers (Castillo-Claudett, 2000; Guillén & Heredia, 2005; Vilas, 2009). 
Culture  
Seeking a more general understanding of the phenomenon, but still focusing on the context 
of the American South, a second strand of literature proposed violent ECLE to be an expression of 
a subculture of honor and violence (see for instance, Clarke, 1998; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967). 
That is, these scholars propose that extralegal collective law enforcement is more likely to emerge in 
subcultures that regard violence as an acceptable way to resolve conflict, especially in cases in which 
this violence is tolerated by the state.  
This perspective has found some resonance among some journalists and scholars. Indeed, 
some have noted that reports of violent ECLE attempts and self-defense movements frequently 
come from traditionally indigenous countries or indigenous sub-national regions within countries. 
Both lynch mobs and extralegal-rural police have been observed in Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia, 
and the recent movements towards indigenous autonomy in these countries have led some scholars 
to suggest that indigenous culture could be related to the emergence of ECLE (Vilas, 2009).  
Although this theoretical correlation has been empirically supported in some contexts 
(Seligson 2005; Mendoza, 2006), this hypothesis has not gone without dispute. For instance, in her 
analysis of lynchings in rural Guatemala, Fernández (2004) concludes that the Mayan justice system 
“emphasizes compensation, not repression” (p.23) and Handy (2004) argues that ECLE-violence in 
Guatemala emerged from rural collapse and a sense of distrust towards the judicial system, rather 
than a legacy of civil war or customary law. From his extensive work in Bolivia, Goldstein (2004, 
2012), for his part, concludes that rather than an expression of cultural identity, spectacular acts of 
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ECLE violence emerge as a community’s attempt to broadcast cohesion and collective efficacy in a 
context of state marginalization.  
Mendoza (2006) himself avoids appealing to culture as an explanation when interpreting the 
link between indigenous population and lynching in Guatemala. He argues that rather than reflecting 
the influence of cultural values, this link emerges out of ethnic solidarity (which trumps barriers to 
collective action) in areas in which the state has historically failed to provide its citizens with many 
basic services.  
Social Hierarchy  
Apart from the debate over the values of those engaging in ECLE, a third strand of 
literature has focused on the type of crimes most prevalent in cases of ECLE. Coming back the 
American context, these scholars have noted that violent ECLE tends to be preceded by crimes that 
challenge the preservation of the social hierarchy (Black, 1976; Senechal de la Roche, 2001; Tolnay 
& Beck, 1995). On this basis, they hypothesize that mob-violence can be understood as a way 
through which dominant sectors in society enforce the normative status quo.  
Again, this perspective might be of use to explain the emergence of violent ECLE in the 
specific contexts studied by this literature (i.e. the segregated American South). However, it seems to 
be of less use for understanding the contexts in which lynching is most often directed against 
ordinary criminals, which is the case in many of the incidents I am studying in this dissertation.  
Further, it lends little traction to efforts to understand countries in which, like in Mexico, vigilantes 
point to a sense of frustration with widespread insecurity and the inaction of law enforcement as 
their primary motives for engaging in violent-ECLE (Guillén & Heredia, 2005).  
In sum, although group-conflict and cultural theories provide us with valuable frameworks 
for explaining the emergence of violent ECLE in contexts of strong social conflict, they are less able 
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to help explain the most recent wave of vigilantism in the Americas. Thus, it seems necessary to 
investigate other factors that might help explain why citizens join with their neighbors to defend 
themselves against crime. 
Insecurity  
More recently, scholars have turned to the current conditions of violence, crime, and 
insecurity prevalent in Latin America as forces that could be behind the recent surge of ECLE 
across the continent. After all, 43 of the world's 50 most dangerous cities today are located in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Ortega Sánchez, 2015). 
Ever since the early works that emerged from the third wave of democratization, scholars 
have warned about the threat that insecurity could represent to democratic consolidation. In her 
foundational work on scarcity and democracy, for example, Bremeo (1997b) underlines how crime 
and insecurity can shape citizens’ political behavior and authoritarian preferences. And in his now 
classic work on democratic consolidation, Diamond (1999) notes: in the “context of weak states and 
an inefficient, poorly disciplined police” (p. 91), citizens may react to crime by taking desperate 
measures. Thus, Diamond argues, “the problem that crime poses for democracy may generate a fatal 
‘cure’” (p. 91).  
Scholars building from this theoretical perspective have noted that fear and insecurity can 
bolster citizens’ support for extralegal mechanisms to fight crime. Malone (2010, 2012c) and Cruz 
(2009), for example, find that citizens victimized by crime or who perceive higher levels of insecurity 
in their neighborhoods, are more likely to be supportive of the police violating the law to catch 
criminals. 
But beyond the police’s extralegal law enforcement, others have found that citizens are also 
more likely to be supportive of citizens engaging in extralegal collective law enforcement. Bateson 
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(2012), for example, not only finds that victims of crime in Latin America are more likely to be more 
active civically and politically but are also more likely to be supportive of vigilante justice (see also R. 
Rojo-Mendoza, 2015). Similarly, Malone (2012c) finds that Central Americans who are more afraid 
of crime tend to be more supportive of citizens taking the law into their own hands. And in the 
specific case of Guatemala, Seligson (2003) finds that insecurity erodes citizens’ democratic attitudes 
and this, in turn, increases their support for vigilantism.  
Theory: Social Capital and Distrust in the Authorities as Determinants of the Emergence of 
ECLE  
As Malone (2012) notes, “When victimized by a crime, citizens must decide to turn to the 
law, extralegal institutions, or to no one at all” (2012b, p. 127). Thus, to a great extent, ECLE actions 
reflect the strategic choice of facing criminals with the assistance of the community (one of the 
extralegal institutions available to citizens) rather than turning to the law to look for retribution, 
protection, or vengeance. Thus, in the following pages, I will argue that distrust of law enforcement 
moderates the degree to which high levels of social capital increase the probability that citizens will 
engage in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement. To unpack this hypothesis, however, it is 
necessary to turn to the incentives (potential costs and benefits) for this behavior as well as the 
actors to which such outcomes are contingent. 
ECLE Incentives 
The first way in which citizens may stand to benefit from ECLE is by reducing the material 
and immaterial costs of crime. In the simplest case, if they are able to confront criminals 
successfully, citizens may expect to immediately recover property or lost income. Further, citizens 
engaging in ECLE may expect to deter criminals and, hence, reduce future material costs of crime 
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(Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2010; Cohen, 2008; McCollister, French, & Fang, 2010; Miller, Cohen, 
& Wiersema, 1996).10 
Second, to varying degrees, citizens may expect to experience positive emotions (and thus a 
psychological benefit) after successfully engaging in vigilante actions. These may come from a 
multitude of mechanisms, including the satisfaction associated with altruistic retaliation (de Quervain 
et al., 2004; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006); successful collaborative interaction (Jung, Choi, Lim, 
& Leem, 2002); obtaining a fair outcome (Tyler, 1988); expressing a message to the offender 
(Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009); or being seen as a hero by others. 
The costs relating to ELCE, for their part, can come from direct and indirect sources. Direct 
costs relate to those coming from ECLE itself, and that cannot be avoided. They can include 
material costs (purchase of weapons or equipment), psychological distress (stress for being exposed 
to violence or risking physical harm), and opportunity costs (lost income due to stopped work or 
production) (Bates et al., 2002).11   
Indirect costs refer to losses associated with external factors such as criminals, law 
enforcement agents, or society in general. First, in addition to the original cost of crime, if 
unsuccessful, citizens who attempt to confront criminals stand to incur in additional material or 
immaterial losses immediately or on the long run. For example, citizens unsuccessfully attempting to 
confront a thief risk being economically, physically, or psychologically injured or even killed during 
the confrontation. Similarly, citizens who join together to attempt to confront someone extorting 
them may put their lives and livelihoods at risk if they decide to defend themselves but are 
unsuccessful (Contreras, 2014).  
                                                     
10 By material costs I refer to the loss of income, property, and land, among other things. By immaterial costs I refer to 
decreased life-satisfaction, the presence of negative emotions, stress, and so on.  
11 Material costs can vary greatly but are almost always a factor. While in some cases vigilantism may only cost the effort 
necessary to engage in it, in other situations citizens may need to invest resources to purchase weapons and equipment. 
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Second, since ECLE implies an intrusion over the state’s monopoly on the coercive use of 
violence, it can be itself considered an illegal or socially deviant behavior. Thus, citizens engaging in 
ECLE risk being subjected to legal and social sanctions.12 Not only can citizens be prosecuted and 
condemned to legal economic and corporeal sanctions (e.g. fines or jail), they may also be subject to 
social stigmatization and thus have to pay important reputational costs. 
 Thus, it is likely that conditions that directly affect the potential costs and benefits of ECLE 
(e.g. laws, social norms or criminal violence) can increase or decrease its prevalence. However, it is 
important to note that citizens do not stand to obtain these outcomes automatically, but they are 
contingent of other agents’ likelihood of intervention. Thus, I argue that citizens’ perceptions about 
these agents are likely to inform their willingness to engage in ECLE. More specifically, I argue that, 
when considering ECLE, citizens might evaluate the likelihood of their community and the 
authorities to intervene in response to crime. 
Trust in the Law Enforcement of the State and ECLE  
The stability of the modern state rests, in part, on the assumption that citizens will turn to 
state-sponsored institutionalized sources of law for support when they are victims of a crime. 
However, as in the case of ECLE, this is not always the case. Under what circumstances do people 
give up on the established state mechanisms of law enforcement? 
Since Hirschman’s (1978) important work on strategic political participation, scholars have 
noted that when there is discontent with the current state of affairs, citizens not only may participate 
with the established framework of the state but they can also exit and participate externally. Yashar 
(1999), for instance, notes that in the wake of the neoliberal reforms in Latin America, sectors that 
                                                     
12 These sanctions may vary depending on the nature of the vigilante actions, the legal context and the nature of public 
opinion about vigilantism.  
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have been left out of the reach of the state have cultivated a profound animosity and distrust 
towards the latter, and have sought alternative strategies of organization and political participation.  
Following this reasoning, it can be seen how citizens who feel left out of the reach of the 
state’s law enforcement institutions and therefore distrust its intentions and capacity, may be more 
willing (and perhaps even prone), when victimized by crime, to resort to their community for 
retribution, rather than to let the authorities address it. But to understand the mechanisms linking 
trust with law enforcement reliability it is important to elaborate on the concept and components of 
trust in law enforcement.  
In its most general sense, the concept of trust has been linked to a general estimation of 
certainty about a future outcome. Drawing from this line of thought, in the context of interpersonal 
relations trust has been defined as the implicit or explicit expectation that others will behave in a 
predictable way (Luhmann, 1979).  
However, further work on the concept of trust has proposed the idea that this phenomenon 
can also refer to the perception that the trustee has the best interests of the trustor at heart 
(Bradford & Jackson, 2010; Tyler, 2006). In this sense, confidence in the law enforcement apparatus 
of the state refers not only to the degree of certainty that citizens have in the way that it will act 
when demanded, but also about the citizens’ estimation of the degree to which the former has the 
best interest of the community at heart, and the perceived degree to which it shares their goals and 
priorities (J. Jackson & Bradford, 2010). 
In an analogous way to the classic conceptualization of support for the system (Booth & 
Seligson, 2009; Easton, 1975), in which a specific and a diffuse component have been hypothesized, 
Bradford and Jackson (2010) propose that trust in the police can be best understood as a concept 
that incorporates both an interpersonal and an institutional dimension. Interpersonal trust in the 
police refers to “the implicit or explicit belief of individuals that one’s own encounters with officers 
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will proceed predictably and according to their assumed role and function” (Bradford & Jackson, 
2010, p. 3). Institutional trust in the police refers to “the implicit or explicit belief that the police (as 
an institution) behaves effectively, fairly, and that it represents the interests and expresses the values 
of the community – whether locally or nationally” (Bradford & Jackson, 2010, p. 2). 
While interpersonal trust in the police has been regarded as dynamic, institutional trust in the 
police has been regarded as a relatively stable set of attitudes toward the police as an institution. 
Although the target of trust is of great importance for the understanding of ECLE, it is also crucial 
to understand the different dimensions underlying citizens’ evaluations of trust, for this, in turn, will 
help us to understand the different mechanisms linking trust and citizens’ willingness to give up their 
use of these institutions.  
It has been proposed that trust emerges from three main dimensions: the perception of 
effectiveness of both the system and the individual officers that compose it, the perception of 
fairness of the procedures that compose the system, and the perception that the values of the system 
and its individual officers are aligned with one’s own or those of one’s community (Bradford, 
Jackson, & Stanko, 2009; Jonathan Jackson & Bradford, 2009). Perceptions of effectiveness refer to 
citizens’ perception of technical competence of the different agents within the system of law 
enforcement. Perceptions of fairness refer to citizens’ perceptions of agent and system compliance 
with basic underlying ideas about rule of law. Finally, perceptions of value alignment refer to the 
degree to which the citizens perceive that the agents in the system share their values or are able to 
understand the needs of the community and place its interests above their own. 
Although a theoretical distinction between the different dimensions of trust in law 
enforcement is critical for advancing a comprehensive theory, it is important to point out that these 
dimensions are in no way orthogonal, and, empirically, many authors have found that these concepts 
sum up to a single underlying factor (Bradford et al., 2009; Jonathan Jackson & Bradford, 2009). 
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Thus, drawing from this literature and my earlier definition of trust, I consider the general concept 
of trust in state law enforcement as an individual’s expectation that state law enforcement agents and 
institutions will intervene with sufficient competence for the law to be enforced effectively, fairly, 
and in a way consistent with both their values and those of their community. 13 
Based on this conceptualization, it is possible to review some of the ways in which trust in 
law enforcement can impact the extent to which citizens are willing (or unwilling) to rely on law 
enforcement. The first indication that citizens’ distrust of law enforcement affects their likelihood of 
relying on police when victimized by crime comes from studies of security co-production. 
In the context of the United States, researchers focusing on procedural fairness have found 
that citizens who perceive that the procedures by which the police implement the law are just are 
more likely to cooperate individually and collectively to co-produce security (Hough, Jackson, 
Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002), even among strongly multicultural societies (Tyler, 2000). In fact, young adults and 
adolescents, populations that have generally represented a challenge for those who study the 
determinants of police cooperation, are more likely to collaborate with the police when they perceive 
them to engage in just procedures (Murphy & Gaylor, 2010; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009). Moreover, 
citizens who feel that the members of law enforcement share their moral values and principles (i.e., 
have high value congruence) have been observed to be more likely to display positive attitudes 
towards and greater cooperation and compliance with authorities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). 
In Latin America, for its part, evidence for the negative effect of police distrust on citizens’ 
cooperation with law enforcement has come mainly from policing reform scholars. Sabet (2014), for 
instance, notes that distrust in the police is a critical component of a vicious circle into which many 
                                                     
13 Note that this definition interprets a positive outcome as relating to the “fair and effective enforcement of the law” 
rather than simply as “a positive outcome for the subject,” as the latter can confound the term with expectations of 
favoritism, corruption, and even criminal collusion.  
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Latin American countries have fallen. The chronic ineffectiveness of law enforcement agencies, 
Sabet argues, has fostered a deep-rooted distrust among citizens. This, in turn, has hindered security 
co-production, and the reluctance of citizens to cooperate with the authorities has translated into 
further inefficiency, closing the vicious circle.  
Echoing Sabet’s argument, Arias and Ungar (2009) have noted that despite heavy 
investments in police reform in Latin America, the erosion of citizens’ trust in police continues, and 
this has made it difficult for these reform programs to rally the security co-production in which they 
desperately depend. As an example (which is also in line with my central argument), Ungar (2009) 
notes how, in some areas of Honduras, violence continued to rise even after the implementation of 
the Mano Amiga program. This was mainly due to the fact that some citizens invested the physical 
and social resources provided by the program in the creation of vigilante organizations that later 
engaged in extrajudicial violence.  
A second indicator of the connection between citizens’ distrust in law enforcement and their 
willingness to rely in the authorities can be found in citizens’ likelihood to report crime. After all, as 
Malone (2012b) notes, “reporting crime indicates that people accept, at least begrudgingly, the legal 
system and its authorities as the legitimate arbiters of justice."(2012b, p. 127).  
In the American context, for instance, Skogan (1994), Camerer et al. (1998), and other more 
recent authors (e.g. MacDonald, 2001; Schnebly, 2008) find that positive attitudes towards the police 
can be associated with an increased likelihood of citizens to report crime. Conaway and Lohr (1994), 
for example, find that repeated victimization is an important determinant of crime reporting only 
when victims experience positive outcomes from their interaction with law enforcement. Levitt 
(1998) finds that changes in the size of the police force are associated with changes in citizens’ trust 
that a crime will be solved, and this, in turn, is associated with citizens’ likelihood to report crime. 
Finally, in the three low-level-equilibrium Central American countries (Honduras, Guatemala and El 
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Salvador), Malone (2012b) finds that a perception that the judicial system is unlikely to punish 
criminals translates into a lower probability that citizens will report crime to the authorities.  
In sum, previous scholarship suggests that distrust in the authorities is linked to how likely 
citizens are to rely on them to prevent crime or find justice after being victimized by crime. 
Evidence from both the United States and Latin America suggests that citizens are more likely to 
cooperate with the authorities to engage in security co-production when they deem them as fair, 
efficient, and generally trustworthy. Moreover, previous research suggests that, after being victims of 
insecurity, citizens are less likely to report crime to the authorities when they have negative attitudes 
towards police, have had negative experience with police reporting, regard them as unlikely to 
punish crime, or see the criminal justice system as generally ineffective.  
All in all, distrust in law enforcement seems to set the stage for citizens to seek alternative 
ways of providing themselves with a sense of certainty and security. However, what conditions 
influence citizens’ willingness to turn to their community rather than to a state law enforcement 
agency?  
Social Capital and ECLE  
In this dissertation, I argue that, in contexts in which citizens distrust law enforcement their 
perception of the strength and availability of their own social capital might increase the probability 
that they will attempt to engage in ECLE. After all, as Malone (2012c) notes, “in order for the 
perceived failure of the justice system to translate into collective action, citizens would need to have 
some sense of solidarity with other members of their community and view citizen action as a viable 
means for achieving their goals” (p.117). 
 Since de Tocqueville’s (1863) analysis of the burgeoning American political system, many 
authors have been intrigued about the role that social capital plays in a democracy. I define social 
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capital as a latent capacity to trigger effective collective action indicated by the ‘‘connections among 
individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’’ 
(Putnam, 2000, p. 19). 
Although some scholars have proposed that social capital is inherently conducive to 
democratic (Putnam & Feldstein, 2004; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994) and economic 
development (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1996), others have noted that social capital can also have a 
dark side. Indeed, social capital has been linked to outsider exclusion (Waldinger, 1995), corruption 
(Graeff, 2007; Schweitzer, 2005; Treisman, 2000), and the emergence and growth of gangs and 
militias (Berman, 1997; Bourgois, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). Moreover, others have linked preexistent 
social capital to the emergence of radical, anti-state, and pro-authoritarian organizations both in 
developing and established democracies (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2013; Armony, 2004; 
Satyanath, Voigtlaender, & Voth, 2013).  
Thus, it seems that although social capital may foster collective action, it does not necessarily 
lead to state-centered political behavior. But can social capital lead to an increase in the prevalence 
of ECLE? I argue that when the relation between citizens and the state erodes significantly, and the 
former decide to engage in an “exit strategy” (see Hirschman, 1978), the community constitutes an 
alternative source to which citizens may turn in search for security. However, just as in the case of 
trust in law enforcement, to better understand the mechanisms by which social capital may influence 
the emergence of ECLE, it is important to unpack the different dimensions among which the 
indicators of social capital have been clustered.  
 Some authors, for example, have differentiated between the structural and cognitive social 
capital. While the structural dimension refers to the degree of connectedness of individuals within a 
community, the cognitive dimension refers to individuals’ norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Uphoff, 1999). Both dimensions may play a significant role in citizens’ 
17 
 
likelihood to join with their neighbors to confront criminals collectively when they perceive law 
enforcement to be untrustworthy. 
The structural dimension of social capital, generally represented by community 
organizations and social networks, facilitates the exchange of information and resources among 
citizens. Thus, when citizens face a problem, citizens with strong social networks are more likely to 
find a point of contact from which to engage in co-operative action to solve it (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). Therefore, it follows that, among citizens who are unlikely to rely 
on the judicial system, a wide and well-connected social network is likely to provide citizens with a 
point of entry from where they can begin to reach for help in confronting criminal victimization. As 
Woolcock (2001) once suggested, “one’s family, friends and associates constitute an important asset, 
one that can be called upon in a crisis” (p. 32). 
For its part, there are at least three theoretical reasons to think that the cognitive dimension 
of social capital (that is, the values and attitudes that encourage citizens to trust and cooperate with 
each other), under circumstances of low trust in the law, might increase the likelihood of engaging in 
ECLE. First, some authors have shown that interpersonal trust facilitates the resolution of collective 
action problems and allows communities to face problems through group behavior even in the 
absence of a clear individual benefit (Newton, 1997; Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994). In the case 
of the ECLE phenomenon, it is reasonable to expect that citizens who believe that their neighbors 
will reciprocate and enforce the law to their advantage will tend to be supportive of ECLE, and 
perhaps even more likely to put themselves at risk by engaging in this behavior. 
Second, cognitive social capital may also increase citizens’ positive attitudes toward ECLE 
through its effect on collective efficacy.14 Since unsuccessful attempts to engage in ECLE may result 
in significant economic, psychological, or even physical losses for the participants, in contexts in 
                                                     
14 Positive perception of “the performance capability of a social system as a whole” (Bandura 1997, p. 469). 
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which citizens distrust the effective intervention of the authorities, ECLE may become more likely 
as citizens consider themselves more likely to effectively substitute the action of the state.  
This is not the first time trust and efficacy have been hypothesized to interact as 
determinants of citizens’ political participation. Gamson (1968), for instance, argues that citizens’ 
trust in government interacts with their sense of efficacy to determine different patterns through 
which citizens attempt to influence government. While citizens who report higher levels in both 
variables are likely to attempt to incentivize government through institutionalized participation, 
Gamson argues that citizens who perceive themselves as efficacious but consider the government to 
be untrustworthy are likely to attempt to constraint government through political mobilization.15  
Although it is useful to understand democratic participation and anti-government 
mobilization, Gamson’s framework assumes citizens preserve enough confidence in (or patience 
with) the state to expect it to be responsive to their attempts at influencing it. However, there are 
number of circumstances in which citizens may be unwilling or unable to wait for the government to 
respond to their requests and may attempt to solve their needs directly. Thus, just as collective 
efficacy can influence the emergence of political mobilization, I argue that, when trust in 
government erodes significantly, this variable may also increase the probability that citizens will 
attempt to substitute for the services that the state fails to provide.  
Since higher levels of social trust have been linked to citizens’ perception of collective 
efficacy (Kim, Lee, Kim, Jeong, & Park, 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001) I hypothesize that 
this variable will be linked to the emergence of ECLE. Specifically, I argue that, among those who 
distrust law enforcement (i.e., those who would not resort to contacting the authorities after being 
                                                     
15 Seligson 1980 refines Gamson’s hypothesis slightly by predicting four types of citizens: alienated activists, alienated 
apathetics, allegiant activists, and alienated apathetics. Further, this author puts this theory to the test and finds some 
support for the idea that trust and efficacy influence institutionalized and mobilized participation among Costa Rican 
peasants. However, Seligson does not test whether efficacy influences non-institutionalized participation differently 
among trusting and distrusting respondents. Thus, a precise test of Gamson’s hypothesis has yet to be conducted.  
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victimized by crime), those citizens who have a higher level of trust in their neighbors may perceive 
the latter as a viable source of criminal justice. Therefore, they will be more likely to reach out to 
them in any attempt to engage in ECLE. 
Finally, coming back to social control theory, cognitive social capital may influence citizens’ 
willingness to engage in ECLE through its effect on the social distance between criminals and 
themselves. Citizens’ who have closer ties with their community may consider their neighbors to be 
more intimate, closer in the social hierarchy, and more culturally proximate, and they may also 
expect their neighbors to see them in the same way.  
Thus, holding the social position of the criminal constant, if victimized by crime citizens may 
expect their neighbors to perceive them as more socially distant from the criminal when inserted in a 
trustworthy community. To the extent that the social distance between the victim and the victimizer 
translates into a moral outrage that triggers in-group collaboration (Black, 1976; Senechal de la 
Roche, 1996), citizens may be more likely to expect to trigger collaboration from the community and 
attempt to engage in ECLE. 
Before moving forward, however, it is important to recognize that this argument assumes 
that the social position of the criminal is unlikely to be affected by varying levels of social capital. 
However, this assumption may not hold when citizens are interlinked by what Putnam (2000) calls 
bridging (social networks that bring together heterogeneous groups) rather than bonding (social 
networks bringing together heterogeneous groups) social capital. Particularly, when embedded in 
communities with high bridging social capital, citizens may expect others to be linked within a more 
diverse social network and therefore be more empathic to them but also, potentially, to those 
engaging in criminal activities. Consequently, as compared to that of bonding social capital, the 
effect of bridging social capital on social distance (and ultimately on ECLE) might be only minor.  
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Recapitulating, in the last ten years a number of countries in Latin America have seen a rise 
in scholarly and public interest in vigilantism. While early scholars argued that this phenomenon is 
an expression of culture, group conflict, or a form of social control, the more recent wave of 
vigilante actions across Latin America and the Caribbean has prompted scholars to start to consider 
this phenomenon as one way citizens have reacted to the high levels of insecurity in the region.  
In line with this view, I argue that, in contexts in which authorities are regarded as 
untrustworthy, ECLE can be understood as a community-based reaction to crime. On one hand, 
previous evidence suggests that citizens are less likely to collaborate with and turn to the authorities. 
On the other, it suggests that, under certain circumstances, social capital can translate in para- and 
anti-state political participation. Building on these two lines of research, I propose that, in situations 
of distrust in law enforcement, citizens’ perception of the strength and availability of social capital 
increases the probability that they will be willing to engage in Extralegal Collective Law 
Enforcement. 
Dissertation Structure  
In the following four chapters I present four different but related studies that have, at their 
core, the objective of putting the idea I am proposing to the test. In Chapter II, I turn to the case of 
Cherán, a town in western México where citizens confronted a band of illegal loggers who were 
cutting down the surrounding forests. This chapter is divided in two subsections. The first 
subsection seeks to understand the process by which Cherán’s self-defense movement emerged. To 
do so, I analyze semi-structured interviews with some of the key actors involved in the movement. I 
find that a sense of distrust in local authorities, the extent of community cohesion, and pre-existent 
social structures all played an important role in each of the stages of the self-defense movement 
organized by the citizens of Cherán.  
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The second subsection puts this insight to the test by comparing Cherán’s social capital 
before 2011 to that of a similar municipality in which no self-defense movement has emerged. To do 
this, I collected data on the community associations that existed in Cherán and the neighboring town 
of Nahuatzen before 2011. I found that, although both towns are demographically, culturally, and 
ethnically similar, Cherán had a higher number of community associations per capita than 
Nahuatzen before 2011. 
Although this research deepens our understanding of the mechanisms and forces behind this 
self-defense movement, being a rural and indigenous community, Cherán is a rather exceptional 
case. To what extent do the insights derived from Chapter II extend to our understanding of 
individuals’ political behavior more generally? To answer this question, it is necessary to look beyond 
the conditions faced by the citizens of Cherán and Nahuatzen. Specifically, it is necessary to 
compare citizens’ likelihood of participating in collective anti-crime organizations in a larger and 
more representative sample of the population.  
With this goal in mind, in Chapter III, I analyze individual-level data collected by México’s 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). I hypothesize that, if the evidence is consistent with my thesis, we should observe 
the effect of social capital on citizens’ likelihood to engage in collective anti-criminal action to be 
stronger among those who distrust in the police.  
This chapter is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, I jointly analyze data 
coming from INEGI’s National Insecurity Survey (ENSI-2010) and the National Survey of 
Victimization and Perceptions of Public Safety (ENVIPE-2011). I find that, as expected, citizens’ 
distrust in the police moderates the connection between citizens’ trust in their neighbors and their 
likelihood of engaging in collective anti-criminal action. In the second subsection I test my 
hypothesis in seventeen countries with a comparable rule of law across Latin America and the 
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Caribbean, using data from LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer extending from 2008 to 2014, and find 
results consistent with those of the first subsection.16  
Although these two subsections shed some light on the applicability of my framework to 
explain the emergence of collective anti-crime organizations, it is uncertain to what extent 
participation in such associations can be linked to participants’ disposition to turning to their 
neighbors as the ultimate source of justice when victimized by crime. To address this question I 
analyze the effect of these organizations on citizens’ willingness to seek assistance from their 
neighbors rather than the state as a source of justice. Once more, consistent with my hypothesis, I 
find that these organizations are more likely to be associated with citizens’ preference for neighbors 
as a source of justice among those who distrust the police more strongly.  
This chapter builds on Chapter II by bringing in support for the idea that my thesis can be 
generalized to the general political psychology of Latin Americans. However, this methodology is 
not without its flaws. First, although it allows us to control for a wide range of variables, it does not 
allow us to control for confounders that were not (or could not have been) measured by the surveys. 
Second, the tests of Chapter II cannot disentangle the simultaneous causation among the variables 
included in the study.17 To produce a test of hypothesis robust enough to account for both of these 
threats, I designed the two experiments presented in Chapters IV and V.  
In Chapter IV, I present the result of a laboratory-in-the-field experiment conducted among 
undergraduate students of the National Autonomous University of México (UNAM) during the 
aftermath of two hurricanes that hit the Mexican state of Guerrero. I created a fictitious article that 
described how an organized criminal organization had seized the aid sent to a small community 
severely affected by the storm. I slightly manipulated the original article to generate four versions 
                                                     
16 Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, 
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Belize. 
17 However, see Appendix VI (Chapter III) for a test robust enough to account for simultaneous causation.  
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that portrayed the citizens of the community and the police in a different light. Consistent with my 
expectations, I found that participants’ support for a collective vigilante action was more sensitive to 
a treatment of the community as trustworthy when they read an article that portrayed the police as 
unlikely to enforce the law.  
Because the design of Chapter IV assigns treatments through a random process, the findings 
of this chapter constitute strong evidence for the causal logic of my thesis. Nevertheless, it is very 
important to emphasize that attitudes are cheap while behavior is expensive. That is, even if citizens 
responded to the exercise carefully and honestly, it is difficult to know whether or not they would 
act in a manner consistent with their responses when exposed to the incentives (potential costs and 
benefits) present in real-world circumstances.  
To address this concern, in Chapter V I identify some of the most important costs and 
benefits associated with collective vigilante behavior as well as the agents on which such outcomes 
depend. Then, from this analysis, and building on previous literature, I create a behavioral 
experiment (referred to as the extralegal-confrontation experiment) in which citizens can display 
vigilante-like behavior while facing the prospect of winning or losing real money for their actions. I 
find that citizens are more likely to confront an agent stealing their income (thief) when: a) they have 
more neighbors likely to help them confront the thief (trustworthy neighbors); they see there is a 
lower probability that a law “enforcer” will intervene (untrustworthy police); and when the thief 
steals a higher proportion of their income (crime severity). Finally, in accordance with my thesis, I 
find that the trustworthiness of the police moderates the effect of trustworthy neighbors on the 
respondent. 
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II. THE CASE OF CHERÁN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Vigilante justice is not a new phenomenon. Early in the 20th century a number of 
communities in the outlaw-plagued territories of the United States independently enforced the law 
and attacked bands of criminals entering their territories (Allen, 2004). What is new is that in nations 
in Latin America, two centuries after their political independence and the establishment of the rule 
of law over their territories, vigilante justice has reemerged. This is not (yet) a region-wide 
phenomenon. However, a problem that had been limited to countries like Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador today has spread to Brazil and Argentina and, over the last five years, has put the 
Mexican government in check (Malkin & Villegas, 2014).18 
Despite the reemergence of vigilante justice, its analysis has been largely left to journalists. 
This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework that helps to explain some aspects of the 
most recent reemergence of this phenomenon and test its applicability to one of the most iconic 
self-defense movements in Mexico. Specifically, in this dissertation I argue that under circumstances 
in which they do not trust the intervention of law enforcement and when they have more preexisting 
social capital, citizens are more likely to take recourse to what I term Extralegal Collective Law 
Enforcement (ECLE) organizations. 
After briefly reviewing my theoretical argument, in this chapter I turn to the case of the town 
of Cherán (referred to throughout this chapter as “Cherán-T” to distinguish it from the municipality 
of Cherán). Cherán-T is a small town located in the western state of Michoacán, Mexico, in which 
citizens confronted a group of cartel-sponsored illegal loggers.19 This case is particularly interesting 
for three reasons. First, it is the case that inaugurated the most recent wave of anti-cartel vigilante 
organizations in Mexico. Second, it has consolidated its reputation as a case of extralegal collective 
                                                     
18 Funding for the study was provided by the Social Science Research Council and Vanderbilt University´s Center for 
Latin American Studies. 
19 As I will develop later, citizens in the town of Cherán, Michoacán, independently faced down illegal loggers who, 
supported by drug cartels, had decimated nearby forest lands.  
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law enforcement. And third, by having evolved into a movement for political autonomy, it 
represents a direct challenge to the Mexican political system at large.  
In my study of the case I proceed in two main steps. First, I investigate the role that distrust 
in the government and social cohesion had on citizens’ decision to confront the illegal loggers, 
organizing a self-defense movement and initiating an autonomous government in Cherán-T. I do so 
by analyzing the narratives portrayed in 31 in-depth-interviews I conducted with citizens and elites in 
the town. Second, I put the social capital explanation to the test by comparing Cherán-T to the 
neighboring town of Nahuatzen (Nahuatzen-T). The latter is a community located only 5km away, 
culturally and demographically similar to Cherán-T but different in that its citizens have not engaged 
in ECLE. Specifically, I observed and collected information of about 500 citizen-run organizations 
that existed in both communities before 2011, and I use these to compare the number of 
organizations per 1000 inhabitants in both towns. 
To foreshadow my results, I find evidence that, by the time citizens decided to confront the 
illegal loggers, Cherán’s municipal (Cherán-M) government was going through an institutionally-
induced crisis of legitimacy. Moreover, I find that in the midst of this crisis of distrust, citizens used 
their available social capital to: a) stop crime, b) organize the 2011 confrontation, c) organize the 
self-defense of the town, and d) build an autonomous government. Finally, when comparing 
Cherán-T’s social capital to that of Nahuatzen-T I find qualitative and quantitative evidence 
consistent with my argument. That is, to the extent that the number of social organizations in a 
town can serve as an indicator of social capital, I find Cherán to have had relatively high levels of 
social capital and cohesion prior to the date in which citizens confronted the illegal loggers 
devastating the surrounding forests.  
In the next section I contextualize and briefly review my general argument. Then, I 
introduce the case of Cherán and describe the general methodology followed in this chapter. Finally, 
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I show the results from my fieldwork in the area and conclude with a brief analysis of the 
implications and limitations of the study. 
The Origins of Vigilante Organizations  
Citizens’ attempts to confront crime directly have challenged a number of governments 
across the Americas and sparked the interests of scholars across the globe (Bangstad, 2005; Bateson, 
2013; Godoy, 2004; Haas, de Keijser, & Bruinsma, 2013; Owumi & Ajayi, 2013; Tadjoeddin & 
Murshed, 2007; Telle, 2009). Under what circumstances do citizens collectively confront crime? 
Researchers interested in the phenomenon have proposed a number of explanations. One 
set of scholars has seen vigilante movements as an expression of group conflict triggered by 
competition over resources (Bagozzi, 1977, 1977; Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940; 
Inverarity, 1976; Olzak, 1990; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007; Tyson, 2013; Wasserman, 1977). 
Although this argument finds some resonance in the emergence of conflict between communities in 
many areas of the world (including Mexico) it is less helpful to explain why citizens attack alleged 
criminals living in their own communities (Castillo-Claudett, 2000; Vilas, 2009).  
Another set of scholarship has proposed that vigilante violence emerges as an expression of 
a culture of honor and violence at odds with the central democratic state (Clarke, 1998; Wolfgang & 
Ferracuti, 1967). Although a number studies have found that lynching and vigilante groups are more 
prevalent in indigenous areas (Mendoza, 2006), the presumed mechanisms linking indigenous culture 
and violence (Vilas, 2009) has been severely challenged (Fernandez, 2004; Handy, 2004). 
 A third set of scholarship has proposed a direct relation between crime victimization and 
the emergence of extralegal anti-criminal action. Since Diamond (1999) and Bermeo (1997a) warned 
about the potential for a widespread sense of insecurity to trigger support for extralegal actions to 
attempt to cope with crime, other scholars have found that crime victimization and insecurity are 
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linked to support for vigilante justice and extralegal police action (Cruz, 2009 and Malone, 2012c). 
Although insecurity has undoubtedly served as a fuel for ECLE, this is not the whole story. Many 
citizens who have been victimized choose to cope with crime differently. Indeed, Malone argues that 
“when victimized by crime, citizens must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no 
one at all” (Malone, 2012b, p. 127). Thus, it is crucial to investigate the factors that influence the 
likelihood that citizens’ will resort to their community (rather than migrating or turning to other 
actors) as a source of security.  
I argue that, when citizens distrust law enforcement, their perception of the strength and 
availability of their social resources may increase the likelihood of ECLE to occur. The deterioration 
of citizens’ relation with the state can have profound consequences for political behavior. As 
Hirschman (1978) argued, when citizens are dissatisfied with the status quo they can seek change 
through exercising their voice within the political system or, when distrust in the state has taken 
root, they can withdraw from political participation entirely.  
Contexts of deep distrust in the authorities have been shown to have deleterious effects on 
citizens’ ability to co-produce security. Distrust in law enforcement has been associated with a 
reduction of crime reporting (MacDonald, 2001; Schnebly, 2008), lower levels of cooperation with 
the authorities to prevent crime (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and lower levels of 
cooperation in Community-Oriented Policing efforts (Arias & Ungar, 2009; Sabet, 2014). Thus, I 
argue that it is in these contexts where citizens are more likely to invest their social capital in 
extralegal collective law enforcement efforts.  
Social capital has been shown to make citizens more likely to participate in a group when 
individual benefit is unclear or far removed (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994), to increase citizens’ 
perception that their group will be collectively efficacious (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et 
al., 2001), and to provide citizens with a social network that facilitates the flow of information and 
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resources making collective problem solving easier (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). However, although 
this variable has been considered conducive to a better functioning democracy, there is nothing 
preventing social capital from translating into actions outside or against the democratic state.  
When doing so, citizens may redirect their efforts outside or against the democratic state, 
resulting in the emergence of criminal, anti-state, and even pro-authoritarian organizations 
(Acemoglu et al., 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath et al., 2013). In line with this view, I argue that, 
under conditions in which citizens distrust state authorities, citizens are more likely to invest their 
social capital into attempts at Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE). 
In line with this argument, other scholars have noted that, in low-level security equilibrium 
contexts, citizens are likely to consider strategic behavior in order to cope with crime (Bailey, 2014). 
Goldstein (2004, 2012), for instance, has argued that, rather than an expression of cultural identity, 
spectacular acts of ECLE violence emerge as a community’s attempt to broadcast cohesion and 
collective efficacy in a context of state marginalization.20 And, in line with this argument, Mendoza 
(2006) has found that, in Guatemala, the two factors most strongly related to the prevalence of 
lynching are “the solidarity among ethnic fellows within the indigenous communities, and the 
number of courts (per capita) in each municipality” (p.1). But how does this theoretical framework 
relate to citizens’ experience of forming vigilante movements? 
General Methods  
To investigate this question, I turn to Mexico, a country whose government is undergoing 
intense criticism after the emergence of a number of vigilante organizations in and around the state 
of Michoacán, and in which citizens’ support for these actions continues to increase (see Figure 2). 
                                                     
20 More generally Gamson (1968) and, later, Seligson (1980) argued that in contexts of low-level government trust, 
efficacy translates in non-institutionalized forms of political participation. I build on this framework to hypothesize this 
as one of the mechanisms through government trust moderates the effect of social capital on citizens’ choice to 
substitute the state’s law enforcement.  
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I examine one of Mexico’s most iconic cases, the vigilante movement of Cherán. This is a 
critical case to study not only because it inaugurated the most recent wave of anti-cartel vigilante 
violence in western Mexico, but also because it remains active four years after its emergence. To 
investigate the degree in which social capital and citizens’ attitudes played a role in the emergence of 
this movement I proceeded in two stages.  
In the first stage (during the autumn of 2013), I traveled to Cherán in order to interview 
some of the actors who participated in the movement. My objective during this stage was twofold: 
first, I aimed to go beyond existing journalistic accounts and uncover a more detailed narrative of 
the process by which the vigilante movement in Cherán emerged; second, I aimed to document 
citizens’ personal experiences of the days before and after the climactic uprising. In these narratives I 
analyze the processes by which social capital and distrust in the authorities established a fertile 
ground for a community-based self-defense movement against organized crime.  
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Figure 2. Support for Vigilantism in Mexico from 2004-2014 
 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2004-2014. The black line shows the linear trend in 
support for vigilantism. The values for the years in which the 
AmericasBarometer was not conducted (2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011) are OLS 
estimates from the available data. 
  
In the second stage (conducted during the spring of 2015), I evaluated the relative strength 
of Cherán’s social capital with the objective of testing the validity of my framework. With this in 
mind, I searched for a community that was culturally, economically, socially, and ethnically similar to 
Cherán and which suffered from similar insecurity problems but in which a vigilante movement had 
not emerged. Ultimately I traveled to the region once more with the goal of comparing the social 
capital of the residents of Cherán with that of their neighbors in the town of Nahuatzen.  
The following section is divided in three main subsections. In the first subsection I quickly 
introduce the town of Cherán, paying attention to some of the characteristics related to the 
emergence of the movement. Then, in the second subsection, I present a timeline of the emergence 
of Cherán’s vigilante movement based on my interviews with the citizens of the town. Contrary to 
previous accounts I identify at least three stages in which citizens decided to engage in Extralegal 
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Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE).21 In the third and final subsection, I present evidence coming 
from my interviews with citizens and elites in Cherán. I find that the movement was less 
spontaneous than previously believed and that social capital and distrust in the government played 
an important role in each of the stages of Cherán vigilante movement. 
Section 1: The Case of Cherán  
The Municipality of Cherán (Cherán-M)22 (221.88 square kilometers) is located in the 
western Mexican state of Michoacán. Specifically, the municipality sits in the heights of the 
Purepechan Plateau, located on the western side of the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt.23 The section 
of the Plateau in which Cherán-M is located sits between 2200 and 3000 meters (6,500-10,000 feet) 
above sea level. The capital of the municipality, the town of Cherán, is surrounded by nine 
mountains and hills24 in which citizens can see the condition of the surrounding pine-oak forests.25 
As I explain below, these forests sit at the center of the problem from which Cherán vigilante 
movement evolved.26  
  
                                                     
21 By ECLE I refer to collective efforts to sanction a legally sanctioned norm without collaborating with the state 
authorities. 
22 Whenever referring to the municipality of Cherán as a whole I use Cherán-M. 
23 More specifically, the municipality is located in the 10th neo-volcanic axis’ physiographic province and the 58th neo-
volcanic Tarascan physiological sub-province (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía. “Michoacán de 
Ocampo. Mapa de Fisiografía”). 
24 El Borrego, Kukundikata, San Marcos, San Miguel, Juanyani, El Tecolote, La Virgen and El Pilón. 
25 Rzedowski, J. 1978. Vegetación de México. Editorial Limusa. México, D.F., México. 
26 Some of the testimonies from the interviewees suggest that the geographical distribution of the hills around the town 
played an important role in the pre-movement outrage in the town. This is because it was easy to see the devastation 
undertaken by the organized loggers. I leave an in-depth exploration of the geographical determinants of the Cherán 
movement to future research.  
32 
 
 
Figure 3. Geographical Localization of Cherán 
 
 
 
Source: INEGI 
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Although there are no sizable rivers, the municipality has some minor creeks and springs 
where ranchers water their cattle. This is important insofar as they have, for a long time, represented 
the town’s only access to water. Cherán-M borders the municipalities of Zacapu, Nahuatzen, 
Paracho, and Chilchota. Of these, the majority of trade and communication takes place with 
Nahuatzen and Paracho. Although its relationship with the surrounding municipalities is generally 
friendly, conflicts over land occasionally ensue in the region. Within the municipality, there are three 
main urban centers, the town of Cherán, El Cerecito, and Tanaco; however, the majority of the 
inhabitants of the municipality live in the town of Cherán, which is the capital of the municipality 
and sits at the crossroads of highways coming from Uruapan (to the south), Patzcuaro (to the east), 
and Zamora (north-west), three of the most important cities in the state.  
Demographically, Cherán is quite similar to other towns in the region. According to the 2010 
census the town Cherán has about 14,328 inhabitants of whom about 51% are women. However, 
since the early 1980s it has been difficult to estimate the real population and gender ratio in the 
municipality since an important number of the inhabitants, particularly men, frequently migrate to 
other parts of the country and the United States (specifically North Carolina, Missouri, and 
California). Additionally, this is a community strongly influenced by its indigenous roots; according 
to the latest census, about 23.76% of the households in Cherán-M have a head of household who 
speaks the Purepechan language (INEGI 2010), yet most of those who speak an indigenous 
language are bilingual in Spanish. 
Historically, timber resources have played a central role in the municipality. Although 
Michoacán is the most important agricultural state in Mexico, traditionally the main economic 
activities in Cherán have been the exploitation of timber for the construction and trade of handmade 
furniture, the gathering of non-timber resources for trading, and small-scale agriculture for self-
consumption.  
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However, since the 1980s the economic landscape of the municipality has changed 
significantly. Reforms to the Mexican economic system have created a growing class of merchants 
who sell goods coming from other parts of Mexico (or the United States) to local markets. 
Additionally, for at least two decades a significant number of citizens (mostly male) have migrated to 
the United States. Thus, an important number of families in Cherán-M (about 8.9% of households27) 
receive economic remittances from their family in the United States.  
For its part, the political history of the town is marked by two political figures. On the one 
hand the 1920s Purepechan general Casimiro Leco, on the other, the ex-president Lázaro Cárdenas 
del Rio. While the former became famous for his defense of the area against the incursions of 
bandits in the early 1900s, the latter is famous for his social and economic policies attempting to 
generate modernization and social justice.  
 More recently, Cherán’s political history echoes the experiences of many communities in 
the region. From the end of the revolution until 1988, the town remained under control of the 
ubiquitous Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). However, the public of Michoacán has a positive 
attachment to the Cárdenas family, owing largely to the creation of the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD) by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (son of Lázaro Cárdenas) in an attempt to bring down 
the PRI in 1988. Ever since then, politics in Cherán have been dominated by the PRD. As I will 
discuss in later sections, understanding this political history is critical, since it was not until an 
internal dispute within the PRD ensued in 2008 that the PRI could regain control over the 
government of Cherán.  
Both the PRI and the PRD had promised to end illegal logging in the municipalities of the 
region; however, neither party met with much success before 2008. For many years, individuals from 
Cherán-M and the surrounding municipalities had illegally cut trees from the surrounding forests to 
                                                     
27 See figure 4. 
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sell wooden boards and pillars, as well as for the production of handcrafted furniture and toys. 
However, according to my interviewees, it was from 2008 (the year in which the PRI returned to 
power) onward that armed bands of illegal loggers who sold the wood wholesale intensified the 
devastation of the surrounding forest.  
At first, the illegal loggers started to open up small roads into the northeastern side of the 
San Miguel Mountain (north of the town). Then they started to move to the northwest side of this 
mountain and spread to the nearby twin volcanos known as Los Cuates. Finally, from the fall of 
2009 to late March of 2010 the loggers moved to the La Virgen Mountain.  
According to estimates by the citizens of the town, by the end of March 2010, the loggers 
were bringing down about 600 tons of green wood every day (about 200 trips using 3-ton trucks). 
Moreover, they were starting to cut down trees around the Cofradía water spring, which has 
symbolic importance due to its role as a stopping point at which citizens can rest and ranchers can 
water their cattle.28  
Methods 
During this research stage (late 2013-late 2014), I traveled to and stayed in Cherán in order 
to conduct interviews with citizens who participated in the town’s vigilante movement. My goal in 
these interviews was twofold. The first goal was to go beyond existing journalistic accounts to 
uncover a more detailed account of the 2011 vigilante movement. Second, I aimed to document 
citizens’ personal experiences in the days before and after the town’s climactic uprising to be able to 
                                                     
28 My informants in Cherán identified two main sites in which the illegal wood that was cut in the area was taken for it to 
be laundered and inserted into the legal market: the towns of Tanaco and Capacuaro. These two centers of laundering 
informed the routes taken by the loggers in and out of the mountains of the municipality of Cherán. At first, the loggers 
entered through the north side of the municipality and exited through the roads towards Tanaco. However, as they 
moved towards the west, during the second half of 2009, the loggers were forced to move through Cherán in order to 
reach the lumber mills of Tanaco and Capacuaro.   
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analyze later the role that social capital and citizens’ distrust in the authorities could have had in the 
emergence of this movement. 
 In order to select those who I would interview, I followed a snowball sampling procedure. 
Starting with my initial contact in the town, I asked each of my interviewees to introduce me to a 
fellow citizen who: a) they considered had played a critical role in the organization, development, or 
evolution of the 2011 movement or b) they regarded as having a privileged position for 
understanding the origins of the uprising. I assured all informants that I would keep their identity 
confidential with regard to these referrals. Whenever a participant did not introduce me to the next 
interviewee directly I kept the recommender’s identity confidential.  
Each in-depth-interview consisted of four stages, an introductory stage, an open interview 
stage, a semi-structured stage, and a final stage. During the introductory stage I introduced myself 
and the research project. Then, I secured written and verbal informed consent from the 
interviewees. I reassured the participants that all information would be used for academic purposes 
only, that no identifying information would be made public, and that all names mentioned would be 
changed using a random name generator. Finally, I asked participants if, under the terms described, 
they would allow me to record the audio of the interviews.29  
During the second stage I asked participants an open question and let them elaborate on it as 
much as they saw fit: “Please try to recall what where you personally doing the morning of Friday 
April 15, 2011 and, from there, please tell me what happened in the town that day.” I took this 
approach in order to avoid citizens’ attachment to the standard narrative of the events. Thus, I let 
participants develop their own thoughts and narratives during this stage without any intervention on 
my part. Whenever I intervened I only did it to encourage the participants to tell me more about 
their experiences.  
                                                     
29 For their own protection, I asked participants not to state their names or provide other identifying information. In the 
following sections, I avoid mentioning any information by which the participants could be identified. 
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The third stage of the interviews was semi-structured. I asked participants to talk about their 
contribution to the movement as well as their perception of the causes of the uprising. Again, I let 
participants talk as much as they wanted in response to these two questions and only intervened to 
encourage them to provide me with more information. In the final part of this section I included a 
battery of questions designed to recover information about citizens’ perception of the illegal logging 
problem and their evaluation of the police and government in power between 2008 and 2012. 
However, only rarely did I have to inquire to subjects about these topics.  
In the fourth and final stage of the interview I simply asked participants whether they had 
any information to add. As described before, after stopping the recording I asked participants 
whether they could recommend other citizens I could interview who they considered a) had played a 
critical role in the organization, development or evolution of the 2011 movement or b) were in a 
privileged position for understanding the origins of the uprising. Finally, participants were thanked 
for their participation and reassured once more that the information they provided would only be 
used confidentially. 
All and all I recorded 31 interviews with key citizens in the town. My interviewees occupied 
important positions in the organization and development of the movement and included: ten school 
teachers (32.26% of the sample), three members of the clergy (9.68%), four students or academics 
(13%), two former members of the armed forces (6.45%), four farmers (13%), six housewives 
(19.3%), and two merchants (6.45%). Moreover, of the citizens with whom I recorded an interview 
13% were political party operatives or activists before the movement, and, at the time of the writing 
of this chapter, 48.39% (15) occupy an administrative role within the structure of Cherán’s 
autonomous government. Finally, of the total sample twelve interviewees were female (38.7%) and 
the rest were male (61.29%).  
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I recorded each of the interviews using a Livescribe-Echo recording device. This hardware 
allowed me to insert time marks within the audio files in order to facilitate later access to the 
relevant information within the recordings. I then analyzed the information collected in these 
interviews in two different ways.  
First, building from extant academic and journalistic research, I recreated a timeline of the 
events of April 15, 2011. I differentiate between three distinct vigilante actions (stages) occurring 
within the larger movement: the confrontation, self-defense actions, and self-government. Second, 
using this distinction, I look at citizens’ accounts of the events to describe the role that citizens’ 
social capital and distrust in the authorities could have played in each of the stages of Cherán’s 
vigilante movement.  
Before moving to these two sub-sections it is important to note that, in the following 
subdivisions of this chapter, I make some references to the interviews described above. To follow 
through with the confidentiality agreement consented at the beginning of the interviews, and due to 
the sensitive nature of the information, in the following sections I have censored all the 
demographic characteristics of the subjects interviewed.  
Further, whenever I included names to make the narrative clearer, I substituted the original 
name with a random name obtained from the webpage www.fakenamegenerator.com. In order to 
avoid accidental coincidences, I used a pool of American names. Thus, any concurrence with names 
of actual citizens from Nahuatzen or Cherán is merely accidental.30 
                                                     
30 While doing my best to preserve the meaning of interviewees’ responses, sometimes it was necessary for me to change 
or insert text into the quotes. This was done only to make the quote clearer or to protect the identity of the interviewee. 
All additions or changes are indicated by brackets [ ]. 
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Results 1: A Vigilante Movement in Three Acts 
As described in the previous section, Cherán’s citizens had faced the incursion of illegal 
loggers into their territory for quite some time, and things remained this way until April 15, 2011 
when citizens of Cherán, armed with sticks and stones, confronted the illegal loggers. In order to 
recover a more detailed timeline in each of my interviews with citizens and elites of Cherán I asked 
them to recall, in addition to the official story, their own experiences in the days before and after the 
uprising. With these interviews I built a new timeline that distinguishes between the three stages: the 
initial confrontation stage, the self-defense stage, and the self-government stage. In each of 
these stages citizens of Cherán had to make a choice: to allow the state to intervene or to take 
matters into their own hands. In the next section I describe each of these stages. Then, I review how 
community organizations and distrust in the authorities played a role in the emergence of each of 
them.  
Stage One: Confrontation  
The first stage of the movement started on April 15, 2011, at about 5:00am when a group of 
15 men and women gathered in front of the Calvary Church with the objective of confronting illegal 
loggers who had crossed through the town. After twenty minutes one of the young members of the 
group started to ring the bell of the church. By 7:00 am, approximately 75 citizens had gathered at 
the church, hoping to learn more information.  
At 7:30 am a group of about 100 citizens intercepted a truck that attempted to cross the city 
filled with wood. The loggers attempted to escape, but the citizens had set up roadblocks in the 
surrounding streets, trapping the alleged criminals. After a brief confrontation (henceforth the 
uprising), the citizens were able to overpower five unarmed loggers. They took them out of their 
vehicles, tied them up, beat them, and interrogated them for about ninety minutes.   
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Figure 4. Timeline of the Uprising of Cherán 
 
2011 April 15th ≈5am Initial Meeting at the Calvary Church 
  ≈7am Confrontation 
  ≈9:00 am Mercenary/Police Attack 
  ≈10:00 am Call to the Military Bases 
  ≈1:00 Attack to the Municipal Government 
    
 April 16th   Fogatas and Barricades emerge 
 April 17th   Negotiations to free hostages start 
 April 29th   Large protest in The City of Morelia 
 June-September  Process of Registration of Candidates 
 November 2nd   Supreme Court ruling on Cherán’s right to 
self determination 
 November 13th   State Elections (Cancelled in Cherán) 
 
December 18th  
 Electoral Institute of Michoacán conducts 
referendum in Cherán   
(Political Parties vs Traditional Elections) 
    
2012 January 21st   Official Election by Indigenous Traditions 
 
At about 9:00 am a group of men armed with semiautomatic weapons (referred to as sicarios 
[paid mercenaries, hired-killers, assassins]) tried to rescue the loggers detained at the Calvary Church. 
While some of the citizens started to throw dust into the air to hinder the loggers’ visibility, others 
threw rocks at them. One logger was injured during this confrontation forcing the remaining sicarios 
to flee. 
After these events, citizens started to fear the possibility that the sicarios would return once 
more to attempt to rescue the captured loggers. They were afraid that this time the sicarios would 
realize that the people of Cherán were relatively defenseless and would commit a massacre in the 
town. In the face of this threat, some of the citizens who were involved in the initial rescue attempt 
decided to telephone the military bases in the neighboring cities of Zamora and Morelia to ask for 
the intervention of the army (at about 10:00 am). However, according to one of the citizens who 
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tried to reach the army, military personnel asked them to send a formal letter of request signed by 
the mayor so they could process their request. Dismayed by this response, citizens asked the town 
priest to persuade the mayor to send the police to the Calvary Church in order to protect those in 
the vicinity. According to one of my sources, after calling the municipal government, the priest told 
them that the mayor had been threatened by the organized crime and would not intervene in the 
issue. 
Stage Two: Self Defense  
The self-defense movement began at this point. After hearing that no government law 
enforcement agencies would intervene immediately, citizens began to take actions to prevent the 
loggers’ potential retaliation. 
On the one hand, some of the younger citizens gathered around the Calvary Church came 
down (around 3:00pm of that day) to attack the House of Culture,31 with the objective of arming 
themselves. After a brief skirmish between the mob and the local police, the citizens were successful 
in seizing guns, bullets, and vehicles from the municipal police. After these events, the armed 
citizens returned to Calvary Church, where they stayed to guard the detained loggers. Hundreds of 
citizens remained near the church until late at night; however, because the night continued in relative 
calm, most of the citizens decided that it was best to return to their homes. 
Although the majority of the citizens stayed in their homes in the following days, many were 
still scared of the possibility of armed retaliation from the illegal loggers. In anticipation of an attack, 
citizens set up roadblocks in every corner of the town in the event the loggers were bold enough to 
return to the community. 
                                                     
31 The location of the municipal government at the time. 
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During the daytime, some of the neighbors would guard the small roadblocks, but at night, 
neighbors would bring out food to spend some time in community. During the first night, these 
improvised campfires served no other purpose than providing shelter to those waiting for potential 
retaliation from the loggers; however, over time, these basic self-defense units (known as fogatas) 
became the basic unit of social and political organization in Cherán. 
The fogatas played three critical roles in and after the secondary self-defense movement. First, 
they served as a strategic center for the diffusion of aid and information. Citizens of Cherán would 
naturally come to the fogata to learn about the most recent developments in the conflict. It is true 
that, sometimes, the information transmitted in these centers was composed of rumor and 
speculation. However, it is also true that those in charge of negotiating with the government used 
these structures as a tool to inform citizens about the progress being made in those exchanges. 
Further, whenever other communities sent aid to Cherán, the fogatas provided those receiving the aid 
with the opportunity to spread it around the community efficiently. 
Second, the fogatas served as a center of political participation. In addition to allowing for a 
relatively efficient dissemination of aid and information, the fogatas became important centers of 
political participation. There were a number of decisions that needed to be discussed and voted on 
by the community; however, conducting a large assembly every time that there was a relevant 
development in the case was impractical and too demanding. Thus, every fogata was encouraged to 
elect a representative in charge of interacting with the movement’s leadership. These representatives 
were not only in charge of bringing the opinion of their fogata to the leadership of the movement 
(often in large assemblies); it was also their job to bring topics of discussion back to their fogata. 
Additionally, it was in the fogatas where citizens were recruited to serve in the new social and 
political structures emerging during and after the secondary self-defense movement. In the first and 
second week after April 15, leaders of the movement supported the creation of a “council of honor 
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and justice.” This council went to the fogatas in order to recruit volunteers to form an independent 
communitarian police. 
Finally, the fogatas served to promote social bonding and participation in a number of 
different ways. On the one side, they created a bridge between citizens who would not have the 
opportunity to interact otherwise. Although most people in Cherán know their neighbors, there is 
no guarantee that they share interests or worldviews. Thus, by providing a framework in which to 
participate together, fogatas allowed citizens to converse with individuals with whom they would not 
interact otherwise. Additionally, the external threat represented by the loggers and the fogatas that 
resulted from it, provided citizens with a framework through which they could resolve conflicts. 
Before April 15, some neighbors did not interact due to mutual resentments, indebtedness, or 
general animosity toward each other. However, by being forced to interact under the threat of 
retaliation, many citizens had no choice but to talk through their problems and strengthen their 
relationships. Finally, the fogatas provided a structure through which the actions of pre-existing 
community organizations could be channeled. 
Stage Three: Achieving Community-Led Long-Term Security  
During the first week of the movement citizens and fogata representatives held assemblies in 
the Calvary Church to discuss the future of the detainees and the security of the town. However, 
these assemblies were so large that it was necessary to create a Coordination Council. This council 
was composed of three representatives from each of the neighborhoods in the town and had as its 
central objective the delineation of a plan for achieving security, justice, and the preservation of the 
forest. 
At first, the strategy focused on pressuring the state and federal government to the point that 
they had to acquiesce to the citizens’ demands. The first time the council attempted to pressure the 
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government was during the negotiations for the liberation of the six illegal loggers detained on April 
15. Citizens of Cherán expected that, in exchange for releasing the detained loggers, the state would 
set up military checkpoints around the town to defend the citizens of the community and the 
surrounding forests. However, these negotiations took an unexpected turn when the council learned 
that the neighboring community from which some of the detainees came from (Capacuaro) had 
kidnaped some of Cherán’s own citizens. Thus, instead of centering on Cherán’s demands, the 
negotiations focused on the terms and conditions for the exchange of prisoners between the two 
communities.32  
The second way in which the council attempted to pressure the government consisted of 
employing two strategies simultaneously. The first strategy was to reach out to the media and set up 
signs along the roadblocks located at the entrances to the town. The second strategy involved 
traveling to the capital (Morelia) to ask for a meeting with the state government. Although some 
representatives met with Cherán’s Coordination Council, these actions had little effect on the 
situation. It was not until thousands of citizens, movement sympathizers, traveled to Morelia in 
order to demonstrate in front of the offices of the state government that the governor finally met 
with the council. As a result, the citizens of Cherán finally received reassurances that the army would 
take up the responsibility of patrolling the forests around the municipality.  
However, only days after this meeting, an event set in motion the third self-defense 
movement. On July 2 the Federal Electoral Institute announced the solicitation for national and 
local elections. Within Cherán’s Coordination Council this prompted the question of whether to 
trust the government’s commitment to holding local elections and securing a return to relative 
normalcy. The prevailing sentiment within the council was that the political parties served no other 
purpose than dividing the community; thus, in order to secure peace within the town it was 
                                                     
32 In the end, Cherán accepted terms in which they would release the illegal loggers they had captured in exchange for 
the liberation of the citizens of Cherán that had been kidnapped by some citizens of the community of Capacuaro.  
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necessary to prevent the elections from taking place. From July until the end of August, the council 
and its lawyers attempted to prevent elections in the community, but were unsuccessful. However, 
the pressure was so constant that in September of that year the state government broadened the 
constitution to allow citizens of Cherán to transition towards a political model in which the council 
would have a voice in the new municipal government.33  
This decision prompted the council to consider the choice of settling for a position in a new 
municipal government or demanding a government characterized by indigenous traditions (i.e., a 
uses and customs government) completely changing the political institutions of Cherán. In the end 
the council decided to seek a government of uses and customs and held traditional elections (by 
public vote in an assembly) the last week of October 2011 (Caraballo, 2012). Although the new uses 
and customs government began working right after this election, the legal battle for this new type of 
government was drawn out for months. After a short battle in court, the State Electoral Institute 
was finally ordered to conduct a referendum to ask citizens whether they wanted to change their 
style of government. In November 2011, the election took place with an overwhelming victory for 
the uses and customs government (Magaña, 2011). Finally, after a Supreme Court ruling in favor of 
Cherán’s citizens’ right to elect their own leaders through indigenous traditional elections, in January 
2012, the State Electoral Institute repeated the elections and recognized the new set of leaders 
(Magaña, 2012).  
But how did citizens’ social capital and distrust in their government influence their decision to 
take the law into their own hands? In the next section I answer this question by examining some of 
the events leading up to the movement as well as the accounts of some of its key participants. 
                                                     
33 Initially, it was suggested that the council function as the cabildo. The cabildo currently is a local set of elected officials in 
charge of co-administering the executive branch with the mayor as a sort of municipal-level legislature. Yet, since 
citizens decided to pursue the full establishment of a government of uses and customs, what the precise nature of the 
council should be was never determined.  
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Results 2: A Strong Community in a Legitimacy Crisis  
Distrust in The Government and Cherán’s Movement  
A superficial exploration of Cherán shows a general retrospective sentiment of contempt for 
the government that led the town before the events of 2011. However, it is unclear whether these 
are post-hoc evaluations or if they reflect a real state of crisis before 2011. Thus, it is important to 
investigate the political environment before the conflict. As I will discuss later, I find that right 
before the movement emerged the municipal government crossed into a deep legitimacy crisis. 
Further, I argue that this erosion of legitimacy can be traced back to the very structure of the 
Mexican electoral system and thus has the potential to spread horizontally (to other municipalities) 
and vertically (at the state and national level) throughout the Mexican political system.  
Primary Stage  
To recall, for eighteen years, the municipality of Cherán-M had been governed by the leftist 
PRD (1990-2008), and during that time, it had incorporated the town’s customs into its primaries. 
The PRD would select three candidates from each neighborhood and then hold primaries between 
the twelve selected candidates. The winner was nominated for mayor, the runner-up was to be 
nominated for síndico, and the rest were nominated for regidor.34  
Although not everyone was satisfied, this strategy was relatively effective in achieving 
symbolic representation in the town of Cherán. However, in other cities within the municipality 
(e.g., Tanaco and Casimiro Leco) the story was different. Since the PRD’s primary election offered 
little representation to those living outside of the four traditional neighborhoods within the town of 
Cherán, citizens outside Cherán tended to support the PRD’s closest opposition, the PRI. Yet, for 
                                                     
34 The síndico is the equivalent of the local attorney general. This office’s functions include representing the municipality 
legally and settling land conflict between landowners. The regidores within the municipality are local legislators in charge 
of creating municipal level regulation.  
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eighteen years the PRD was able to secure control of the municipality by a large margin (between 50 
and 60% of the votes).  
In 2008 politics took an unexpected turn. After a very close primary, the runner-up did not 
accept the winner’s victory and decided to accept an alternative candidacy via a new party trying to 
break into Michoacán’s political landscape, the Party of Social-Democratic Alliance (PAS). Thus, in 
the 2008 municipal elections the PRD’s primary winner not only competed against the PRI but also 
against an unusually popular candidate from PAS.  
As Figures 5a-5c show, this caused PRD voters to split between those supporting the 
primary winner (Faction 1[PRD]) and those in favor of the runner-up (Faction 2[PAS]). Although 
PAS was able to secure 35% of the votes inside the town of Cherán, and the PRD was able to rally 
as much as 31% of the voters within the community (see Figure 5a), they were not able to win the 
municipality as a whole (see Figure 5b) due to the fact that the PRI was able to secure 62% of votes 
from the citizens living outside the capital of the municipality (see Figure 5c).  
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Figures 5a.-5c. Municipal Elections in the Municipality of Cherán (Cherán-M)  
Figure 5a. Inside the Town of Cherán 
 
Figure 5b. Total Results in Cherán-M 
 
Figure 5c. Outside of the Town of Cherán 
 
Source: Michoacán Electoral Institute (iem.org.mx) 
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In sum, 66.31% of the voters in the town of Cherán turned out to vote for one of two leading 
factions within the PRD, however, the least popular party, the PRI, won the municipal government, 
which, according to their perspective, occurred thanks to the votes of people outside of the 
community. These events, I argue, triggered a crisis of legitimacy that eroded citizens’ trust in the 
town authorities in particular and the political system more generally.  
First, the closeness of the elections caused the political elites to put the winner of the 
election and its government into question. Not only did the PRD sympathizers not acknowledge the 
PRI’s victory but they occupied the Town Hall and held daily rallies around it to proclaim the 
municipal government’s illegitimacy and ask for its recall. The anti-government movement was so 
strong within the municipal capital that the new PRI government had to move its offices to the 
House of Culture (far from the center of the town).35 One of my interviewees explained: 
[After the PRI won the election] we wanted [the local government to be 
impeached].36 We occupied the town hall and kicked the mayor out of there. He 
rented a house and ultimately went to the House of Culture; he never really 
governed. The occupation lasted two years [...] but we couldn’t achieve anything 
because the PRI is one of those parties that have always played dirty. 
 
Second, the distribution of votes generated a sentiment of suspicion about the new 
government. Not only had this government not come from a customary primary, but it was also a 
different party than the one preferred by the vast majority of the citizens in the municipal capital. 
What is more, the government was elected into office due to votes coming from other communities 
that might have very different interests and priorities.  
In sum, the electoral rules of the PRD municipal primaries (simple majority winner-takes-all 
with no runoff) allowed a candidate to win without majority consent. At the same time, the 
                                                     
35 The House of Culture is a governmental institution designed to promote artistic activities in the town. In Cherán, the 
House of Culture is located near the southwestern entrance to the town. 
36 The interviewee actually said “we wanted desaparición de poderes”. This refers to a procedure by which, in Mexico, a 
higher level of government removes lower-level elected officials from power. Often this occurs due to social unrest, 
violence, corruption, scandals, or political instability. This happened in the state of Michoacán circa 2013, and that is 
probably why the interviewee chose these words.   
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proportional representation system at the national level (responsible for the emergence of minority 
parties searching for local strongholds) provided the losing sector with incentives to reject the results 
and seek an alternative nomination. These two factors combined caused the dominant PRD to 
fractionalize and enter an election with three parties with similar levels of support. The electoral 
rules of the municipal election, in turn, allowed the PRI (the party that otherwise would have been 
the least likely to win) to win without sufficient consent and, ultimately, drove the town into a 
legitimacy crisis.  
This crisis, evident in an environment of political dissatisfaction and elite contention, eroded 
citizens’ trust in the government and its institutions. Not only did citizens become increasingly 
suspicious of the PRI government, they also became more and more distrustful of police agents’ 
actions and intentions. Since I argue that an environment of high distrust in authorities set the stage 
for the emergence of Cherán’s vigilante movement, it is important to trace how this legitimacy crisis 
eroded citizens’ confidence in the government’s willingness to intervene to stop organized criminals’ 
incursions into Cherán-M’s territory.  
First of all, citizens perceived the PRI government to be corrupt and the police to be 
populated by overbearing officers from communities outside of Cherán. For example, when I asked 
a citizen about the quality of the police during the 2008-2011 PRI government he responded: 
The policemen were always overbearing. They always thought that because they 
were police they could do whatever they wanted... There were five or six people 
who were killed or died in jail… there was also a young man who was taken by the 
patrol after a party and then appeared dead in a soccer field.  
 
And another interviewee said,  
When we were evaluating what to do, we thought the municipal police cannot be 
police anymore. They proved that [they were involved with the criminals]. Most of 
them came from outside the community, and many of them were already involved in 
crime. 
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Secondly, some citizens perceived the increase in illegal logging to be directly related to the 
PRI’s commitment to the surrounding communities’ interests in logging the forests. One of the 
people I interviewed recalled, 
In his campaign, [the 2008 PRI candidate (who later became mayor)] ... went [to the 
communities where most of the loggers lived] and offered them the forests. He said, 
“If you support me I offer you [...] the forests for you to exploit,” and starting from 
2008, more open exploitation of the forests started. 
Thirdly, citizens believed the authorities to be unprepared, impotent and thus incapable of 
standing up to the loggers. One of my interviewees said, 
Even when it became very evident that the loggers were bringing a lot of wood 
down, [the government] never did anything to stop them. It’s like they didn’t even 
care. That’s why people said the president gave away that mountain over there 
(signaling to one of the surrounding mountains). 
 
Some of the citizens in Cherán even believe that the police were responsible for a significant 
part of the crime occurring in the area. One of the citizens I was able to interview said, “It 
was...municipal policemen who were doing all the disappearances. [They were] extorting merchants, 
threatening citizens and [more]. That is why we were asking for security! For a trustworthy security!”  
In addition to the legitimacy crisis caused by the way the PRI won the elections, between 
2008 and 2011 there were a number of political assassinations that further deteriorated citizens’ 
perception of the trustworthiness of the town’s authorities. The first assassination occurred only 
months after the PRI’s takeover. One of the most widely-recognized teacher-activists against illegal 
logging in the town (henceforth referred to as “Herbert”) was murdered. One of my interviewees 
recalled,  
Herbert, in collaboration with other people, took machinery to open trenches. 
Further, they set up a sound system in the main square of the town to speak about 
the problem. I remember them saying, “Cherán, wake up! Your forests have been 
sold!”  
 
However, since the victory of the PRI in 2008, the mayor was against him and, as we 
all know, [the mayor] was involved with the “bad guys”. Therefore, it was not long 
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until they decided to assassinate Herbert. They kidnapped him on the morning of the 
8th of May of 2008, […] outside of the Teacher Supervision Center. The next day in 
the afternoon they found his body in a landfill nearby. They had tortured him before 
killing him. 
 
Although he was a controversial figure, Herbert was well respected within the community 
and his disappearance was to many of the citizens of the town a signal of the government’s 
willingness to cooperate with organized crime to obtain its political objectives.  
The last series of assassinations that shook citizens’ trust in authorities occurred only two 
months before the primary stage of the vigilante movement. This time the victims were three 
citizens who had been elected in a public assembly with the explicit objective of lobbying the 
government to take action against illegal logging in the municipality. One of my interviewees 
explained,  
The group [...] was confirmed by eight community members. But organized crime 
ended up assassinating or disappearing now four of that group. The first disappeared 
four years ago [2009], the other three disappeared in February (2011)...[only two 
months before the movement]. 
 
These representatives not only met with the government but also organized protests and dug 
trenches to stop the crossing of the illegal loggers. To this day, the bodies of the kidnapped 
representatives have not been found. To many in Cherán, these disappearances constituted evidence 
of the government’s incapacity or unwillingness (or possibly even collusion) with regard to stopping 
illegal logging in the region. For example, when asked about the actions that citizens took against the 
presence of illegal loggers in the town, one of my interviewees commented,  
People would make meetings. However, if someone dared to speak in public, he 
would last, at most, eight days before [the government-crime coalition] would 
organize a kidnapping. They would [abduct] him and then someone would either 
find their dead body or they would never appear. 
 
[...] Since the mayor had all the authorities in his pocket, he only needed to get 
together with the [organized crime lieutenant], they would make a plan, and they 
would take out any [dissidence]. 
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Secondary Stage  
The erosion of citizens’ trust in government law enforcement was also critical for the start of 
the secondary stage of the vigilante movement. Even though before April 15 citizens had little trust 
that the municipal police would intervene to stop illegal loggers, after they confronted and detained 
the illegal loggers by themselves citizens hoped that the police would take the prisoners and defend 
the citizens against an eventual retaliation by the cartels. In an interview a witness of the events 
recalled, “When the police crossed [in front of my house] I told my neighbor –The police are going 
that way, perhaps they are going to defend those who are up there–But no, they were going to 
defend the bad guys.” 
 
The collaboration between police and organized crime to attempt to rescue the captured 
illegal loggers quickly eroded citizens’ trust in the municipal government. As one of my interviewees 
said: 
It was very evident that the government [was working together] with the “bad guys” 
here [...]. When [the illegal loggers] came down with the wood [on April 15] the ones 
who opened the way for them to escape were municipal policemen. That is why the 
people got pissed off and said... NO WAY! [Outraged]  
 
The [movement emerged out of that] situation with the municipal police, and the 
municipal police as a symbol of the government. 
 
Moreover, the role that the deterioration of trust played during the secondary stage of the 
movement is evident in the alternatives that citizens sought before taking the defense of the town 
into their own hands. Specifically, it is very telling that citizens reached out for the army and the 
church, the two most trustworthy institutions, to try to solve the emerging crisis. During an 
interview, one of the citizens involved in the initial stage of the movement explained how, initially, 
they still hoped for the intervention of the state:  
Interviewee: What I was asking was for the army to intervene. Because I have a 
telephone in my house I called the army in Zamora at about 10:00 am. They 
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answered but told me that, in order for them to intervene; they would need a signed 
authorization from the municipal government. 
 
Researcher: And what did you think when they told you that? 
 
Interviewee: A great deal of disillusion and fear. Because people then thought [the 
ones who confronted the loggers] put us in a huge problem. So, then, I called the 
army base in Morelia. However, they told us exactly the same thing. 
 
After not receiving help from the army, citizens turned to another traditionally trusted 
institution, the Catholic Church. The same interviewee continued,  
Then [after the army’s refusal to intervene], […] I left the people that at the time was 
surrounding me and went to the Church in order to talk with the priest. I asked him, 
“Father, what are we going to do? Without weapons, without anything, what are we 
going to do now?” He said, “Only god knows!” 
 
Then, I asked him to call [the mayor and his assistant] and they told him that they 
could not do anything because they had also been threatened.  
 
In sum, my research of the events surrounding the secondary self-defense movement, as well 
as my interviews with some of the actors involved in those events, suggest that the citizens’ choice 
to build fogatas, barricade the town, and confiscate the police’s weapons relates back to their 
perception that the government was unlikely to intervene to prevent an eventual violent retaliation 
by the cartels.  
Tertiary Stage  
The citizens’ decision to form an autonomous government to achieve security, justice and 
the preservation of their forests in the long run (labeled the tertiary vigilante moment) also seem to 
relate back to citizens’ distrust in Mexico’s political system.  
As described earlier, even after deciding to defend against probable cartel retaliation, citizens 
continued to pressure the government in the hope that it would take measures to ensure their safety 
in the long run. It was not until the government called for the registration of candidates for the next 
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electoral cycle that citizens of Cherán decided to take the government of the town and, thus, the 
long-term provision of security into their own hands (tertiary vigilante movement).37  
Three factors informed the citizens of Cherán’s estimations that they could expect to achieve 
long-term stability within the Mexican political system: 1) citizens’ perception of the progress of 
their negotiation with the government; 2) their perception of the effectiveness of the measures taken 
by the government; and 3) their perception of the impact of political parties in Cherán’s civic 
society. The Coordination Council believed that the negotiations were too slow and only moved 
forward whenever they were able to mobilize the whole community. An interviewee who was close 
to this process stated:  
The Coordination Council insisted that it wanted to be received [by the governor in 
the city of Morelia (the capital of the state)]. It was continuously coming and going 
to and from the city [...] but never managed to be received.  
 
Once, the sub-secretary and the secretary of the governor received us [...] but we told 
them –we don’t want to talk to you-[...] we want to talk with whoever is going to 
resolve our problem.  
 
[...] What did we do? We called for a meeting of the entire community and said –let’s 
go everyone to Morelia– Then, everyone went [to the capital], except the elderly. It 
wasn’t until then that the governor received us. 
 
However, even when they managed to secure some reaction by the government, citizens’ skepticism 
of the authorities remained strong. My interviewee continued: 
When the governor received us it was all the same. He made promises, he signed the 
minutiae of the meeting, and he fulfilled his promises half-way. He set up some 
security measures but only here in the community, not around the municipality. 
Thus, we had to protest in Morelia once more, the entire community [...], it was only 
at that point when he finally put eight security filters all around the municipality. 
However, we never let them [the police] enter here inside the town, they always had 
to stay outside of the barricades.  
 
                                                     
37 It’s important to note that the citizens of Cherán’s decision to govern themselves was, in the beginning, legally 
controversial. It was not until November that the Supreme Court finally ruled in favor of their right to self-
determination.   
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Moreover, by the time the call for candidates appeared, citizens’ disconnection with the state 
had become so profound that the movement in itself had come to be about defending the 
community against the social divisions that, they believed, were caused by the political parties. One 
participant elaborated:  
Interviewee: When the deadline to register candidates came, we didn’t have any 
registered because, since the very beginning of the movement, we had said that we 
didn’t want any more parties in the town. 
 
Researcher: How did that idea come to be? 
 
Interviewee: A now deceased comrade, who had always been militant with regard to 
the PRI, […] said: “No more political parties in Cherán! Not even one! It’s thanks to 
them that we are in the state in which we are right now. They are the root cause of 
the divisionism in the community.” So, at that point in time, we even set aside our 
demands for justice and security, and we focused on the fact that we wanted the 
political system completely out of the community. 
 
Another interviewee said, “The problem was that we had said that we didn’t want more parties 
anymore, so we had to decide how to rule ourselves.” 
In sum, my analysis of the testimonies of some of the most important actors in this 
movement shows that citizens’ distrust in the government played a critical role in the emergence of 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary vigilante movement in Cherán. By April 15 citizens in Cherán 
had little hope that the municipal government would intervene to stop the illegal logging in the 
surrounding areas. This negative environment was fueled by the controversial election of the PRI 
(due to the electoral rules in Mexico) and a history of political assassinations and impunity in the 
municipality.  
Moreover, the deterioration of citizens’ trust in the government’s likelihood to intervene also 
played an important role in the emergence of the secondary and tertiary vigilante movements in 
Cherán. While the police’s intervention in favor of the illegal loggers influenced citizens’ decision to 
defend themselves against the retaliation of the loggers, in later stages of the conflict the difficulty of 
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the negotiations and citizens’ perceptions of the effect of the political parties influenced their choice 
to seek a community-based approach to long-term security.  
Social Capital and Cherán’s Self-Defense Movement  
As evidenced by the statements of my interviewees, it seems that at every point in the 
movement citizens faced negative prospect with regard to state authorities’ intervention. Moreover, 
given the gruesome assassination of individuals standing up to the logger-cartel alliance, individual 
action seemed unlikely to be conducive to a solution to the problem. Still, citizens seemed to face a 
choice between individual escape and collective action. Indeed, many (if not the majority of) 
Mexican citizens have migrated to other areas of the country or to the united states facing similar 
situations (Hastings, 2013). Thus, what conditions favored citizens’ from Cherán’s willingness to 
engage in collective vigilante justice? I argue that it is critical to turn to the preexisting structures, 
norms and networks (a.k.a. social capital) in the town in order to better understand the emergence of 
this movement.  
Social capital is a “new old” idea. That is, it refers to a concept that, although it has been 
around since the times of de Tocqueville (1863), it has only recently been incorporated into theories 
of economic and democratic development.  
As they go through life, citizens face a diversity of problems and tasks. Sometimes, citizens 
can derive utility by investing their individual physical or human capital into these tasks but, 
sometimes, citizens face challenges and opportunities that are unlikely to result in positive outcomes 
without investments that go well beyond any particular individual’s capacity. It is in these moments 
that citizens find that they need to appeal to their community for collaboration in order to achieve 
these outcomes collectively. It is this latent capacity to trigger effective collective action which a 
number of authors have defined as social capital.  
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With regards to its origin, Putnam has characterized social capital as emerging from the 
‘‘connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them’’ (Putnam 2000, 19), and both Coleman (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and Fukuyama 
(Fukuyama, 1996) have echoed this position.  
Social networks refer to family links, informal community networks, social organizations, etc. 
that need to be maintained through the investment of time, effort, and fiscal resources. Although 
they might suppose some costs for citizens, they are deemed to result in social capital because they 
provide citizens with a scaffold through which solidarity, common interest, and information may 
flow. Social norms refer to commonly accepted principles and patterns of behavior as well as the 
informal sanctions that make them effective. These norms are deemed to be conducive to social 
capital since they provide citizens with some sort of reassurance that they will be able to benefit, 
even if immediate individual utility is unlikely or far removed (Newton 1997; Ostrom 1998; Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994). Finally, social trust refers to citizens’ general expectation that other 
members of the community will behave in a benevolent and consistent way. They reassure citizens 
that others will be likely to cooperate even in the absence of potential punishment. In the following 
section I describe whether and how each of these factors emerged in the interviews I collected with 
citizens involved in Cherán’s 2011 self-defense movement. 
Before moving on to what I found during the interviews that I conducted with key actors, it 
is important to acknowledge that most citizens with whom I spoke casually told me a story that 
disparages the importance of preexisting social capital and the community’s organizational capacity. 
This frequent narrative (which I call the “standard story”) portrays the uprising as a spontaneous act 
of outrage and bravery undertaken by a group of old ladies. This view has become so popular that 
one of the citizens I interviewed said, “There was nothing, this was spontaneous. It was the women 
who normally wake up early to go to mass [who were] the ones who confronted the loggers.” 
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Many of my interviewees began our conversation with similar statements, however, 
whenever I asked them about their personal experiences before, during, and after the uprising a 
different picture started to emerge.  
Primary Stage  
I found that, although the majority of citizens who participated in Cherán’s vigilante 
movement were largely unprepared, the uprising as a whole does not seem to have been entirely 
spontaneous. On the contrary I found evidence that the uprising involved planning and that this 
vigilante movement was not the first time in which community organizations attempted to directly 
solve the illegal logging problem.  
Long before the events of April 15, citizen-led ranchers, farmers, and teachers organizations 
attempted to address the illegal logging problem by themselves. At first, citizens attempted to 
publicly pressure the authorities to solve the illegal logging crisis. For example, in the spring of  2008 
community members gathered in a large assembly and elected eight unofficial members (two per 
neighborhood) as representatives of  communal goods. Their job consisted of  lobbying against the 
illegal loggers crossing through the municipality. Although this committee held meetings with the 
local government and even traveled to the state capital to meet with state government officials, little 
was done to limit the loggers’ incursions.  
As a result, the efforts of  the communal goods representatives became more and more 
dangerous, to the point that by March 2011, they decided to go to the offices of  the municipal 
government to resign from their posts as communal good representatives. After giving up their 
mandate, three of  the members were kidnapped and executed by organized criminals.  
Scared of suffering the same fate, other religious, professional, and economic groups 
attempted to influence the local government discretely or in secret. A group of teachers organized a 
60 
 
task force to generate collaboration between the PRI government and the PRD opposition to fight 
the illegal loggers. Due to the effective participation of the town priest, citizens were able to 
organize a meeting between the opposing factions in the town. However, none of the politicians 
stayed at the meeting, and the citizens were left with a sense of frustration and disappointment with 
the political elites of the town. A citizen close to the organization of this meeting lamented, 
We, and people of good will, met [...] with the president [...] and with the 
representative of communal goods [...] what we asked was unity. [We told them,] 
“We will leave [...] you to talk. Make a plan for us! Make a plan of activities and tell 
us what to do. We are not going to leave you alone, tell us what to do and we will do 
it.” Then, we left them there, on the plaza.  
 
We had not even finished speaking when each of the participants went on their way. 
Thus, our attempt to bring them together and make them talk to each other was 
worthless! 
 
Seeing the ineffectiveness of lobbying the state and local authorities, other groups attempted 
to take matters into their own hands and involved the government only tangentially. More than one 
group emerging from the existing ranchers, farmers, and professional associations met months 
before the uprising to dig large holes in the dirt roads surrounding Cherán to prevent the loggers 
from being able to reach the still virgin sections of forest. These groups continued to take this 
approach in the months leading to the uprising. Although these groups were already taking matters 
into their own hands, they were not expecting to have to directly confront the loggers. Whatever the 
case, it was not long until the loggers attacked them, and when this happened, the participants were 
forced to resort to the police. Unfortunately, the police response was slow or nonexistent to the 
point that citizens became convinced of the ineffectiveness or outright complicity of the state 
security forces operating in the community. I interviewed one of the citizens who participated in 
these extralegal groups. He stated, “The farmers invited me to go to the forest. [...] We tried to break 
the roads where the illegal loggers crossed. We tried [but] we were not prepared, [...] they kicked us 
out [...] with bullets.” After barely escaping alive from the attack he and his companions went to the 
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municipal palace and asked to talk with the mayor. He recalled, “We asked for a hearing with the 
mayor [but] he left us there, hanging. That’s how much he cared for solving the problems. Everyone 
was left with the feeling of what we had lived there. We started to say, ‘They are all the same, they 
are part of the same.’” 
 
But this was not the only approach to the problem. Other groups, feeling uncertain about 
their capacity to confront the loggers directly, took an indirect approach. A group of eight ranchers, 
for instance, held secret meetings one month before the uprising. They decided to look more closely 
into the possibility of hiring armed mercenaries to confront the illegal loggers crossing through the 
town. A citizen close to these events commented,  
In addition to cutting the trees, the loggers were stealing cattle. So, some days before 
the movement, [some people of the town] formed a secret group [...] of about eight 
[...] ranchers [not to confront the loggers directly] but to hire mercenaries.  
 
And the question was: Who goes? Who will make the negotiation? Where do we find 
mercenaries? So one of us said, “I know a group in Nurio, they are army deserters,” 
and [another one] added, “I know another group in Copucho, but it’s expensive. So, 
who wants to go and talk to them? I will tell you where they are.” 
 
[The group] had a first talk with the mercenaries and they said, “You know, we’ll go, 
but we want half a million pesos in advance, and the rest you will give it to us when 
we give you the bodies. And the problem was to collect that amount of money.” 
One rancher in the group said, “I will donate one cow for the cause,” and another 
one followed, “I will donate two...” However, it was insufficient to get the quantity 
that [the mercenaries] were asking as an advance. [...] So, the group was in the 
process of gathering the money and seeing who was going to do the final negotiation 
and all of that when the movement happened. 
 
Not only was the mercenaries’ quote too high, the ranchers also distrusted their intentions. 
Particularly, they feared entering into a vicious cycle of extortion in which the mercenaries would 
charge them regular fees in order not to terrorize them.  
All in all, there is evidence that before the 2011 uprising preexisting community groups were 
actively pressuring the government to take effective action to solve the problem of illegal logging. 
Moreover, my interviews suggest that, as citizens became increasingly disillusioned with the 
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government’s response, they started to seek more direct action. But what was the role of preexisting 
community organizations in the organization of the uprising itself?  
Not only is the standard story silent about the role of community organizations, it 
perpetuates the idea that the uprising was primarily spontaneous. However, a more careful 
investigation of the events leading up to the uprising suggests a more nuanced story. While it is true 
that some of the citizens of Cherán were surprised by the events of April 15, I found indications that 
a number of citizens participated in preparing for the uprising by spread around flyers before the 
event. One of my interviewees recalled,38  
On the 15th I went out of my house to exercise with my neighbor at around 5:50am. 
I found a flyer on my door. I didn’t give it much importance, but there were a lot 
thrown on the sidewalk and in the street.  
 
When we crossed the street there were also a lot of flyers, when we crossed the street 
of the hospital there were even more flyers, and when we arrived to the sports unit, 
there were fliers spread all around the soccer field.  
 
It was then when I asked myself, why are there so many papers thrown around? So 
when I came back I picked up the flyer and red it and in the flyer it said that we 
should do something because they were taking all of the wood. That we should 
organize with our neighbors, with our family, with those on our street because the 
guys from Tanaco had already arrived to the water spring. 
 
Another interviewee told me, 
I was not involved in the preparation of the flyers, but I recall seeing them. The day 
before the confrontation I spent all afternoon in my mother’s house. However, I 
decided to go back to my house around 10:00 pm. As I was coming back to my 
house my brother stopped me and told me: “See! Finally, someone is organizing for 
what you’ve been talking about all along.” Then, I saw a flyer on one of the cars over 
there [points towards the street]. I didn’t ask my brother any details about the flyer but I 
asked him to join us and not let us down. 
 
Another interviewee recalled, 
I remember that on Thursday I was going up the hill when I caught up with a farmer 
and he told me, “Look, I found a flyer, it was lying on the floor by the Calvary 
Church.” He handed it to me and I could read that it said: “If we don’t rise up they 
                                                     
38 What’s more, citizens of Cherán recalled finding two different types of flyers — some handmade and others made by 
computer. 
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are going to finish with our forests, and we are going to be left without water. And if 
we don’t organize, then we will be lamenting [...] tomorrow in the Calvary Church. 
We will organize to detain them.” 
 
To follow up with this lead I tracked down and interviewed some of the actors most involved in the 
April 15th uprising. I found strong indicators that teachers, ranchers, and women from the 3rd 
neighborhood were organizing in advance:  
We were originally planning to stop them on Sunday. We thought about gathering in 
the Calvary Church. When the uprising started [we] had already warned all our 
relatives. We told our cousins who [have a business in the eastern side of town],39 
“Look, on Sunday we are planning to do this [referring to the confrontation at the Calvary 
Church]. As soon as you hear the bells you have to close the highway.” Then, we have 
an aunt who lives all the way where the INI is.40 We also told her, “We are thinking 
about this [referring to the uprising] are you not going to help us? And she said, 
“Yes, of course.” “So, organize in this neighborhood! When you hear bells at the 
Calvary Church and some firecrackers it is because we already started.” “My husband 
said this is the time of truth. If people help the ones who are starting this, we will be 
successful! If not, then we will be doomed.” “Don’t worry, I am organizing here 
already.”  
 
Another interviewee recalled:  
The day before the confrontation I spent all afternoon in my mother’s house. I 
decided to go back to my house around 10:00pm ... When I arrived; there was a large 
group of women meeting with my husband. I am not sure about everything that was 
talked about in the meeting, but what I am sure about is that everyone attending 
agreed to meet next morning. At about 4:00 am, people were going to ring the bells 
and light up firecrackers in front of the Calvary Church for people to gather. 
 
A citizen who directly participated in the events said,  
The butcher gave me the details. He said, tomorrow at 5am people are going to 
organize to meet in a place called Cruciro... I woke up about 5am and arrived there… 
there were about 15 people already (at the Calvary Church) …they had already set up 
large stones… they wouldn’t let us pass; they said “We need people.” There were 
many young people and some elderly people but only two women. 
 
Finally, I found that although the organization of the uprising was largely secular, the 
local Catholic church played a role in facilitating its success. Even when I could not find 
                                                     
39 Originally, the interview mentions the business’s name, but I removed it to protect the interviewee’s confidentiality. 
40 INI refers to the National Institute of Indigenous Studies. Note that the facilities of this institute are in the western 
exit of the town. 
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evidence of his participation in any concrete action, some interviewees perceived significant 
moral support from the town priest. For example, one of the women who was among the 
first 15 citizens who gathered outside the Calvary Church recalled how the priest came to 
give mass and instructed some of the citizens to stay out and fight and others to come into 
the church and pray. After finishing the mass, the woman recalls, the priest concluded his 
homily by telling the faithful, “Go on and defend yourselves. May God be with you.” 
All in all, the testimony from the citizens and elites of Cherán indicates that before 2011 
groups of citizens emerging from a variety of community organizations were active in attempting to 
stop the illegal loggers. Initially, they worked within the framework of the state; however, as their 
confidence in the local political and law enforcement authorities deteriorated, they started to redirect 
their efforts towards extralegal action. Moreover, I found that, contrary to the standard story, the 
emergence of the uprising was not entirely spontaneous. It seems that a number of community 
groups prepared for the uprising together and independently. Further, it seems that the local priest 
played an important role as a moral support for those willing to confront the loggers. As another 
citizen who participated in the primary stage told me, “What is true is that they had already 
organized what they were going to do. Some were organized here; some were organized there. Most 
groups were planning to do it on Sunday but one group pushed the plans earlier. I am not sure who 
were the organizers, however, I have the feeling that it was the youth.” 
Secondary Stage  
When analyzing the events following the direct confrontation of the loggers I found that 
Cherán’s social capital also played a role in the towns’ organization against an eventual retaliation 
from the cartels (secondary stage). On the one hand, preexisting social structures shaped the 
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organization of the movement; on the other, community groups helped provide leadership and 
support for the undertaking.  
As described before, Cherán is divided into four traditional neighborhoods of about equal 
size: Aharikutin, Kéiku, Kalakua, and Pharikutin. These neighborhoods provide citizens with distinct 
identities and play an important role in community and political life. Even before the movement, it 
was customary for citizens to describe themselves as belonging to one of the traditional 
neighborhoods and participate in community life according to the role assigned to them.  
For instance, during the patron saint’s party, each neighborhood is in charge of financing a 
specific aspect of the celebration.41 And every year citizens are elected within the neighborhood in 
which they live to work as volunteer organizers and fundraisers for the celebration. This 
neighborhood-based organization is not unique to the feast of Saint Francis (the patron saint). For 
virtually every local celebration, the traditional neighborhoods provide the framework through 
which citizens raise resources and organize collective action. Not surprisingly, this social framework 
seemed to set the psychological and practical stage for the emergence of the secondary stage of the 
vigilante movement.  
On the one side, in the face of the ominous police-sicarios’ attempt to rescue the captured 
illegal loggers, the efficacy associated with citizens’ experience with neighborhood-level collective 
organization is likely to have provided the conditions under which they were able to start to consider 
to take the defense of the town into their own hands. As one of my interviewees recalled,  
[The self-imposed siege of the town] emerged from [the betrayal of] the municipal 
police and the municipal police as a symbol of the government… That’s why they 
called for an assembly of neighbors. They asked, “What do we do?” [And we 
responded,] “Well, help us!” And that is when we decided to do the so called fogatas. 
 
                                                     
41 For example, one neighborhood would pay for the music, another would pay for fireworks, and another would pay for 
the bull fight. 
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However, as time passed and the need to defend the town became more real, the 
neighborhood-oriented organizational framework also became more practically relevant. As a matter 
of fact, when they first structured the movement, citizens proceeded in a way very similar to the way 
they would for organizing a celebration. They formed neighborhood-level commissions to achieve 
the necessary objectives (in this case security and coordination) and selected two representatives 
from each neighborhood to lead these commissions.  
Later in the week, when those on the coordination committee agreed to build barricades at 
each of the entrances to the town, the solution was once more to use the preexisting neighborhood-
oriented organizational framework for their administration. Each entry point was assigned to a 
different neighborhood, and each of the districts was in charge of rotating those responsible to 
watch over the barricade. Thus, the neighborhood-based organizational framework is likely to have 
provided not only the psychological but also the practical bases for the organization of the second 
stage of the movement.  
Yet, in addition to the neighborhood-oriented framework that had been used for the 
organization of celebrations there was another way in which social capital contributed to the 
emergence of the secondary stage of the vigilante movement. Specifically, as I present in the second 
section of this chapter, even before the 2011 uprising there were an important number of internal 
community organizations and these made important contributions in at least three ways. First, they 
provided citizens with a high level of organizational experience that take on the leadership of the 
movement. Second, they engaged in actions to strengthen the economy and the mood of the 
population, and, finally, they reached out to their external counterparts in order to raise funds and 
distribute aid in the town. Particularly, I found the academic, educational, and religious associations 
to be among the most active in this stage of the movement.  
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Throughout the duration of the movement, teachers and educational centers in Cherán 
played a central role. Schools were not only used as centers where political assemblies were held. 
When it came time to choose the movement’s leadership, citizens overwhelmingly turned to local 
educators most active in the school communities and in the teacher-labor movement for guidance.42  
The teachers’ leadership experience benefited the movement in two ways. First, teachers’ 
experience with the politics of protest created bridges with activist movements outside the town. 
This provided them with sufficient know-how to organize massive protests that would put 
significant pressure on the state and federal governments. Second, teachers with connections (or 
working) in the surrounding communities were in a privileged position to spread information and 
rally political and economic support from citizens of the surrounding communities. The latter were 
particularly important because, as citizens set up barricades around the town, the community 
plunged into what could very well have been one of the deepest economic crises in its history.  
Given the uncertainty of the events developing in Cherán, many suppliers of basic goods 
suspended service to the town. As basic necessities, such as purified water, flour, corn, rice, and 
beans stopped coming into the town, citizens quickly started to suffer from a supply crisis. In 
addition, citizens who needed to leave the barricaded perimeter in order to go to work (farmers, 
professionals, etc.) suffered a substantial and sudden cut in their income flow. It was at this point 
that preexisting internal community organizations contributed once more. Not only did they take 
action to deal with the scarcity crisis in the town, they also reached out for the collaboration of 
external organizations and helped administer the aid coming into the community.  
After the self-imposed siege started, the tortilla mill association met and agreed to subsidize 
the price of this basic product during the time of scarcity. Similarly, the butcher association 
subsidized the price of meat and agreed to donate leftovers to the fogatas guarding the town at night. 
                                                     
42 The three main leaders during the secondary movements were all teachers in the surrounding schools.  
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For their part, visual artists and musicians organized workshops and public displays of their arts in 
order to entertain the children and boost the morale of the citizens of the town. Finally, the teachers 
of public schools, who received a direct deposit from the federation, conducted a teachers meeting 
and agreed to donate most of their income to purchase basic supplies.  
 But the action of community organizations did not stop there. They also reached out to 
their counterparts outside of the town in order to rally donations and support from their citizen-run 
organizations outside of Cherán. The Catholic church in the town, for instance, reached out to the 
churches of the surrounding municipalities and, in response, received a significant quantity of 
donations of basic food supplies. In addition, a group of men and women who participated in the 
National Jesuit Youth Network reached out to this organization and were able to rally additional 
support in the form of supplies from some of the largest private Jesuit universities in the country. 
Moreover, as part of the support this organization provided, one of the Jesuit leaders traveled to the 
town and blessed all of the fogatas and barricades in the community. A Jesuit priest involved in these 
actions told me: 
After we heard about the conflict we traveled to the community, we talked with the 
priest and we told him that we needed to do something to keep people’s morale up. 
So we started to bless every fogata. People started to bring their saints outside and 
spend the night praying. 
 
For their part, students who were part of non-religious student groups reached out to activist 
organizations in Morelia (the state capital) and Mexico City. As a response, tens of activist 
organizations raised supply donations within some of the largest public universities in the county. 
Additionally, these activist associations held rallies around the country in support of Cherán’s 
vigilante movement and traveled to the community to deliver the donations and, in some cases, hold 
political discussion circles. For example, an interviewee who was very active in the post-uprising 
period told me, 
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We a received number of student groups…at first, people were a bit suspicious of 
them…but little by little they became convinced that they came to help us…through 
them we received a lot of support in terms of food, cash, guns, bullets, all of that we 
received from the student groups. 
 
The contributions from the student-activist organization at the state university (Universidad 
Michoacána de San Nicolas de Hidalgo) became so central that they became known within the town 
as the fogata de Morelia. As one of my interviewees suggested, “The fogata de Morelia helped us to create 
the structure of government itself. They also joined us at every visit that we did in Morelia ... There 
were people from here working in the university. That was their role, to be very aware of all the 
information.”  
Finally, although in different ways, other organizations also contributed to the vigilante 
movement during this stage. The Association of Tortilla Producers of Cherán, for instance, agreed 
to control inflation and even subsidized the price of this basic product. For their part, a group of 
visual artists from the town organized workshops in the fogatas encouraging citizens to demonstrate 
their fear, anger, and hope through painting and the construction of sky lanterns (called globos de 
cantolla in Mexico).43 Further, many of the musical groups in the community gave impromptu 
presentations to cheer up the community, and in the following months they participated in the 
religious festivities at no cost.  
Overall, social structures, community organizations, and the emergent collective efficacy 
among citizens of Cherán seem to have played an important role in their capacity to organize to 
defend their town against the potential retaliation of the loggers. First, there is evidence that soon 
after their confrontation against the police-supported mercenaries, citizens voiced their perception 
that the community could defend itself. Second, an analysis of the organization of the secondary 
vigilante movement shows that instead of organizing the movement from nothing, citizens 
implemented a preexisting neighborhood-oriented organizational framework very similar to the one 
                                                     
43 Small hot air balloons made of paper with an opening at the bottom where a small fire is suspended. 
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used to organize religious and traditional celebrations. Finally, internal community organizations 
participated in the second stage of the movement in three ways. First, they organized activities to 
provide economic and psychological support for the rest of the inhabitants of the town and, finally, 
they coordinated with their external counterparts to raise and distribute aid and assistance to the 
town.  
Tertiary Stage  
It is important to recall that during the three months following the initial uprising, citizens of 
Cherán focused on preventing an eventual retaliation by the loggers and on pressuring the 
government to make a commitment to guarantee long term security in the area. However, the 
Federal Electoral Institute’s (IFE) call for candidate registration pushed citizens to take a step back 
and rethink their strategy (the tertiary stage). Not surprisingly, community organizations (particularly 
activist and academic groups) as well as the nascent self-defense structures also seem to have played 
an important role in this stage of the movement.  
After making public the IFE’s call for candidates it was very clear to the Coordination 
Council the antipathy citizens felt towards the political party system. A citizen close to the 
Coordination Council said, “When the call for candidates came out we remembered that citizens did 
not want any more political parties. I remember the words of Jeffrey Henley. Even though he was a 
PRI partisan and he was the first to say ‘No more parties in Cherán.’” 
However, it was not clear how to translate this antipathy into action. It is here where the 
assistance secured through student-activist and academic organizations became important. Initially, 
one of the activist organizations linked to the movement offered citizens of Cherán free legal 
assistance to achieve their objectives. From that moment on, the coordination council started to 
work closely with lawyers to try to prevent elections in the municipality.  
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Initially, the strategy consisted of pressuring the government to prevent the installment of 
electoral booths in the municipality. However, the movement demands were unsuccessful, as the 
Constitution would not allow the cancellation of elections. At this point, Cherán’s citizens had to 
reconsider whether to allow elections in the town or to take their movement even further.   
In the context of a strong distrust in political parties and in view of the success of their 
neighborhood-oriented organizational framework, citizens decided to continue to reject the 
implementation of standardized elections in the town and requested full political autonomy from the 
Mexican electoral system. For example, one of my interviewees said, 
The appearance of the call for candidates hit us very hard. [On the one side], the 
Coordination Council, designed to organize the needs of the community, was already 
operating […] and the council of Honor and Justice, in charge of the security of our 
territory, was already working… [On the other], we had already said that we were not 
going to have political parties in our time any more… that’s when we said, well, we 
need to see in the state congress to what extent can we name our authorities by 
ourselves. 
 
It was at that point that lawyers and academics supporting Cherán’s vigilante movement 
from the fogata de Morelia (originally contacted by academic organization from the town) played a 
central role. While lawyers helped the coordination council to lobby congress to change the law so 
they could start a government by indigenous traditions (a government of usos y costumbres), 
anthropologists and historians helped citizens to re-frame the organization of the movement into a 
system of government reflective of the ancient Purepechan governments of the region.  
 In the end, the new autonomous government was designed to be composed by five councils 
(communal goods, honor and justice, local administration, social programs, and neighborhoods) 
composed of eight representatives (two per neighborhood), as well as a council of elders (K’eris) 
composed of twelve representatives (three per neighborhood), all elected through a public vote in 
neighborhood-level assemblies. Although it is true that this design symbolically represents the 
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Purepechan traditions, it appears to be more closely related to the organization implemented during 
the secondary stage of the vigilante movement.  
In sum, my interviews with some of the key actors in Cherán’s vigilante movement suggest 
that the town’s social capital was important during the emergence of the three stages of the vigilante 
movement. First, I found clear signals that community organizations attempted to take the logging 
problems into their own hands even before the first confrontations against the loggers, and that they 
actively participated in the preparations for the uprising. Second, I found that these organizations, in 
addition to the social structures present before the movement, were critical for the organization of 
the self-defense movement that sought to prevent an eventual incursion of the illegal loggers and 
their mercenaries during the first four months after the uprising. Finally, citizens’ connections with 
academic and activist organizations seem to have played an important role in their capacity to 
transform the citizens’ demand for the cancellation of elections into the design for a new 
governmental institution to substitute for the Mexican political and electoral system.  
All in all, my exploration of the social and political environment before and during the 
movement seems to bring initial support for asserting the importance of social capital in the 
emergence of vigilante organizations, particularly in the context of deteriorated government 
legitimacy. However, a skeptical reader might ask about the similarity in the social structures of the 
communities in the region. To explore this possibility further, I also conducted an inventory of the 
citizen-run organizations in Nahuatzen, a community very similar to Cherán in which vigilante 
justice has not occurred.  
Section 2: Cherán in a Comparative Perspective 
In order to test the applicability of my argument to the case of Cherán I searched for a 
community that was demographically, geographically, institutionally, culturally, and socially similar to 
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Cherán but in which, even when victim to similar criminal pressures, a collective vigilante 
organization failed to emerge. Although it is not possible to find an absolutely identical case, I found 
the neighboring town of Nahuatzen to have many of the same characteristics as Cherán. 
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Figure 6. Nahuatzen and Cherán in Comparison 
 
Source: Inventario Nacional de Vivienda. National Geography and Statistics Institute of 
Mexico (INEGI). 
* Municipal level estimates, source: www.microregiones.gob.mx 
^ Municipal level estimates, source: www.mx.undp.org 
’ Municipal level estimates, source: www.conapo.gob.mx 
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In addition to being only 5 km apart, Cherán and Nahuatzen have important similarities. 
Figure 6 shows the available socio-demographic characteristics of both municipalities. The 
information available at the level of locality (bottom half of Figure 6) yields important similarities. 
Both communities seem to have similar age distributions and, going by the characteristics of the 
houses in both towns, they seem to have similar socioeconomic levels. When looking at the 
municipal-level information (top half of Figure 6) from Nahuatzen-M and Cherán-M, similarities 
continue to be apparent. Both municipalities have similar population densities (89.08 vs. 81.34), 
gender balance (51% vs. 52.04% female), and Human Development Index (0.62 vs. 0.68 HDI).  
Although the differences are not striking, Nahuatzen-M seems to have a slightly higher 
number of Purepechan speaking citizens (36.75%) than Cherán-M (23.76%) and a slightly higher 
percentage of homes receiving remittances from the United States (8.29% vs. 5.55%). Before 
moving on, however, I want to point out that in my interviews with the government authorities of 
Nahuatzen they noted that the indigenous population in Nahuatzen-M was more heavily 
concentrated in the towns of Sevina and Arantepacua. Therefore, although there is no data on the 
number of indigenous households at the locality level it is likely that the difference in the number of 
indigenous households between Nahuatzen-T and Cherán-T is smaller than the difference between 
Nahuatzen-M and Cherán-M (Microrregiones by SEDESOL, 2013).  
Before moving on, it is necessary to note that some of my interviewees attributed the 
uprising to the severe deforestation occurring in Cherán before 2010, and there is good reason to 
think that the advance of deforestation may have played an important role in the emergence of the 
uprising. For this reason, it was important to select a community located in an area likely to be a 
target of illegal logging activity by criminal organizations. Although there is no data on the advances 
of illegal logging at the municipal level, the director of the state forest commission went on record 
stating that the state as a whole has lost 20% of its forests in the last 25 years (El Universal, 2011) 
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and a number of journalists noted the increase of illegal logging in all the municipalities of the area 
even before the 2011 uprising (Lemus, 2011). By the time I visited the town in 2014, just as in the 
neighboring Cherán, the ongoing destruction of the surrounding forests was evident in Nahuatzen, 
and it was common for me to encounter groups of men driving trucks loaded with logs through the 
streets of Nahuatzen. An interviewee highly informed on the management of timber resources in 
Nahuatzen told me,  
I had a group of more than 200 people re-foresting in the past, but we had to stop 15 
to 18 years ago. Since then illegal logging has been on the rise. As the matter of fact, 
every day, more than 100 huallineros (3-ton trucks) go up that mountain to log [pointing 
to a patch of destroyed forest]. And it is all robbed. They don’t even pay those who own 
the lands. 
 
In sum, even when there is no hard data that allows us to compare the intensity of illegal 
logging in Nahuatzen-M and Cherán-M, I found evidence that illegal loggers have been active, and 
sometimes very active, in Nahuatzen-M.  
Yet, even without the action of organized crime, Nahuatzen, as well as the rest of the 
municipalities of the plateau, suffers from important levels of baseline deforestation. Based on 
historic forest data and demographic and demand characteristics Brown, DeJong, Guerrero, Hall, 
Masera, Marzoli, Ruiz and Shoch (2003), estimate that baseline deforestation in the Purepechan 
Plateau is likely to be associated with the deforestation of about 57,000 hectares of forest in the 
region from the year 2000 to the year 2010. Thus, even in the conservative scenario in which illegal 
loggers were never as active in Nahuatzen, this municipality is likely to be a relatively good point of 
comparison due to its high levels of baseline deforestation.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that Nahuatzen has experienced more power sharing than 
Cherán. While in the latter municipality, political supporters of the PRD are concentrated in the 
municipal capital, in Nahuatzen no political party is dominant in the municipal capital. As a result, 
the town experiences frequent political transition. Additionally, politicians from Nahuatzen have 
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been more willing to remain distant from organized crime than politicians from Cherán. For 
instance, in 2008 the mayor of Nahuatzen attempted to resist paying extortion to a criminal 
organization and, as a result, was executed by a local cartel (Garcia Tinoco, 2013).  
That said, government and law enforcement authorities do not enjoy a good reputation in 
Nahuatzen. During the time I lived in the area (2014) I witnessed at least two occasions when 
citizens blocked the entrance to the municipal government’s offices in order to protest against 
corruption and resource mismanagement. Another interviewee, with experience in the management 
of timber resources, told me, “The Forestal44 and the local police have intervened but corruption 
never ends. Because those instances always come and they give them money… as you can see this 
forest over here (signaling a nearby hill) it’s running out.” 
In addition to being geographically, socially, culturally, economically, and ethnically similar to 
Cherán, Nahuatzen has also suffered incursions from cartel-sponsored illegal loggers. Further, 
although it has not suffered a legitimacy crisis at the levels Cherán did in 2011, citizens of Nahuatzen 
are not generally satisfied with the government and do not trust that the municipal police will be 
effective in fighting illegal logging. However, citizens of this town have not organized an extralegal 
collective self-defense movement, and therefore it constitutes a good point of comparison to test the 
degree that my argument is consistent with the case of Cherán. If the case of Cherán is indeed 
consistent with my argument, I expect to find that Cherán had a stronger social capital than 
Nahuatzen even before 2011.  
Method and Data Collection  
Cherán and Nahuatzen’s cultures are so similar that a casual observer may fail to find 
differences in both towns’ civil societies. Both towns, for example, have strong Catholic populations 
                                                     
44 The Policía Forestal is a special unit from the federal government in charge of monitoring the exploitation of timber 
resources. 
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and people from both communities frequently participate in patron saint’s celebrations, traditional 
weddings, funerals, baptisms, and celebrations honoring the Indigenous-Catholic calendar.45 In order 
to uncover differences in the social capital between the two communities, it is necessary to engage in 
a more detailed comparison.  
The measurement of social capital has been contended, but specialists in the topic generally 
agree that measurement should circle around three main dimensions: social networks, community 
norms, and social trust (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2000). Ideally, one would rely on 
a diversity of indicators tapping into the structural (networks and associations) and cognitive 
dimensions of social capital (trust and norms). However, the fact that I am interested in measuring 
the levels of social capital in both communities retrospectively brings three main challenges to this 
strategy. First, the fact that the study took place almost three years after the movement makes 
uncertain the degree to which citizens will be able to accurately recall their capacity to generate 
collective action with their peers. Second, even if they were able to accurately recollect events, 
citizens’ favorable views of and commitment to their anti-criminal movement generates incentives to 
portray a stark contrast between the current social cohesion of the community and social cohesion 
before the movement. Third and most importantly, some scholars have suggested that the 
movement may have actually increased the levels of social cohesion and cooperation among the 
citizens of Cherán. If this is so, measuring citizens’ retrospective evaluations of social trust may 
indirectly incorporate this effect in citizens’ recollection, thereby introducing systematic bias into the 
measurement.  
To avoid these challenges, I turn to the measurement of groups and organizations that 
existed in Cherán and Nahuatzen before 2011. This is done under the assumption that it will be 
                                                     
45 These include, among other activities, fundraising and organizing for religious festivals such as Holy Week, the Feast 
of Corpus Christi, Christmas, the Day of the Dead, as well as setting up and removing nativity scenes, etc.  
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more difficult for memory, social desirability, and post-movement changes in social cohesion to alter 
citizens’ recollection of the community organizations that were in the town before 2011.  
With the objective of recovering this information, I moved to Mexico in June of 2014, and 
lived in Cherán from January to May of 2015. Over the course of the time I visited and/or lived in 
the communities, I collected information from a number of community organizations and 
individuals (in both towns) through a snowball sampling technique. Adhering to the guidelines of 
this method, I began by contacting local governments, leagues, and churches. I spoke with members 
of these organizations whenever possible and collected information. Afterwards, I asked them to 
recommend other groups and/or individuals whom I might contact. I then contacted those groups 
and/or individuals and repeated the process. I continued in this fashion until every group or 
individual I contacted could not direct me to any additional organizations or individuals.46 By using 
this method I collected information about the community groups that existed in Nahuatzen and 
Cherán before 2011. I collected but excluded from my analysis any groups formed in Cherán after 
2011 to avoid capturing the potential impact that Cherán’s movement in the strengthening of 
community bonds and social capital.  
Results  
Overall, during my investigation of both towns I was able to document 632 community 
organizations, of which 520 existed before 2011. Among the community organizations I was able to 
document, I was able to identify artistic, productive, altruistic, religious, educational, and fitness 
organizations. As Figure 7 shows, I found a strong difference in the number of community groups 
in Cherán (355) and Nahuatzen (165), and this difference extended to almost every area of 
                                                     
46 For a larger discussion on snowball sampling and statistical estimation techniques for this type of sampling see Berg 
(2004). 
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community life. In the next section I look at every type of organization and conduct a brief 
qualitative and quantitative comparison of what I found.  
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Figure 7. Community Groups in Cherán and Nahuatzen before 2011  
 
In the case of Cherán I included only the groups created before the year 2011 and 
surviving through 2014.  
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Catholic Church Organizations  
First, I looked at Catholic Church groups in both towns. Although social capital can be 
present in friendship networks, athletic leagues, neighborhoods, and productive organizations, it is 
difficult to understand social capital in rural Mexico without looking at citizens’ participation in 
religious activities. As stated earlier, both Cherán and Nahuatzen have similarly strong Catholic 
populations.  
Yet, there are differences in citizen-church relations across towns. The first difference 
between Cherán and Nahuatzen emerges from the life of the local Church. The priest of Nahuatzen 
has been living in the community for more than twenty years, is fluent in Purepecha, and is widely 
beloved in and outside the community due to his social work and efforts in constructing water wells 
across the region. He is currently a professor at one of the universities as well. In contrast, the priest 
of Cherán (when I lived in the town) arrived only after the 2011 movement, has a rather 
conservative ideology, and vocally disagrees with the Cherán self-defense movement. 47 Therefore, I 
expected to find a relatively contentious church life in Cherán and perhaps a smaller number of 
church groups, even if the community had stronger social capital than the surrounding communities.  
Indeed, I found a much more contentious church life in Cherán. Almost every citizen with 
whom I spoke openly manifested their discomfort with the resident priest at the time, and church 
officials confirmed that church and group assistance had decreased significantly since 2011. 
However, to my surprise, I found that Cherán’s church had nearly twice (23 [1.61 per thousand 
citizens]) the number of church groups than Nahuatzen (13 [1.26 per thousand citizens]). Although 
this can be interpreted as evidence that Cherán is simply more religious, I interpret this finding as a 
                                                     
47 After the 2011 movement, the Catholic dioceses of Zamora decided to assign a new priest to Cherán.  This new priest 
has attempted to reconcile the community with one of the towns accused of stealing wood in 2010 by scolding the 
citizens of Cherán during mass.   
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sign of a strong civil society eager for community participation despite the contentious attitude of 
the resident priest.  
Schools and Educational Centers  
Second, I looked at the number of educational centers in both communities. Although the 
Mexican government is constitutionally mandated to provide free education to all its citizens, it is 
clear that institutional, informational, and economic constraints have limited the government’s 
capacity to provide rural communities in Mexico with the educational services they require. Against 
this background, it has become necessary for groups in civil society to organize in order to open new 
schools in the region. Opening a new school requires significant collaboration from teachers, 
citizens, local government, and already existing schools. First, interested teachers and families need 
to start an extension from an existing school. This requires them to collaborate to rent an 
appropriate space and recruit at least one hundred children who are unable to attend existing 
schools. Second, citizens need to find a donor or collect sufficient funds to buy land where the new 
school will be built. Finally, citizens need to complete the paperwork in order for the state to 
recognize the new school and assign a budget for infrastructure and personnel. Thus, it seems that 
the number of schools open in a community of this kind could provide an additional indicator of 
citizens’ capacity for collective action.  
As would be expected from a strong civil society, I found that the citizens of Cherán have 
been notably more successful in establishing educational institutions than the surrounding 
communities. In contrast to the 17 educational centers open within Nahuatzen’s municipality (1.65 
per thousand inhabitants), I found that by 2011 Cherán had already opened 43 educational 
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institutions (3 per thousand inhabitants)48. While by 2011 Nahuatzen had only one initial education 
center and 5 pre-schools, Cherán had been able to open 4 initial education centers and 10 pre-
schools. Further, I found that while Nahuatzen has been able to open 7 elementary schools and 2 
junior high schools, Cherán has 17 elementary schools and 3 junior-high schools. Additionally, while 
Nahuatzen has one high school institution, Cherán today has two large high schools. Finally, while 
the municipality of Nahuatzen has only one institution of higher education, Cherán has four.  
In sum, in almost every rubric, the data I recovered from both municipalities suggests that 
citizens of Cherán have been more successful in recent years in opening and maintaining educational 
institutions. It is true that, by itself, the number of schools may also capture differences in citizens’ 
needs and ability to navigate the system. However, my investigation of the process by which new 
schools are open suggests social capital, as expected from the citizens’ capacity to collaborate legally 
and financially, plays an important role in the emergence of new educational centers in the region.  
Productive Organizations: Artisans Farmers, Ranchers   
In addition to these groups, some citizens in the region associate in order to coordinate their 
economic activities, and the prevalence of these groups can also serve as a social capital indicator. 
Qualitatively, I found no difference in the type of activities citizens of both communities organize. 
Both places are centers of production of wooden hand-crafts, ranching, and farming, and an 
important number of citizens earn their keep as merchants. However, I found differences in the 
quantitative and qualitative organization of the groups in each of these economic sectors.  
The most important economic activity of Cherán and Nahuatzen is farming. Citizens grow 
corn, squash, beans, and other greens for personal and local consumption as well as to sell in the 
markets of other towns. I found that farmers do not have an overarching association; however, they 
                                                     
48 Nahuatzen has one institution offering initial education, 5 pre-schools, two junior-high schools and one high-school. 
Additionally, Nahuatzen has one institution of higher education.  
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form groups in order to receive subsidies from the state. While in Cherán I found 23 farmers groups 
that receive subsidies (1.95 group per thousand citizens), I found 13 farmers groups in Nahuatzen 
(1.26 groups per thousand citizens).  
In addition, both towns have an important ranching sector. Both communities have a 
ranching association, however, I found that Nahuatzen’s ranchers association is mostly run by two 
office workers and does little more than certify ranchers’ transactions and disputes. Cherán’s 
ranchers association, however, in addition to serving as an authority to certify the sale of cattle, also 
holds regular meetings in which their members participate to address practical problems (e.g. cattle 
theft, plagues, diseases, etc.). In addition to these associations, ranchers also form groups to request 
state subsidies and, in Cherán, ranchers have formed groups to receive training on preventive animal 
medicine. Taken together, I found a total of 14 ranchers groups in Cherán (0.95 groups per 
thousand citizens) and only one (0.1 groups per thousand citizens) ranchers association in 
Nahuatzen (Figure 7). 
A third important economic sector in both towns is trade. Citizens of both towns have a 
market and an important number of establishments selling anything from tortillas to medicine. I 
found both quantitative and qualitative difference between the trade organizations in these towns. 
While before 2011 Cherán had close to 17 merchant organizations (1.19 groups per thousand 
citizens), Nahuatzen only had one (0.1 groups per thousand citizens): the association of merchants 
of the central market. In Cherán I found organizations of tortilla sellers, butchers, bakers, and 
formal and informal-market sellers. Interestingly I found that the formal market of Nahuatzen is 
much better managed than that of Cherán.  
Finally, although tourism is not a primary source of revenue for either town, I found 
organizations that focus on the promotion of traditional crafts. While in Nahuatzen I found only 
one wool-craftsmen organization (0.10), in Cherán I found nearly 19 citizen-run organizations (1.33 
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per thousand citizens) that concentrate and organize craftsmen. These organizations include groups 
of toy craftsmen, groups of embroiderers, and groups of hand-made fabric producers and, 
traditionally, have two functions, to help producers buy cheaper materials for their crafts and seek 
and assign places in craftsmen fairs.  
 Overall, I found that, with the exception of the market association (admittedly better 
administered in Nahuatzen), the groups in Cherán were more numerous and better organized than 
the ranchers, farmers, merchants, and craftsmen organizations in Nahuatzen.  
Nonetheless, before concluding, it is important to acknowledge that some of the groups I 
found did not conduct regular meetings and seemed to have been formed as a result of top down 
government mobilization. Particularly, state and federal government programs require citizens to 
register as a group in order to receive funding. To the extent that these programs mobilize 
individuals to form groups, even in contexts in which collective action may be difficult or unlikely, 
the quantitative differences before may represent only a conservative reflection of the real difference 
in social capital in both communities.  
Sports  
In addition to organizing for economic and religious reasons, citizens of the region also 
organize to engage in recreational and sports-related activities. There are three reasons why these 
organizations may yield valuable indicators of social capital for this type of communities. First, 
although these activities may seem superfluous, citizens in rural areas invest a considerable amount 
of time, income and effort in managing athletic leagues. Second, it is traditional for local 
governments generally to manage a small budget for supporting this type of activity. Since this 
budget is insufficient to fully fund every team in the community, citizens generally collect their own 
funds and use government funding for prizes and trophies. This makes citizens relatively 
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independent and willing to work outside the government budget if necessary. Finally, although they 
seem innocuous, competition in this context can, at times, become rather contentious. Just as sports 
competitions can foster peaceful conflict resolution in communities with deep and strong social 
bonds, they can cause conflicts to surface in places where links between citizens are only superficial.  
Except for baseball, which is only played in Nahuatzen, I found that citizens of both 
communities enjoy participating in soccer and basketball teams. As Figure 7 shows, both towns have 
outdoor and indoor soccer leagues. Leagues in both municipalities have, over time, had a similar 
structure and level of participation. The leagues are run by a council of team captains and are 
coordinated independently from the local government. After analyzing the records of the indoor 
soccer league I found that both communities have a similar number of teams registered in their 
indoor soccer leagues (Nahuatzen 17 vs Cherán 15) yet once the population diference are taken into 
consideration there seems to be a higher team density in Nahuatzen (1.65 per 1000 persons) than in 
Cherán (1.05 per 1000 people). Similarly, I found only small differences in the number of outdoors 
soccer teams registered in Cherán and Nahuatzen. While I found that 36 soccer teams are registered 
in the Nahuatzen municipal league, in Cherán I found the league had 40 participating teams. Once 
these numbers are weighted by the numer of citizens in each town I found Nahuatzen to have a 
higher density of teams per thousand inhabitants (3.5 vs 2.8).49 
While I did not find substantive differences in these leagues, I found qualitative and 
quantitative differences when I looked into basketball, the most popular sport in the region. On the 
one hand, I found basketball in Nahuatzen to be coordinated around a municipal league. That is, for 
many years this sport has been organized through collaboration between citizens and the 
                                                     
49 In conducting the analysis I removed two teams that came from communities outside of Nahuatzen-T (Arantepacua 
and Sevina) and one that came from outside Cherán-T (La Colonia). To the extent that teams from other communities 
in the municipality are likely to register in the leagues of the municipal capital it is likely for this differences to be biased 
in favor of Nahuatzen-T. This, because, although the town of Nahuatzen is smaller than the ton of Cherán, the total 
population of the municipality of Nahuatzen-M (about 27,000 citizens) is larger than the total population of the 
municipality of Cherán-M (18000).  
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government. While citizens are responsible for registering their teams and paying the referees, the 
municipal government organizes the role of games, hosts the tournament in the municipal court, and 
gives money for the prizes.  
In contrast, before 2011 Cherán did not have a government run municipal basketball league. 
In its place, it had two run basketball independent from the government. The Paris Basketball 
League, the first of them, operates as a non-profit organization run by a number of teachers from 
the community and held its games in a pubic court of the Pharikutin neighborhood (neighborhood 
III). Not only did this league manage to maintain itself as fully independent from government, its 
organizers repeatedly declined invitations to coordinate a government-sponsored municipal league, 
as one interviewee recalls:  
The government came to us and asked us whether we wanted to manage the 
municipal basketball league and we said no. Mainly because we had emerged from an 
election from the neighbors of the third neighborhood and for us to get the 
municipal league would have been perceived as an act of corruption. Since then, the 
municipal government said they would not give us any more support. However, we 
told him “It doesn’t matter, we will find a way!” and we started to collect our own 
funds.  
 
Additionally, by 2011 a healthy for-profit league called the Shikuami league already had been 
operating for five years in Cherán. This league not only trained teams in every category, it also 
organized a tournament in the equally private Erandi Court and even has a professional team that 
competes with teams from the surrounding areas and charges for entrance. Quantitatively, I also 
found differences between the number of basketball teams in each town. I visited each of the 
leagues to consult their records for the number of teams registered. Unfortunately, none of the 
leagues kept records before 2011. Still, I was able to record the number of teams registered in 
ongoing tournaments (as of spring 2015) and, with the help of organizers, marked the teams that 
were likely to have had participated in each of the leagues before 2011. Finally, since many citizens 
are willing to register in more than one league and even play in both communities, I worked together 
89 
 
with the organizers of the leagues to identify the origin of each team and to mark teams participating 
in more than one league with multiple names. In the end, I found that, while in 2011 Nahuatzen had 
no more than 15 basketball teams (1.74 per thousand inhabitants), Cherán had about 82 teams 
participating in tournaments throughout the region (5.72 per thousand inhabitants). 
Finally, by the time I was living in the towns (spring 2015), I found basketball organizations 
to be moving in opposite directions. In Cherán, Paris League organizers and the post-2011 
autonomous government were finally able to collaborate and created a Municipal Basketball League 
run entirely by the government. In contrast, the government of Nahuatzen reduced funding for the 
municipal tournament. As a result, the prices were significantly reduced and, by the time I was there, 
the league was going through an all-time low level of participation.  
In sum, I found significant qualitative and quantitative differences in the athletic 
organizations in Cherán and Nahuatzen. Not only did I find a higher number of sport teams in 
Cherán than in Nahuatzen, I also found a difference in how athletic leagues were formed and 
managed. While in Nahuatzen, athletic organizations continue to be strongly linked to the 
government, in Cherán, citizens have been rather successful in organizing athletic teams and 
organizations without the interference of the local government. All and all, athletic activities 
represent an important pastime for the citizens of the region and, to the extent that they are a 
reflection of social capital, in my cases of interest I found that, even before 2011, Cherán had a 
relatively stronger civic society capable of organizing independently of and even in opposition to the 
government.  
Groups of Artists  
In addition to collecting information about sports organizations I investigated artistic 
organizations. Music, dancing, and the visual arts are especially important in the rural communities 
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of Mexico and Latin America. Not only do they help citizens fulfill their individual expressive needs, 
they also serve as a bridge between citizens and their heritage. Although many communities’ 
historical records have been lost to time, painters, writers, and musicians continue to recreate these 
communities’ pre-Hispanic heritage.  
Qualitatively, I could not find strong differences between the musical and dancing 
organizations in both towns. Both Nahuatzen and Cherán have musical and dancing groups 
dedicated to the rescue and promotion the traditional music from the region. Additionally, both 
communities have groups-for-hire who play popular music at weddings and public festivals in the 
region.  
That said, I found quantitative differences between the towns. While in Nahuatzen I was 
able to find two traditional dancing groups (0.19 per 1000 people) and nearly twenty music 
organizations (1.84 per 1000 people), in Cherán I was able to find seven dancing companies (0.49 
per 1000 people) and 30 bands, orchestras, and musical groups (2.09 per 1000 people). 
In addition to these differences I was able to find differences between the management of 
both towns’ cultural centers (Casa de la Cultura). Before 2011, the cultural center of Cherán was 
formally managed by the municipal government. It provided space for artist and musical groups but 
a comprehensive artistic program or budget was largely absent. Thus, although funding was 
practically absent, artists of Cherán could use the center to hold meetings and work on their self-
funded projects.  
In contrast, the cultural center of Nahuatzen has been administered by the town priest for 
nearly twenty years. This priest has created a relatively well structured cultural program centered on 
the idea of turning the Casa de la Cultura into a symbolic monument of the architectural and cultural 
landscape of the town. Although it is true that the priest promotes exhibitions and workshops by 
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artists coming from the state capital, it is also the case that some of the artists express their 
dissatisfaction with the fact that the Casa does not offer local artists any space to meet or work.  
Not surprisingly, I found strong differences in the number groups of visual artists working in 
the town. While in Nahuatzen I found a number of artists who work on individual paintings of 
saints. I only found one group of artists who collaborate for the creation of sky lanterns. In contrast, 
I found a very strong community of visual artists in Cherán. Not only did I find two groups of 
painters and visual artists who collaborate in the creation of monumental paintings, I also found 
nine groups of artists that have, for at least ten years, collaborated in the creation of sky lanterns (in 
total I found 0.63 groups of visual artists per 1000 people).  
I also inquired about the existence of organizations with the goal of organizing and 
promoting town celebrations. I found that, like most rural communities in Mexico, both towns have 
an annual festival to celebrate the saint to which their church is consecrated. Thus, each community 
has four committees (one per neighborhood) in charge of fundraising and organizing the activities 
for those occasions. However, in addition to these celebrations, community groups organize two 
other festivals every year. On one hand, a group of artists and professionals organize an annual 
festival to commemorate the anniversary of the promotion of Cherán to the category of 
municipality. On the other, a group of artists organizes an annual festival of sky lanterns in which 
teams and individuals from Cherán and the surrounding communities participate.  
In sum, I found both similarities and differences between the towns. I found similarities in 
the structures in which cultural activities are organized (an annual religious festival and a cultural 
center) and the type of cultural activities that take place in both towns (similar type of dances, similar 
outputs from visual arts, and similar musical tendencies). However, I found differences in the 
organization and prevalence of artistic groups between the communities. Not only did I find that 
there were more cultural organizations in Cherán than in Nahuatzen, I also found that while cultural 
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groups have been strongly centralized by the priest in Nahuatzen, in Cherán artistic groups are 
generally decentralized and independently funded.  
Multimedia  
Finally, I investigated media groups and organizations in both towns. That is, groups of 
citizens working on projects related to radio, television or cinema. These groups are important 
because they bring local news, debates of relevance for the local communities and often generate 
collective action and influence the community’s public opinion.  
Just as with the artistic organizations, media centers and organizations in both towns 
emerged through very different paths. While the priest has been the main proponent of radio, 
television, and cinema groups in Nahuatzen, in Cherán these groups emerged independently from 
the church or government.  
In Nahuatzen, media efforts have not been very fruitful. In 2012 the priest of Nahuatzen 
started a radio station that would generate cultural content until 2013, when the Purepechan New 
Year would take place in the town.50 During the time that the radio was active the priest invited 
citizens to participate in the programming, and eight groups of citizens contributed to the 
production of content. After the celebration of the New Year, however, the priest decided to donate 
the radio equipment to the community that would host the New Year festival the following year. 
Since then, there have not been radio groups in Nahuatzen. Additionally, from 2000 to 2010 the 
Priest produced a television station aimed at taking cultural content to the community; however, the 
station was self-administered and did not promote the emergence of any community organization. 
Finally, also as an initiative of the priest, Nahuatzen has a cinema administered by the church, which 
                                                     
50 The Purepechan New Year (also called the Festival of the New Fire) is a celebration in which citizens from the 
majority Purepechan towns from around the region present their traditional songs and dances. Additionally they lit a fire 
to signal the start of a new year. This celebration takes place once a year in February 2 and changes to a different town of 
the region every year.  
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is often used to raise fund for the local schools. Taking all groups into account, I found nine groups 
in Nahuatzen that have worked for the production of media content. Once the population of the 
town is taken into consideration this constitutes about 0.87 groups per 1000 people.  
In contrast, I found that in even before 2011, Cherán had 18 groups organizing to produce 
multimedia content (1.26 groups per 1000 people). Cherán has had a functioning radio station for at 
least 15 years. Even though the Pro-Indigenous National Institute founded the station in order to 
promote the Purepechan language, it also airs content in Spanish, and the majority, if not all its 
contributors are unpaid volunteers. Overall, after investigating the station’s records I found that in 
addition to all individually run programs, by 2011 Cherán’s radio station hosted nearly 19 shows that 
were coordinated by groups interested in topics relevant to the citizens of the area. Although Cherán 
never had a television station before the movement, after 2011 a group of activists donated the 
necessary components to start one; and, today, a group of six to ten young volunteers work together 
to produce material to air on TV-Cherán. Finally, although there is not a community cinema in 
Cherán, there is a group of young adults who have collaborated since 2008 in the production of 
documentaries about the town and the surrounding areas.  
In sum, there are important differences in the community media organizations in each town. 
This may be due to the centralization that the Nahuatzen’s priest has exerted over the funding and 
control of the infrastructure. However, it may also be explained by a difference in citizens’ 
willingness or capacity to organize to create media groups in both towns. Whatever the case, I found 
that by 2011 Cherán had more community groups participating in the creation of multimedia 
content. 
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Conclusion  
Under what conditions do citizens engage in Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement? I have 
argued that, in conditions in which citizens’ trust in the authorities has deteriorated significantly, 
citizens are more likely invest their social capital into the construction of extralegal collective law 
enforcement organizations. To examine this hypothesis further I have taken a closer look at the case 
that instigated the most recent wave of vigilantism in Mexico, the case of the town of Cherán.  
In doing so, I have proceeded in two steps. First I look at the narratives of citizens living in 
the town of Cherán. Second, in order to investigate whether social capital in Cherán was relatively or 
only apparently high I compared this town to a very similar municipality only 5 km away, the town 
of Nahuatzen.  
In my interviews, I found that the 2011 vigilante movement emerged in three stages, 
confrontation, self-defense and self-government. Moreover, I found that contrary to current believes 
the movement does not seem to have evolved spontaneously but to have involved significant 
premeditation. Additionally, I found that, in the narratives of my interviewees, distrust in the 
authorities and community cohesion played an important role for the emergence and success of each 
of the three stages of the movement.  
With respect to the relative levels of social capital I found that even before 2011 there were 
important differences in the prevalence and organization of community groups. Not only did I find 
evidence of a more decentralized community life in Cherán, I also found that in almost every rubric 
this town had almost twice the number of community organizations than Nahuatzen.  
The results described in this chapter have implications for the case of Cherán and, more 
generally, for our understanding of social capital and its role in democracies going through security 
crises.  
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Since the eruption of the 2011 movement, the case of Cherán in particular has fascinated the 
academic community of Mexico. While most authors have focused on the implications of Cherán’s 
legal fight for autonomy (Andrade, 2013; Cienfuegos Salgado, 2013; Mandujano Estrada, 2013; 
Patiño & Carmen, 2012) others have focused on a normative analysis of what the movement means 
for the Mexican state, capitalist structures, and liberal democracy more generally (Andrade, 2013; 
Calveiro, 2014). Only a precious few are empirically oriented, focusing on the way in which the 
movement has impacted democratic governance (Víctor Manuel, 2014), citizens’ feelings of security 
(González Candia, 2014) and their interaction with their territory (Velázquez Guerrero, 2013). With 
the exception of Velazquez Guerrero (2013), virtually every study reviewed dedicates only a minor 
section to describing the standard journalistic account of how the vigilante movement arose, and no 
study has focused specifically in the factors that led to its emergence.  
Thus, the findings of this chapter contribute in three ways to our understanding of this 
movement. First, the initial subsection of this chapter provides a timeline derived from first-hand 
accounts rather than second hand narratives formed during the months following the uprising. 
Although my results largely validate Velazquez Guerrero’s (2013) description of the evolution of the 
movement, they extend on it by identifying three critical moments in which citizens had to decide 
the course of the movement. This is suggestive of the political behavior displayed by the towns’ 
inhabitants which, I argue, is unlikely to be explained only by the threat posed by illegal logging.  
Second, this chapter deepens the empirical study the role social capital and distrust in the 
authorities as forces related with the emergence of this movement. Most studies of this case have 
argued in one way or the other that the strong community ties in Cherán made its citizens better 
able to develop the autonomous movement that today governs the town. Cendejas Arroyo and 
Sanchez (2015), for example, argue for the importance of a symbolic concept of communality as a 
strategy to which citizens of Cherán have appealed to face criminal violence, and Dosil (2014) 
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defends the idea that tradition has been used as a cohesive force to facilitate resistance not only in 
Cherán but also in other communities in the Purepechan plateau. My evidence yields support but 
also some challenges to these authors’ assumptions. While validating the idea that social capital 
currently runs high in Cherán, I find that it was high even before the 2011 events. Thus, to the 
extent that tradition and communality could have been already high before the uprising, my findings 
call us to take any claims about a significant impact of the movement on social cohesion with 
relative care.  
More generally, my findings have implications for the meaning of the most recent rise of 
vigilantism in Mexico and for the potential of these groups to extend throughout the country. On 
the one hand my findings suggest that vigilante actions are not merely a dramatic expression of 
outrage over nature of the crimes in which ordinary and organized criminals sometimes engage. 
They suggest that vigilante actions could also emerge out from a deep sense of desolation, distrust, 
and frustration with the dysfunctional performance of the state’s political and/or security 
institutions.  
Moreover, my findings suggest that citizens’ latent capacity to reach out to their community 
to engage in collective action to solve security problems (a.k.a. social capital) is likely to constrain the 
capacity of this type of movements to extend beyond the places where they originate. That is, due to 
the fact that vigilantism can result in important risks to those engaging in it, and that it is unlikely to 
be successful unless it can rely on widespread community participation, groups seeking to expand 
their fight against the cartels (like the auto-defensa groups of Michoacán) are unlikely to be successful 
in communities with low levels of social capital or with longstanding social divisions, even in the 
face of widespread distrust in the authorities.  
Ultimately, my results suggest that collective vigilante action is unlikely to emerge without 
warning. On the contrary, my findings seem to indicate that communities with strong social capital 
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may seek to engage in security coproduction before attempting to engage in vigilantism. If the case 
of Cherán is any indication for the psychology of those going through significant insecurity crises, it 
is only after citizens’ trust in the authorities erodes significantly that groups of citizens start to invest 
their social capital outside the purview of the state. 
Even more generally, the findings have implications for our understanding of social capital 
and how it manifests under insecurity crises. Evidence for the correlation between social capital, the 
quality of democracy (Newton, 1997; Putnam et al., 1994), and economic development (Coleman, 
1988; Fukuyama, 1996; Woolcock, 1998) has remained quite strong. However, it is important to 
highlight that these two variables do not necessarily go together. Under some circumstances, 
communities with high levels of social capital can be exposed to economic, political, and security 
crises and, under such circumstances, social capital can have distinct and quite puzzling effects. 
While, under some circumstances it can foster resilience (Aldrich, 2012), under others, social capital 
can have unexpected consequences that can put economic (Graeff, 2007), political (Armony, 2004), 
and democratic stability (Satyanath et al., 2013) at risk.  
First, my results challenge those who, like Putnam, view social capital as the driving force for 
a healthy society and urge us to view social capital as a resource rather than a normatively-charged 
variable. Indeed, the case of Cherán illustrates how, when faced by a crisis that put their lives and 
livelihood at risk, citizens can reach to their reservoir of collective action to surpass such challenges. 
This, in itself, does not need to pose a challenge for government or society; however, when citizen 
action involves the use of violence to restore security, it generates a serious challenge to the state if it 
does not involve the coproduction of security between the community and the state.  
Along this same line, my findings not only validate those contending for the existence of a 
“dark side of social capital”. They also provide supporting evidence for those noting the importance 
of citizens’ perceptions of the governments authorities as a moderating force for social capital 
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investment under crises (Della Porta, 2000; Sabet, 2014). Indeed, not only is there evidence for the 
preexisting strength of social networks in Cherán, but there are important indications that citizens 
attempted to coproduce security with the government, and, after failing to obtain collaboration from 
the local authorities they turned to collective action to face the loggers by themselves, to protect the 
town from the potential retaliation of the cartels, and, finally, to guarantee the long term security and 
stability of the town.  
Before concluding this chapter, however, it is important to recognize the limitations of this 
study. Although the first section provides contextualization to the general argument I defend, there 
are at least three limitations that need to be underlined.  
First, during my interviews I noted that citizens tend to justify the ongoing autonomy 
movement by asserting it as a source of good governance. Thus, interviewees may have had 
incentives to overstate the levels of corruption and illegitimacy of the pre-2011 administration. 
Although I consider it unlikely for this source of bias to completely reverse the general picture 
portrayed in this chapter, it is important to recognize that the negative portrayal of the PRI 
administration could have been exaggerated. 
Second, similar to the case of governance, during my stay in Cherán I found that citizens 
were eager to assert the movement as a source of unity. Indeed, a number of activists and scholars 
have framed the movement as a generator of community cohesion, and by the time I was in the 
town other academics working in the town had made their conclusions public to the inhabitants of 
the town. In this context, it is possible that the inhabitants might have had understated their 
retrospective perceptions of the state of social capital in the town before the 2011 uprising.  
Third, it is important to acknowledge the selection bias inherent to citizens’ discussion of the 
pre-organizational stage of the uprising. Although I spent considerable time building rapport with 
the interviewees and tried to be as careful as possible not to provide information that might lead to 
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the identification of my sources, a number of interviewees expressed concerns and did not want to 
discuss the organization of the uprising or censored their statements. Thus, it is possible that my 
interviews portray only a subset of the total number of community actions and organizations that 
participated in preparing the initial confrontation with the loggers.  
The second section has its own limitations. Although it allows me to test my argument to the 
specific case of Cherán, it does not allow me to test my argument more generally. To do this, it is 
necessary to analyze a larger pool of data containing variation in both dependent and independent 
variables while including a larger array of controls.  
In the next chapter (Chapter III), I turn to two sources of data (INEGI and LAPOP) to test 
my hypothesis in Mexico, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Then, in Chapter IV I conduct an 
attitudinal experiment that allows me to test the causal logic of my argument. Finally, in Chapter V, I 
design and implement a behavioral experiment in which I incorporate the potential costs of 
engaging (or not engaging) in vigilante behavior. 
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III. CONFRONTING CRIME BY OURSELVES: TRUST IN THE COMMUNITY, 
DISTRUST IN THE POLICE AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-CRIMINAL 
ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS THE AMERICAS 
In the previous chapter, I presented an exploration of how citizens of the town of Cherán 
mobilized their social resources to confront the cartel-sponsored illegal loggers that were devastating 
their forests when their trust in the authorities deteriorated significantly. However, how does the 
experience of the citizens of Cherán relates to that of others living in similar contexts?  
Across Mexico and Latin America, many regions have seen an increase in crime and violence 
over the last decade, and more and more citizens have begun to reach out to their neighbors as a 
potential source of protection against crime. While these anti-criminal organizations can remain 
inactive, they can, sometimes, attempt to seek justice extra-legally by punishing criminals or 
enforcing legally sanctioned norms without the participation of government authorities (what I call 
Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement [ECLE]). Under what circumstances are citizens more likely 
to form collective anti-crime organizations? And under what conditions do these organizations 
increase the likelihood of citizens to seek to engage in ECLE? 
In the previous two chapters I have presented a framework that sees the emergence of 
ECLE as the result of a choice between two potential security providers: the citizens of the 
community and the state’s authorities. Thus, I have hypothesized that citizens’ distrust in authorities 
may intensify the degree to which citizens invest their social capital in Extralegal Collective Law 
Enforcement.  
This chapter is divided in three main sections. In the first section I develop my thesis and 
derive expectations for the emergence of collective anti-crime organizations across Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Then, in the second section, I test my theory by evaluating the degree to which 
police trust moderates the degree to which trust in neighbors increases the likelihood that citizens of 
selected Latin American and Caribbean countries will participate in collective anti-crime 
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organizations. Then, in the third section, I evaluate the degree to which police trust moderates the 
degree to which these organizations influence citizens’ willingness to turn to their neighbors (rather 
than state authorities) as a source of extra-legal justice.  
To conduct these tests, I analyze data from the Mexico’s National Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (INEGI) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). I find that in 
Mexico and 16 other Latin American and Caribbean countries in a “low-level” security equilibrium 
(Bailey, 2009),51 police distrust moderates the degree to which trust in one’s neighbors increases the 
likelihood that citizens will join with them to defend themselves from crime. Moreover, even when I 
find that participating in these organizations is associated with an increased willingness to turn to the 
neighbors (rather than state authorities) as a source of justice after being victimized by crime, I also 
find that this connection is reduced (or disappears) among those who consider the police to be more 
trustworthy.  
Confronting Crime as a Community  
Since the 1980’s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have gone through 
significant political and economic transformations. However, few changes have marked citizens’ 
political attitudes and behavior as strongly as the rise of crime and insecurity. In less than ten years, a 
region that for centuries was regarded as a refuge for those escaping from war and persecution, 
today stands as the most violent subcontinent in the planet.  
In this context, citizens have taken a wide range of strategies to cope with crime. Some have 
set up physical barriers to protect their property; others have migrated to areas (or countries) with 
lower levels of insecurity. Still, a third set of citizens have joined with their neighbors to directly or 
                                                     
51 That is, countries with comparable levels of insecurity and rule of law.  
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indirectly defend themselves form crime. What factors increase citizens’ willingness to cope with 
crime in this way?  
The main contribution of this chapter is to look at the influence of citizens’ trust in their 
neighbors on the emergence of this type of behavior and to examine how trust in the authorities 
moderates this connection. However, before turning to these variables, it is important to address the 
direct effect of crime and insecurity on ECLE and other forms of political participation.  
The literature on the effect of crime on citizens’ attitudes towards vigilante justice suggests a 
positive connection between these two variables. Since their foundational work on democratization, 
Bremeo (1997b) and Diamond (1999) insist that insecurity can push citizens to reach for short term 
solutions that can put democratic governance at risk. And, in line with these scholars, a number of 
researchers have found Latinamericans to be more supportive of violating due process when 
victimized by crime.  
In the context of the low-equilibrium countries in Central America, for example, Malone 
(2012b) finds that citizens victimized by or fearful of crime are more supportive of extralegal police 
action and vigilante justice, and Cruz and Bateson find consistent evidence for Latin America as a 
whole. Cruz (2009), for instance, finds that citizens who perceive their neighborhoods to be less safe 
are more likely to regard it as acceptable for the police to violate the law in order to capture 
criminals. Bateson (2012), for her part, finds that citizens victimized by crime in the previous year 
were more likely to support citizens taking the law into their hands when the authorities do nothing 
to punish criminals. Seligson (2003) not only finds support for the connection between insecurity 
and support for vigilante justice, but he also finds this effect to be mediated by a deterioration of 
citizens’ support for democracy.  
In contrast with these findings, however, the literature on the connection between insecurity 
and political behavior unfortunately tends to be unclear and, at times, contradictory. While some 
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have argued and found evidence in favor of the idea that insecurity reduces citizens’ social trust as 
well as civic and political engagement (Trelles & Carreras, 2012; Walklate, 1998), others have argued 
(and also found evidence to support the contention) that “Rather than becoming withdrawn or 
disempowered, crime victims tend to become more engaged in civic and political life” (Bateson, 
2012, p. 1). Indeed, while some citizens and communities have become withdrawn as a result of the 
rise of violence in the region, there is no shortage of examples of ordinary citizens52 becoming anti-
crime activists after being personally affected by crime (R. T. Rojo-Mendoza, 2014). 
In sum, academic perspective on the role of insecurity is mixed. While scholars seem to 
agree that insecurity erodes citizens’ support for the rule of law, it is hard to speculate about the 
impact of this variable on citizens’ behavior. Indeed, the lack of consensus on whether it promotes 
or inhibits citizens’ civic and political engagement seems to suggest that it is necessary to look at 
other variables to better understand the conditions that increase citizens’ likelihood to start collective 
anti-crime organizations. In the following section I argue that in order to understand why citizens 
engage in collective anti-crime organization, it is important to look at their perceptions about two 
actors that are likely to influence the expected relative utility of engaging in anti-crime organizations 
(vis-a-vis engaging in security co-production).  
An Interactive Trust Hypothesis  
In forming collective anti-crime organizations and, ultimately, confronting crime outside of 
the purview of the authorities, citizens face both risks and opportunities. The expected relative utility 
of engaging in anti-crime organizing is not only contingent on citizens’ own behavior but also on the 
expected behavior of the agents surrounding them. The first actor to consider is government.  
                                                     
52 Note, for example, the cases of Manuel Mireles, a doctor who became the leader of the auto-defensa movement in 
Michoacán, and Javier Sicilia, a poet who became the leader of a broad anti-criminal civic movement after his son was 
assassinated in Mexico City.  
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Since his foundational 1968 work Power and Influence, Gamson, for instance, has highlighted 
the importance of trust in government as a determinant of citizens’ choice in attempts to influence 
the status quo through institutional or non-institutional channels. However, government is a large 
and multifaceted institution, and not all its agents are likely to be relevant for the emergence of 
ECLE. For the specific case of crime and insecurity, I argue, law enforcement agents (in particular 
the police) are the most relevant state representatives to consider. After all, as Malone once noted, 
“when victimized by a crime, citizens must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no 
one at all” (Malone, 2012b, p. 127).  
On one hand, law enforcement authorities can influence citizens’ likelihood of finding justice 
on their own or reporting crime to the police. On the other, they influence citizens’ likelihood of 
incurring in legal fines (or jail time) when the latter attempt to take the law into their own hands. 
Thus, trust in law enforcement is likely to influence citizens’ perception of the relative utility of 
engaging in institutional (security-coproduction) or non-institutionalized actions (like ECLE) to cope 
with crime and, ultimately, in their decision to report crime or start an independent, collective anti-
crime organization.  
Some researchers have noted, for instance, that citizens are more likely to collaborate with 
police efforts to fight crime when they have stronger trust in the authorities. Tyler and his 
collaborators, for instance, have found that, when citizens perceive that the police as having similar 
values to those of their community or that they are likely to apply fair procedures when processing 
those detained, they are more likely to follow the law and collaborate with the police to prevent 
crime (Hough et al., 2010; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). 
For their part, scholars interested in the evaluation of police reform in Latin America have 
noted that, although governments and international agencies have invested millions in the 
implementation of Community-Oriented Policing programs, the deep-seated distrust among the 
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parts involved in these efforts has caused them to advance very slowly (Arias & Ungar, 2009; Sabet, 
2014).  
But beyond its effects on security co-production, distrust in the authorities can also have 
important consequences on citizens’ willingness to rely on them as a source of justice. Diamond 
(1999), for instance, notes that it is in the “context of weak states and inefficient, poorly disciplined 
police” (p. 91) where citizens may react to crime by taking desperate reactions to achieve security. 
Further, Bailey (2009, 2014) warns that an eroded citizen-state relationship can submerge states into 
a low-level security equilibrium in which crime, corruption, and impunity influence the behavior of 
citizens and state officials and vice-versa. 
Thus, there are reasons to think that, when attempting to take action to face crime, citizens 
are less likely to turn to the authorities when they deem them to be untrustworthy. Malone, for 
example, found that among citizens living in low-level-equilibrium Central American countries 
(Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador), a perception that the judicial system is unlikely to punish 
criminals translated into a lower probability of citizens being willing to denounce crime and 
concluded: “reporting crime indicates that people accept, at least begrudgingly, the legal system and 
its authorities as the legitimate arbiters of justice” (Malone, 2012b, p. 127).  
For his part, in his evaluation of the community oriented policing programs in Central 
America, Ungar (2009) notes how, in some areas of Honduras, violence continued to rise even after 
the implementation of the Mano Amiga program. This was due to the fact that, in the face of 
untrustworthy authorities, citizens re-directed the social resources strengthened by the program into 
vigilante actions.  
In sum, distrust in the authorities is likely to inform both citizens’ willingness to participate 
in crime-prevention programs and their likelihood to report crime to the police once they have been 
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victimized. However, what propels citizens to form collective anti-crime organizations rather than 
taking individual-level measures?  
In the following section I argue that, when citizens’ distrust law enforcement, their 
perception of the strength and availability of their social resources may increase the probability that 
they will turn to their community and engage in collective anti-criminal action. Consistently, I 
hypothesize that it will be among those who distrust in the police, where trust in the neighbors will 
be more strongly associated with an increased likelihood of joining together to engage in anti-
criminal self-defense organizations. Further, I hypothesize that, among those more distrusting of the 
authorities, the availability of these organizations is more likely to increase citizens’ willingness to 
turn to their neighbors (rather than the state) as a source of extra-legal justice.  
Social Capital When the Authorities Cannot Be Trusted 
Since the influential work of de Tocqueville (1863), social capital has been regarded as a 
predictor of state-tropic participation (participation within the state). Fukuyama, Putnam, and others 
have argued that social networks and the rules of trust in reciprocity that emerge from them (a.k.a. 
social capital) can be associated with both economic and political development (Fukuyama, 1996; 
Putnam et al., 1994).  
Social capital has been shown to make citizens more likely to participate in a group when 
individual benefit is unclear or far removed (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam et al., 1994), to increase citizens’ 
perception that their group will be collectively efficacious (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et 
al., 2001), and to provide citizens with a social network that facilitates the flow of information and 
resources making collective problem solving easier (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Although this 
variable has been considered to be conducive to a better functioning democracy, there seems to be 
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no mechanisms preventing social capital from translating into extra-state political behavior (actions 
outside the state).  
Indeed, as other scholars have argued, in contexts in which trust in state authorities has 
eroded significantly, more efficacious citizens may be more likely to attempt to influence 
government through non-institutionalized means (Gamson, 1968) or seek to exit the state entirely 
(Hirschman, 1978). When doing so, citizens may redirect their efforts outside or against the 
democratic state, resulting in the emergence of criminal, anti-state, and even pro-authoritarian 
organizations (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath et al., 2013). 
In line with this view, I argue that under conditions in which citizens distrust the state 
authorities, citizens with more social capital may be more likely to channel it into collective anti-
criminal action rather than investing their social capital in direct cooperation. Moreover, I contend 
that, when citizens distrust in the authorities, they are more likely to direct their social resources to 
Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE) rather than directing their anti-criminal efforts into 
security-co-production with the state. 
This argument finds some support in previous scholarship. Mendoza (2006), for instance, 
defends that the most recent wave of vigilante justice in Guatemala can be explained by solidarity 
among co-ethnics (which trumps barriers for collective action), particularly in areas where the state 
fails to provide its citizens the most basic goods and services (e.g., indigenous municipalities). From 
his analysis of MINUGA’s data in that country, Mendoza concludes that “the main structural factors 
affecting the lynching hazard are the solidarity among ethnic fellows within the indigenous 
communities, and the number of courts (per capita) in each municipality” (p.1). 
Similarly, Malone (2012b) defends social cohesion as a critical factor whose relevance is 
moderated by citizens’ distrust in the state. After noting that “under vigilantism, citizens band 
together and engage in collective action to sanction those they suspect of criminal activity” (p.117), 
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Malone highlights that, “in order for the perceived failure of the justice system to translate into 
collective action, citizens would need to have some sense of solidarity with other members of their 
community and view citizen action as a viable means for achieving their goals.” (p.117) 
In sum, Latin America seems to be going through one of the most serious crises of 
insecurity in its history. This crisis not only has the potential to undermine citizens’ well-being but 
also to put democratic governance in check. While corruption, crime, and impunity can erode 
democratic institutions and government directly, they can also foster a low-level equilibrium that 
shapes the way citizens cope with crime. It is in this equilibrium where citizens’ distrust in the 
authorities can move them to mobilize their social capital to provide themselves with the goods and 
services the state fails to provide.  
Study 1: Collective Anti-Criminal Action in Mexico  
Perhaps the most paradigmatic case of ECLE in the last five years is the case of Mexico. 
Whether it is in the form of neighborhood watches, communitarian polices, or paramilitary self-
defense movements, an increasing number of Mexicans have turned to their neighbors to confront 
crime directly.  
In large urban centers like Mexico City citizens have associated with the neighbors in their 
street or district to illegally close streets, install video cameras, purchase radio communicators and 
even install communal alarms (Rivera, 2011; Salgado, 2014). While these actions have often been 
tolerated by the authorities it is not uncommon for these organizations to post signs trying to deter 
crime by promising violent ECLE. A sign posted in a lamppost in the Xochimilco neighborhood of 
Mexico City, for example, warns: 
Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you, we will not take you to the authorities we will 
lynch you! (Author’s translation)  
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But collective anti-criminal action has not been limited to the urban centers of Mexico. 
Citizens living in rural communities across the country have also turned to their neighbors to defend 
themselves from crime. Towns in states as diverse as Michoacán, Guerrero, Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
Veracruz, and Chihuahua (Rea, 2013; Reyes Maciel, 2013; Villalpando, 2009) have expelled the state-
appointed police forces in their town and created their own citizen-operated policías comunitarias 
(community police forces). While most of these policías comunitarias have focused on investigating and 
prosecuting crime within their communities, others have been more aggressive and formed a 
movimiento de auto-defensa (self-defense movement) to pursue the drug cartels in a paramilitary fashion 
(Malkin & Villegas, 2014).  
 All and all, in the last ten years Mexico has seen an increase in collective anti-crime 
organizations that, although at times are willing to collaborate with the authorities, often carry out 
actions that challenge the rule of law and bring democratic governance into question (Melgar, 
2013).53 What role has citizens’ trust in their neighbors had on the emergence of collective anti-
criminal actions in this country? 
Methods  
In order to study why citizens participate in ECLE in Mexico, I analyze two of the largest 
victimization surveys that have been conducted in the country. In 2010 and 2011, the National 
Institute of Informatics Geography and Statistics of Mexico (INEGI) collected two very similar 
surveys aimed at reviewing citizens’ experiences with crime. Although different in name, the 
National Insecurity Survey (ENSI-2010) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of 
Public Safety (ENVIPE-2011) are similar in content, methodology, and scope. Not only did both 
studies implement a multistage random sampling design that allows us to derive inferences 
                                                     
53 For instance, although it rarely results in violence, the hundreds of streets that inhabitants of Mexico City have closed 
illegally in order to attempt to control who enters their street have created a real problem for authorities trying to 
guarantee citizens’ free transit across the city (Rivera, 2011).  
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representative at the state level (N=60,461 and 66,865 respectively).54 They were also based on 
almost identical questionnaires. 
In addition to the standard demographic questions, the two surveys asked Mexicans about 
their crime victimization history, about their perceptions of insecurity and about their trust in their 
neighbors and the police. Crucially, in addition to these questions both ENSI and ENVIPE surveys 
included the following question, “In the previous 12 months, they had taken joint action with their 
neighbors to defend themselves from crime [Yes or No]? (To be concise, I refer to this variable as 
“Collective Anti-Criminal Action”). 55,56 
While 14.42% of Mexicans were victims of some sort of crime in 2010, 36.04% of Mexicans 
were victimized by crime in 2011.57 Additionally, in both years, about 39.35% of Mexicans reported 
feeling unsafe in their neighborhood. Yet a plurality of Mexicans expressed “a lot of trust” towards 
neighbors. In 2010 31.43% of citizens marked this category, and in 2011 40.48% did. This translated 
into a slight increase in the overall average, so that on a one (no trust) to four (a lot of trust) scale, 
Mexicans went from 2.79 in 2010 to 2.96 in 2011.  
Although INEGI was careful to keep the wording of questions and questionnaire placement 
consistent across the ENSI and ENVIPE studies, it took a slightly different approach to the 
measurement of trust in the police in 2010 and 2011. While in ENSI-2010 INEGI included three 
                                                     
54 The ENSI-2010’s fieldwork was conducted from August 2 to September 3 of 2010. The complex sample included 303 
strata and 8,467 primary sample units (PSUs). The ENVIPE-2011, for its part, was conducted from March 14 to April 
22 of 2011. The complex random sample included 324 strata and 10,025 PSUs. In both surveys a probability weight was 
included to obtain representativeness at the subnational level. 
55 See Appendix I for a full list of question wordings. 
56 It is important to note that, although I have found that citizens consistently recall police-community collaborative 
endeavors, the question does not specify that the actions have to be extralegal. To the extent that this question recover 
acts of collaboration between citizens and the police my conclusions may be a conservative estimate of the effects that 
would be found had the question asked explicitly about extralegal actions.  
57 It is important to take this difference in crime victimization with a grain of salt as there are important differences in 
the victimization question across surveys. First, in 2010 INEGI asked citizens whether they, a minor, or someone else 
had been victimized in or outside of the state in 4 different questions (in-state victim, out-of-state victim, minor victim). 
In 2011 INEGI used a single general question and only then asked citizens to distinguish who was victimized and where. 
Second, while in 2010 INEGI asked citizens whether they were victim of “a crime,” in 2011 INEGI asked citizens 
whether they suffered one of the crimes on a list. Thus, the difference may be explained by measurement difference in 
addition (or instead of) actual victimization.  
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“trust in the police” items, in the ENVIPE-2011 study it included only one. In 2010 citizens were 
asked about their trust in the municipal, state, and federal police forces. INEGI found that citizens’ 
trust in the police across the three different administrative levels is highly correlated (0.63 average 
inter-item correlation). Perhaps due to this fact, in 2011 INEGI decided to include only one item 
measuring citizens’ general trust in the police. 
To be able to evaluate the change in citizens’ trust in the police, I created an additive index 
with the 2010 scale. Although at the expense of the nuance provided by the original battery, the 
police trust index provides us with a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83) that is likely to tap on a 
similar dimension to the 2011 item. Overall, Mexicans showed a low and decreasing trust in the 
police. In a one (no trust) to four (a lot of trust) scale, citizens’ trust in the police went from about 
1.97 in 2010 to about 1.87 in 2011. In sum, this results show that by the time both surveys were 
conducted citizens’ trust in their neighbors and general distrust in the police were high and rising.  
Finally, my descriptive analyses of both ENSI-2010 and ENVIPE-2011 show that the year 
previous to the 2010 survey 11.6% of Mexicans took joint action with their neighbors to defend 
themselves from crime and that, during the twelve months before the 2011 survey, 8.5% of 
Mexicans engaged in some form of Collective Anti-Criminal Action. But what can these data tell us 
about the factors that contribute to citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action? In order to 
answer this question, I specified the following logistic regression model: 
 
1)  
Here, the probability of a respondent to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action 
(AntiCrime) is modeled as a function of his trust in his neighbors (Trust N), his distrust in the 
police (Distrust P), whether he or she has been a victim of a crime (Crime Victim) and his/her 
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perception that the neighborhood in which he/she lives is unsafe (Insecurity). But, in addition to 
these variables it is important to account for the other factors that have also been linked to the 
emergence of ECLE and that might also be linked with citizens’ involvement in anti-crime 
organizations. 
Particularly, journalists and scholars specializing in Latin America have suggested a 
connection between areas of strong indigenous traditions and the emergence of communitarian 
guards, and anti-criminal mob-violence (Vilas, 2009). Although the logic behind this claim has been 
strongly challenged (Fernandez, 2004; Handy, 2004), Mendoza (2006) found a correlation between 
the density of indigenous population and the prevalence of lynching in Guatemala. To the extent 
that an indigenous ethnic identity could be linked to an individual’s social capital, trust in the 
authorities and, ultimately, his/her willingness to engage in anti-criminal action, it is important to 
account for this variable in the model.58  
Unfortunately, neither the ENSI nor ENVIPE surveys collected information about the 
ethnic background of the respondent; however, the 2010 census provides information about the 
percentage of households in a municipality in which the head of family speaks an indigenous 
language. I specify this proportion as a respondent’s likelihood to have an indigenous identity 
(Indigenous). That said, it is important to underscore that I included this variable as control of 
substantive importance. Any results derived from this variable ought to be taken with extreme 
precaution since the size of the standard error is likely to be underestimated.  
Finally, in order to test the interactive trust hypothesis, I include the interaction between 
citizens’ trust in their neighbors and distrust in the police. This interaction is represented by the 
                                                     
58 Recall that Mendoza (2009) goes as far to regard this variable (the density of ethnic co-ethnics) as an indicator of social 
capital. Moreover, note that from his study of lynchings in Bolivia, Goldstein (2004, 2012) concludes that rather than an 
expression of cultural identity, spectacular acts of ECLE violence are linked to an attempt to broadcast cohesion and 
collective efficacy in a context of state marginalization. 
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multiplicative term Trust N x Distrust P. To recap, if distrust in the police moderates the effect of 
trust in the neighbors, then I expect this multiplicative term to be positive and significant.  
Before moving to the results of the model, it is important to explain the two terms 
highlighted in equation 1. The term Φ’CONTROLS’ represents a vector of control variables. 
These include demographic variables such as Sex, Education, Age and Size of the Locality as well as 
other relevant variables such as perceptions of Insecurity in the State, perceptions of the trend of 
Crime in the State and perception of the trend of Crime in the City. Additionally I also included 
controls for respondents’ reports of Alcohol Consumption, Illegal Alcohol Sales, Drug 
Consumption, Gunfire, Gangs, Gun Sales, Assaults, Extortions, Floor Charges, Drug Stores, 
Kidnappings and Piracy Sales in his/her Neighborhood.59 All variables were recoded from 0 to 1.  
Finally, it is necessary to point out that for the sake of parsimony (and because the results 
from each year support the same conclusions) I pooled together the data from both surveys. The 
term Φ’FIXED EFFECTS’ refers to a vector of 64 dummy variables that identify each state-year 
included in the final merge. These variables capture all variance at this label and, therefore, even 
when the results come from a pooled model, the analyses only assume exchangeability within each 
state-year.60  
Results  
Table 1 shows the results from the model in equation 1 (full results available in Appendix 
I.I). As this table shows, there is a statistically significant effect of insecurity on citizens’ likelihood to 
engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action.  
                                                     
59 Unfortunately, the National Insecurity Survey did not include a direct measure of household income. Although the 
omitted variable bias introduced by the omission of this variable cannot be completely accounted for, it is likely to be 
attenuated by the inclusion of Education and Occupation controls. Education was included and presented in all 
models. For parsimony, occupation was not included in the models shown; however, the results are robust to including 
dummy variables for each occupation (results of this model are available upon request: see Appendix III).  
60 Additionally, I ran all of the analyses and robustness tests in the ENSI-2010 and ENVIPE-2011 separately. The results 
show that the findings are not an expression of a single year. The interaction is significant in each dataset independently 
(see Appendix II) 
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Overall, a maximum change in 
insecurity is predicted to be associated 
with a 9.18 percent increase 
(henceforward, a 9.18% increase) in the 
probability of a citizen to engage in 
joint action with their neighbors to 
defend themselves from crime. As 
Figure 8a shows, while those who 
report that they feel safe in their 
neighborhood have a 0.098 probability 
of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal 
Action, those who report feeling unsafe, 
have a probability of 0.107 of engaging 
in this type of behavior.61 
For its part, crime victimization also has a positive effect on citizens’ likelihood of engaging 
in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Overall, crime victimization is predicted to be associated with a 
36.97% increase in the probability of a citizen to engage in joint action with their neighbors to 
defend themselves from crime. As can be seen in Figure 8b, those who were not victimized by crime 
in the previous year have a 0.093 probability of engaging in ECLE. For their part, those who 
reported that they had been victimized have a probability of 0.127 of to engage in joint action with 
their neighbors to defend themselves from crime.62  
                                                     
61 Probabilities are calculated using STATA’s margins command. This command calculates the overall probabilities using 
a logit link function and setting all other covariates at their means. I also test the role of insecurity as a factor 
conditioning the moderating effect of distrust in the police. Although statistically insignificant, the effects seem to go in 
the expected direction (See Appendix IV). 
62 However it may also be the case that, ironically, by engaging in collective anti-criminal actions citizens expose 
themselves to a higher risk of being victimized by crime.   
Table 1. Interactive Effect of Trust in the Neighbors 
and Distrust in the Police on the Probability of 
Engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action 
 ENSI/ENVIPE 
 2010-2011 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Trust in Neighbors 0.784*** (0.131) 
Distrust in the Police -0.563*** (0.140) 
Trust in Neighbors x 
Distrust in the Police 
0.525*** (0.168) 
Crime Victimization 0.377*** (0.0338) 
Insecurity 0.0915** (0.0375) 
Indigenous -0.475*** (0.159) 
Age 0.124* (0.0731) 
Female 0.0435 (0.0286) 
Education 1.119*** (0.0999) 
Size of Locality 0.226*** (0.0263) 
Constant -2.901*** (0.175) 
Fixed Effects 64 State-Year 
Observations 115,727 
Design- based robust standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
stratification, clustering and weighting. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. See full results in Appendix I.I. For a complete list of 
question wording see Appendix I. 
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Figures 8a.-8c.Insecurity, Crime, Ethnicity and Anti-Crime Organization  
                   Figure 8a        Figure 8b    Figure 8c 
 
 
For its part, the effect of the density of indigenous language speakers seems to run against 
the indigenous culture hypothesis. Once other variables are accounted for, indigenous density does 
not seem to have a positive but a negative effect on Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Once more, as 
citizens’ ethnicity is not measured but only approximated by the indigenous density in his 
municipality, these results need to be taken with a very big grain of salt. Still, Figure 8c shows a 
graphical display of the relation between indigenous density and a citizens’ likelihood to engage in 
Collective Anti-Criminal Action.  
Finally, the shaded row in Table 1 shows that, as expected, distrust in the police positively 
and significantly moderates the effect of trust in the neighbors.  That is, the coefficient suggests that, 
as distrust in the police increases, the effect of trust in the neighbors also increases (see Figure 9a). 
Figure 9b illustrates the moderating effect of distrust in the police more closely. The vertical axis in 
the figure displays the estimated probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action and the 
horizontal axis displays citizens’ trust in their neighbors.  
Additionally, the figure distinguishes the effect among those who trust (clear-solid line) and 
those who distrust in the police (dark, dashed line). The figure shows that as citizens’ trust in their 
neighbors increases so does their probability of engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. But more 
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relevant to my argument, it shows that the degree to which citizens’ likelihood of engaging in 
Collective Anti-Criminal Action increases in response to changes in citizens’ trust in the neighbors is 
greater among those more distrustful of the police (dashed-dark line) than those who trust in the 
authorities (clear-solid line).  
Figures 9a. and 9b. Marginal Effect of Trust in the Neighbors on Anti-Crime 
Organization as Moderated by Distrust in Law Enforcement 
Figure 9a Figure 9b 
  
Indeed, among those with the lowest level of distrust in the police, a maximum change in 
trust in the neighbors is associated with a 92.46% increase in the probability of engaging in 
Collective Anti-Criminal Action (going from 0.076 to 0.146). However, among those with the 
highest level of distrust in the police, a maximum change in trust in the neighbors is predicted to be 
associated with a 210.36% increase in the respondents’ probability of engaging in Collective Anti-
Criminal Action (going from 0.046 to 0.142).  
To summarize across the broader set of results, the analyses show that older, more educated 
Mexicans living in larger communities with a lower proportion of indigenous-language speakers are 
more likely to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Moreover, I find that, consistent with Malone 
(2012) and Seligson’s (2003) attitudinal findings, those who have been victims of crime and/or do 
not feel safe in their neighborhood are more likely to engage in joint actions with their neighbors to 
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defend themselves from crime. Finally, in line with my hypothesis, I find distrust in the police to 
significantly moderate the positive effect of citizens’ trust in the neighbors. While among both 
sectors trust in the neighbors translates into an increased probability to participate to participate in 
Collective Anti-Criminal Actions, it is among Mexicans with the maximum level of distrust in the 
police where the effect is the strongest. 63,64 
 However, it is important to point out 
that Mexico is not the only country in which 
collective anti-crime organizations have 
emerged. Other countries under security crisis 
and in which impunity and corruption are 
rampant (what Bailey (2009) would call a low 
level equilibrium) have also seen the emergence 
of this type of groups. Traditionally indigenous 
countries like Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia have 
been noted for their rural anti-criminal organizations. However, both Brazil and Argentina also have 
old and recent problems with citizens taking the law into their own hands (Barbara, 2015; De Souza 
Martins, 1991; El País, 2014). As much as four thousand miles away, a banner almost identical to the 
one found in Mexico (Figure 10) hangs from a lamppost in the Los Hornos neighborhood in Santa 
Fe, Argentina, warning bystanders of the presence of a collective anti-crime organization. To what 
                                                     
63 Other authors have looked at the privatization of security as an indirect indicator of indirect-ECLE (Malone, 2012a; 
Ungar, 2007).To further assess the validity of my results, I replicated all the analyses using citizens´ likelihood to join 
together with their neighbors to hire private security for a public space (their street or neighborhood) as an alternative 
dependent variable. I find that distrust in the authorities activates the degree in which citizens´ trust in their neighbors 
translates into an increased likelihood of collectively investing in private security for public spaces. See Appendix V.    
64 Note that, by itself, ENSI/ENVIPE´s individual level data cannot disentangle the simultaneous relation between 
citizens’ trust in their neighbors and their participation in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions. To produce a test robust to 
this type of endogeneity, I conducted a lagged variable test by aggregating the data from both surveys at the municipal 
level and conducting a series of lagged variable analyses. In almost every case these analyses support the interactive trust 
hypothesis (See Appendix VI). 
Figure 10. Sign Posted in the “Los Hornos” 
Neighborhood in the City of Santa Fe 
(Argentina) 
 
“Neighbors Organized! Thief, if we catch you we will not 
take you to the police station, we will lynch you!” Authors’ 
translation. Source: El Día (2014) 
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extent are the results found in Mexico reflective of the reality of the rest of the “low level 
equilibrium” countries of the Americas?  
Study 2: Collective Anti-Crime Organization in Latin America and the Caribbean  
To assess the robustness of the core finding presented above, I turn to the data that the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has collected from 2004 to 2014 in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Particularly, I look at the AmericasBarometer, a biennial survey designed with 
the objective of recovering citizens’ political attitudes, experiences and behavior with a high degree 
of comparability across countries and waves. As part of this survey, LAPOP conducts a minimum of 
1,500 face to face interviews in most of the independent democracies of the hemisphere.  
In addition to the standard demographic questions, voting age adults are asked about their 
political and democratic attitudes, perceptions of insecurity, crime victimization profiles, perception 
of the trustworthiness of their neighbors and perception of the trustworthiness of the police. 
Importantly, in 60 country years, LAPOP asked citizens whether, “In the last 12 months out of fear 
of being a victim of crime, they had organized with the neighbors of their community [Yes or No]” 
(For short I refer to this variable as Collective Anti-Crime Organization). 
Following the work of and Bailey (2014) and Malone (2012) I expect citizens living in 
countries with relatively lower levels of insecurity and a stronger rule of law to behave differently 
than citizens living in what Bailey would call a “low level equilibrium”.  
Thus, I restrict my analysis to countries with comparable levels of criminal violence, 
corruption and impunity. Specifically, I analyze data from Mexico (2012 and 2014), Guatemala 
(2008, 2012 and 2014), El Salvador (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014), Honduras (2008, 2010, 2012 and 
2014), Colombia (2012 and 2014), Ecuador (2012 and 2014), Bolivia (2012 and 2014), Peru (2012 
and 2014), Paraguay (2012 and 2014), Brazil (2012 and 2014), Venezuela (2012 and 2014), Argentina 
(2012 and 2014), Dominican Republic (2012 and 2014), Haiti (2012 and 2014), Jamaica (2012 and 
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2014), Guyana (2012 and 2014), and Belize (2008, 2012 and 2014).65 The countries excluded from 
the analysis were the Bahamas, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Nicaragua, the United States, and Canada.  
In order to replicate my previous 
results, I re-specified equation 1 in the 
AmericasBarometer data. In this model, 
the probability of a respondent to engage 
in Collective Anti-Crime Organization 
is a function of his trust in his neighbors 
(Trust N), his distrust in the police 
(Distrust P), his position as a victim of a 
crime (Crime Victim) and his perception 
about the insecurity of the neighborhood 
in which he lives (Insecurity).66  
In contrast to the ENSI/ENVIPE 
surveys, LAPOP did ask respondents 
whether they identified with an ethnic 
group. Thus, in this model, the variable Indigenous represents a dichotomous variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the respondent self-identified as indigenous and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that, 
since I also included dummy variables for those who identify themselves as Mestizo, Black, Mulato, 
and Other races, β6 captures the difference between self-identified Indigenous and White 
respondents.  
                                                     
65 The missing years among some low level equilibrium countries (e.g. Guatemala 2010, Belize 2010) are due to LAPOP 
not including the question in those questionnaires.  
66 Again, see Appendix I for details about question wording. 
Table 2. Interactive Effect of Trust in the 
Neighbors and Distrust in the Police on the 
Probability of Engaging in Collective Anti-
Criminal Action 
 Americas Barometer  
2008-2014 
 Coefficient Standard 
 Error 
Trust in Neighbors -0.00625 (0.0953) 
Distrust in the Police -0.208** (0.0972) 
Trust in Neighbors x 
 Distrust in the Police 
0.320** (0.141) 
Crime Victimization 0.456*** (0.0310) 
Insecurity 0.752*** (0.0506) 
Indigenous 0.523*** (0.0699) 
Age 1.270*** (0.256) 
Female -0.0887*** (0.0239) 
Education 0.102* (0.0579) 
Size of Locality 0.146*** (0.0525) 
Constant -2.363*** (0.171) 
Fixed Effects 40 Country-Years 
Observations 51,787 
Design-based robust standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
stratification, clustering and weighting. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. See full results in Appendix I.I. For a complete list of 
question wording, see Appendix I. 
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Importantly, in order to test the interactive trust hypothesis, I include the interaction 
between citizens’ trust in their neighbors and distrust in the police. This interaction is represented by 
the multiplicative term Trust N x Distrust P. As we recall, if distrust in the police moderates the 
effect of trust in the neighbors, I expect this multiplicative term to be positive and significant.  
Similar to the model for Mexico, the term Φ’CONTROLS’ represents a vector of control 
variables including Sex, Education, Age, Size of the Locality and an individual level variable for 
Wealth. The latter, captures the respondent’s level of wealth within the urban/rural stratum of the 
country in which he lives based in his possession of consumer goods. In addition to these controls I 
also included variables to account for respondents’ Support for Vigilante Justice, Support for 
Democracy, Perceptions that the Justice System Punishes Criminals, Perceptions that the 
Administration Improves Citizen Safety, and Support for a Military Coup in Case of High 
Levels of Crime. All variables were recoded to run from 0 to 1 to show maximum effects. 
Finally, the term Φ’FIXED EFFECTS’ refers to a vector of dummy variables that uniquely 
identify each of the 40 country-years included in the analysis. These variables capture all of the 
outcome’s variation at the country-year level so that exchangeability only has to be assumed within 
each country-year.  
Table 2 shows the results from fitting equation 1 to the rest of the low-level equilibrium 
countries in the Americas (see Appendix I.I for the full set of results). In almost every case the 
results are consistent with the analysis conducted in Mexico.  
First, the data show a positive and statistically significant association between insecurity and 
citizens’ likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization. The pooled model shows 
that a minimum to maximum change in citizens’ feelings of insecurity is associated with a 77.35% 
increase in the probability of a citizen to organize with his neighbors out of fear of crime. As can be 
seen in Figure 11a, those who feel very safe in their neighborhood have a 0.14 probability of 
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engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization, while those who report feeling very unsafe have a 
probability of 0.25 of engaging in this type of behavior.  
Second, Table 2 shows a positive and statistically significant association between 
victimization and citizens’ likelihood of engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization. Overall, 
crime victimization is associated with a 40.61% increase in the probability of a citizen to organize 
with the neighbors of his community out of fear of crime. As Figure 11b shows, those who were not 
victimized by crime the year previous to the survey have a 0.17 chance of engaging in ECLE. For 
their part, those who were victimized have a probability of 0.24 of organizing with the neighbors of 
the community to defend themselves from crime.  
Third, in stark contrast to the Mexico results, I find that citizens who self-identify as 
indigenous are more likely to organize with their neighbors in response to criminal threats than any 
other ethnic group. As Figure 11c shows, for example, other things constant, the probability that a 
self-described indigenous respondent (0.26) will engage in Collective Anti-Crime Organization is 
46.42% larger than the probability that a self-reported white or mestizo citizen will engage in this 
type of behavior (0.18).  
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Figures 11a.-11c. Determinants of Anti-Crime Organization in Low Security Equilibrium 
Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
Figure 11a Figure 11b Figure 11c 
 
 
Figures 12a. and 12b. Effect of Trust in the Neighbors as Moderated by Distrust in the 
Police 
Figure 12a Figure 12b 
  
Once more, the positive and statistically significant interaction between distrust in the police 
and trust in the neighbors brings supporting evidence for my hypothesis. As can be seen in Figure 
12a, as distrust in the police increases, so does the effect of trust in the neighbors. Figure 12b 
follows the same logic of Figure 9b. This time, Figure 12b shows that, among those with the highest 
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level of trust in the police (clear-solid line), a mini-max change in trust in the neighbors cannot be 
associated with any change in the likelihood that a citizen will seek to organize with their neighbors 
against crime. In contrast, among those who distrust the police most intensely, a maximum change 
in trust in the neighbors is predicted to be associated with a statistically significant 78.74% increase 
in the respondents’ probability of engaging in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization (going from 
0.16 to 0.21). 67 
All in all, the results obtained for Mexico seem to be reflective of the reality faced by citizens 
living in countries with comparable levels of insecurity and rule of law. In line with my analysis of 
Mexico, I find that citizens living in the “low-level equilibrium” countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean are more likely to engage in ECLE when they have been victimized by crime and/or feel 
unsafe in the neighborhood in which they live. Additionally, in contrast to the previous results, I 
find that respondents self-identifying as indigenous are more rather than less likely to engage in 
ECLE.68  
Finally, I find additional evidence in support of the idea that citizens’ distrust in the police 
significantly moderates the effect of citizens’ trust in the neighbors. While among those who trust in 
the police, trust in the neighbors could not be associated to a significant increase in citizens’ 
likelihood to engage in Collective Anti-Crime Organization, among those who distrust the police, an 
increase in citizens’ trust in their neighbors is associated with an increase in citizens’ likelihood of 
organizing with them in response to crime.  
                                                     
67 I also considered the change in the marginal effect of distrust in the police as a function of citizens’ trust in their 
neighbors. I found that, among citizens who trust in their neighbors, trust in the police does not significantly change 
citizens’ likelihood of participating in a collective anti-crime organization.  However, among those who distrust in their 
neighbors, a maximum change in citizens’ distrust in the police is associated with a 14.81% decrease in a citizens’ 
likelihood of participating in a collective anti-crime organization. This may be due to a shift of the locus of management 
across both situations. That is, in contexts of strong social cohesion, collective anti-crime organizations might be 
managed by citizens. Therefore, trust in the police might only play a small role in their emergence. However, in contexts 
in which social cohesion is low, collective anti-crime organizations might be more actively managed by the authorities. 
Thus, it is here where citizens’ trust in the authorities might be more likely to play a role (see Appendix VII, Figure A2 
for an illustration). 
68 This could be explained either by the inconsistency of the measure across models or by the differences in indigenous 
cultures across the Americas. Further research is necessary to arrive to a thorough explanation of this inconsistency. 
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Study 3: Collective Anti-Crime Organization and ECLE  
Although the previous analysis taps into the factors that contribute to the emergence of 
Collective Anti-Crime Organization, a skeptical reader would point out that it is unclear the extent 
to which citizens’ participation in a neighborhood-based attempt to address crime translates into 
extralegal action. Under what circumstances do citizens’ collective anti-crime efforts translate into a 
willingness to reach out for the neighbors, rather than the state, in search for justice? 
To investigate this question, I collaborated with LAPOP to include an item in Mexico’s 2014 
AmericasBarometer questionnaire. The item asks citizens: 
VICZIZ14. If you or someone of your family was victim of a crime in one of the streets of 
your neighborhood, to whom would you turn in search for justice? 1) The municipal police 
2) The public prosecutor 3) Your neighbors/community 4) Other 5) No one.69  
Of the total of respondents, 50.64% said that in case of being victimized by crime they would turn 
to the municipal police, and 28.36% responded that they would go to the public prosecutor. 
However, while 4.01% of respondents said that they would not turn to anyone to seek justice after 
being victims of a crime, as many as 10.64% of the interviewees manifested their preference to turn 
to their neighbors or community to seek justice were they victimized by crime.70 
To evaluate the determinants of respondents who were willing to seek extralegal justice with 
their neighbors, I collapsed the responses to this question into three different behaviors: 1) turning 
to the authorities, 2) turning to the neighbors/community, and 3) other preferences (seeking other 
actors or seeking no one). I then specified a multinomial logistic regression model in which the 
respondents’ probability to turn to their neighbors, rather than the authorities, is a function of their 
perception of insecurity, their distrust in the police (DistrustP), and their participation in a 
Collective Anti-Crime Organization. 
                                                     
69 Note the question close resembles Malone’s statement cited on page 6 (Malone, 2012b, p. 127). 
70 6.35% of Mexicans say that they would turn to another actor in order to seek justice. 
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To test the degree to which distrust of the police moderates the effect of participating in a 
Collective Anti-Crime Organization, I include a multiplicative term between Organization x 
Distrust P. Remember that if distrust in the police moderates the effect of participating in a 
Collective Anti-Crime Organization we should expect a positive and significant coefficient 
associated with this term.  
 
2)  
In line with the previous specifications Φ’CONTROLS’ represents a vector of control 
variables. Demographic controls include Sex, Education, Age, Size of the Locality and 
Wealth.71 However, I also include controls for citizens’ Support for Vigilante Justice,72 and a 
dummy variable that distinguishes those respondents self-identifying as Indigenous from those 
with a different ethnic identity. All variables were recoded from 0 to 1 to show maximum effects. 
Finally, the term Φ’FIXED EFFECTS’ in this case is a set of four dummy variables that 
uniquely identify each of the regional strata for which the Mexican sample is representative. Table 3 
shows the results from this model.73  
 Although the results do not show evidence that insecurity directly increases citizens’ 
willingness to engage in ECLE, they show that citizens’ support for vigilante justice, citizens’ 
perception that the justice system punishes criminals, citizens’ perceptions that the administration 
improves citizen safety, and citizens’ evaluation of police response speed all are positively associated 
                                                     
71 Note that in this case, wealth takes particular relevance since an important strand of literature has linked lynchings, 
brawls, and vigilante organizations to group competition (Olzak, 1990) often triggered by economic pressures 
(Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007) but, at times, also encouraged by rapid 
religious, political, and demographic change (Bagozzi, 1977; Inverarity, 1976; Tyson, 2013; Wasserman, 1977). 
72 I included this control to evaluate the effect (and control for) citizens’ general attitudes towards vigilantism. 
73 In addition to running this model I also evaluated the direct effect of citizens’ trust in the neighbors on their 
willingness to turn to their community as a source of justice after being victimized by crime. I did so by an identical 
model to the one presented in Table 1. Although the results suggest a positive relation between both variables, the 
coefficient was statistically indistinguishable from zero. Further, I did not find distrust of the police to significantly 
moderate this effect. The results of this model are presented in Table A10 of Appendix VIII. 
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with an increase in citizens’ willingness to engage in ECLE. Additionally, the results show that 
citizens describing themselves as indigenous are more likely choose to turn to their neighbors or 
community (rather than the state) to seek justice after being victims of a criminal act.  
  
As Figure 13a shows, a minimum to maximum change in a Mexican’s support for vigilante 
justice is predicted to be associated with an 86.71% increase in the probability of being willing to 
turn to the neighbors/community (rather than the state) in search for justice in case of being 
victimized by crime. Figure 13b, for its part, shows that indigenous respondents (0.16) seem to have 
a likelihood 55.09% greater than non-indigenous respondents (0.10) of responding that they would 
be likely to turn to their neighbors (rather than the authorities) in search for justice in the case of 
being victimized by crime.  
  
Table 3. Collective Anti-Crime Organization and Turning to the Neighbors for Justice 
 Neighbors vs Authorities 
VARIABLES Coefficient Standard Errors 
Distrust in The Police 1.569*** (0.372) 
Anti-Crime Organization -0.486 (0. 643) 
Distrust in The Police X Anti-Crime Organization 1.414* (0.789) 
Trust in the Neighbors 0.440 (0.388) 
Support for Vigilante Justice 0.951*** (0.285) 
Insecurity -0.239 (0.444) 
Victimized by Crime -0.0797 (0.222) 
Indigenous vs Other 0.448* (0.264) 
Women -0.127 (0.213) 
Wealth -0.192** (0.0829) 
Education -0.265* (0.158) 
Age -0.00979 (0.0675) 
Size Of Town -0.0260 (0.111) 
Constant -2.996*** (0.709) 
   
Fixed Effects 4 Regions 
Observations 1,256 
Design-based standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figures 13a. and 13b. Effect of Other Variables on Citizens’ Willingness to Turn to Their 
Neighbors 
Figure 13a Figure 13b 
 
 
Finally, as expected, distrust of the police significantly moderates the effect of citizens’ 
participation in Collective Anti-Crime Organizations. That is, as citizens’ distrust in the police 
increases, so does the association between Collective Anti-Crime Organization and a citizen’s 
preference for turning to his/her neighbors, rather than the authorities, as a source of justice (Figure 
14a).  
As seen in Figure 14b, among those who trust the police most strongly, belonging to a 
Collective Anti-Crime Organization does not significantly increase citizens’ willingness to engage in 
ECLE. However, among those who distrust the police, belonging to a Collective Anti-Crime 
Organization positively and significantly increases citizens’ willingness to engage in ECLE. Among 
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those in this subgroup, participating in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization is predicted to be 
associated with a change of about 64.29% in a citizen’s willingness to engage in ECLE.74  
Figures 14a. and 14b. Effect of Engaging in a Collective Anti-Crime Organization as 
Moderated by Distrust in The Police 
Figure 14a Figure 14b 
  
 
 
Conclusion  
To summarize, this chapter has focused on the emergence of Extralegal Collective Law 
Enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to reviewing and testing other 
explanations for the emergence of ECLE, I have offered a novel, testable theoretical framework in 
which the likelihood of a person to engage in ECLE is influenced by an interaction between trust in 
two alternative law enforcement providers: the state and the community.  
I conducted three empirical test of this framework. In the first section, I turned to Mexico, 
one of the countries that have been most concerned about ECLE. I analyzed data from ENSI-2010 
                                                     
74 Finally, I also considered the opposite side of the interaction — that is, the moderating effect of participating on 
collective anti-crime organizations over the effect of police distrust. I found that while the effect of distrust of the police 
is statistically significant for both groups, it is substantively larger for those who participate in collective anti-crime 
organizations, while a maximum change in police distrust is associated with a 263% increase in the likelihood of turning 
to the neighbors to seek for justice for those who do not participate. A maximum change in police distrust is associated 
with an 882 percentage point change among those who do participate in collective anti-crime organizations. See Figure 
A3 in Appendix VII for a graphical representation.  
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and ENVIPE-2011 and found that citizens who have been victimized by crime and feel insecure in 
their neighborhoods are more likely to engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Action. Additionally, I 
found that the effect of trust in one’s neighbors on Mexicans’ likelihood of engaging in Collective 
Anti-Criminal Actions is stronger among those who distrust law enforcement.  
In the second section, I tested whether my hypothesis is generalizable to “low-level 
equilibrium countries”. Again, I found that, all other things being equal, crime and insecurity were 
positively associated with engaging in Collective Anti-Crime Organization and that distrust in the 
police significantly moderated the effect of citizens’ trust in their neighbors.  
In the final section, I evaluated the degree to which citizens’ experiences with Collective 
Anti-Crime Organizations can be associated with an increased willingness to seek justice with the 
neighbors at the expense of state authorities. Consistent with my hypothesis, I found that, all other 
things being equal, the association between a citizen’s participation in a Collective Anti-Crime 
Organization and his/her preference for reaching out to his/her neighbors (rather than the 
government) in search for justice is stronger among those who distrust the police more strongly.  
Although it is true that not all citizens’ attempts to defend themselves or to seek justice with 
their neighbors in response to crime end in dramatic acts of violence or in the emergence of 
paramilitary vigilante organizations, it is still crucial to understand the early (although perhaps 
innocuous) manifestations of ECLE before they can exert significant political, economic, or human 
costs. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that not only sociological but also 
political factors are important for understanding citizens’ attempts to join with their neighbors to 
face crime. Trust in law enforcement allows the state to exert its most basic role, which is to serve as 
a moderating force in society. When citizens lose their confidence in this actor, they invest their 
social resources to engage criminals directly, an act that threatens the alleged criminal’s individual 
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rights, bears significant opportunity costs, and in extreme cases can shake the very foundations of 
the state, particularly with regard to the monopoly over the coercive use of violence (Weber, 1919).  
Even as this chapter brings important evidence (coming from more than 100 thousand 
interviews conducted in 17 different countries) in support from my thesis, the nature of the data 
does not allow us to completely rule out the potential interference of unmeasured variables and/or 
the simultaneous effect of ECLE on my predictors of interest. To produce a test that can account 
for these potential confounders, in the following two chapters I present two laboratory-in-the-field 
experiments conducted between 2013 and 2014.  
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IV. TRUST AND SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE VIGILANTISM: A VIGNETTE 
EXPERIMENT 
The recent increase in the number of collective vigilante organizations around the world has 
captured the attention of scholars from many fields (Bangstad, 2005; Godoy, 2004; Tyson, 2013). 
Although collective vigilantism may help citizens to reduce the costs of crime in the short term, it 
can also threaten the rights, lives, and economic livelihoods of the vigilantes and their targets (Bates 
et al., 2002; Hine, 1998). Moreover, as they tend to be more long-lasting than individual vigilante 
actions, collective vigilante groups pose a particularly serious challenge to the state’s capacity to 
maintain its monopoly over the coercive use of violence (Silke, 2001; Weber, 1919), and therefore, 
this phenomenon is of particular importance to political science.75 
Citizens’ support for collective vigilantism as an alternative to state intervention varies 
significantly across contexts (Malone, 2012c; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2015). Understanding the 
circumstances under which citizens manifest different attitudes towards this phenomenon may allow 
us to understand fluctuations in both public opinion and in the emergence and success of collective 
vigilante organizations. What factors contribute to an increased probability that citizens will support 
the idea that those concerned about crime should circumvent the state and resort to their 
community to confront criminals directly? I propose that the perceptions citizens have of the 
trustworthiness of their neighbors and the police (i.e., the apparent likelihood of effective 
intervention) can influence the degree to which they support this type of action. Moreover, I argue 
that citizens’ distrust of the police moderates the effect of the apparent trustworthiness of the 
neighbors.  
I designed a laboratory experiment in which participants were asked to react to one of four 
versions of a mock newspaper article. The article describes the situation of a group of concerned 
citizens who, having been victimized by a band of criminals, need to consider how to cope with 
                                                     
75 This study was reviewed by Vanderbilt’s Institutional Review Board (IRB # 131653).  
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crime.76 The four versions of the article are identical in every way except that they each portray the 
likelihood of intervention by the concerned citizens’ neighbors and the police in a different light. 
This strategy allows me to compare citizens’ support for the idea that the concerned citizens should 
confront criminals directly and independently of the authorities (vicarious support for collective 
vigilantism) at different levels of perceived neighbors’ and authorities’ trustworthiness while holding 
every confounder constant. 
The experiment was conducted among undergraduate students in one of the largest public 
universities in Mexico during the fall of 2013, only three months after a devastating storm 
(Hurricane Manuel) hit the coast of the state of Guerrero, causing the government to declare a state 
of national emergency. This context contributes to the validity of the study in two ways.  
First, the setting used for the experiment, a natural disaster, makes it easier for participants 
to attribute crime to the context rather than to police incompetence. This is particularly important 
since an unintentional reduction of citizens’ trust in the police in the “high police trust” condition 
could make the identification of any effect more challenging.  
Second, not only is Guerrero one of the states that have been most severely victimized by 
crime, it is also one of the regions in which collective vigilantism has been most prevalent.77 Thus, 
this context allowed me to conduct the study among a pool of participants who were likely to see 
organized crime as a latent but realistic threat, be sensitive to the criminal situation described in the 
article, and consider collective vigilantism as a believable reaction from concerned citizens. Although 
it is important to acknowledge that the results only capture citizens’ vicarious support for collective 
                                                     
76 The treatments were fictitious. After their participation, subjects were fully debriefed with respect to the nature of the 
treatments as well as the objective and motivation for the study. Additionally, I answered all the questions raised by 
those who were still curious at the end of the study.  
77 For a thorough discussion of the geography of vigilante groups, see Pérez (2013) and Reyes Maciel (2013). For a 
discussion of the drug cartel presence in Guerrero, see Trujillo and Michel (2014).  
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vigilantism, the random treatment assignment and the realism triggered by the study’s context are 
likely to bolster the internal and external validity of the results. 
To foreshadow my results, I find a direct effect of both distrust of law enforcement and 
trust in the community on citizens’ vicarious support for collective vigilantism. Further, I find a 
significant interaction between these two variables (i.e., support for my hypothesis). That is, I find 
the effect of trust in the community manipulation to be increased by distrust in the law enforcement 
manipulation.  
For the particular case of Mexico, these results provide some insights about the factors that, 
in recent years, may have contributed to citizens´ sympathy towards the idea of starting organizaciones 
de auto-defensa (self-defense organizations) in response to organized crime. More generally, this study 
provides a framework from which to understand how trust contributes to the emergence of vigilante 
justice and to explain why citizens turn to their community, rather than the state, to address their 
most urgent problems.  
Defining Vigilante Justice  
In order to theorize about the factors that increase the probability that citizens will be willing 
to support vigilantism as a valid response to crime, it is necessary to define what a vigilante action is. 
I define a vigilante action as the deployment of extralegal punitive force to castigate violations of 
the state’s laws.78,79 This definition builds on previous conceptualizations in three ways. First, it 
defines behavior rather than subjects. Common usage has centered on the classification of 
individuals and groups as vigilantes (Merriam Webster 2014); however, as Smith (2014) points out, 
many so-called vigilante groups use a variety of tactics to achieve their goals. Thus, I limit myself to 
                                                     
78 By extralegal punitive force I refer to force exerted outside of the legal framework of the state. 
79 I do not restrict my definition of a vigilante action to include only non-state actors since it is entirely possible for an 
agent occupying an official position to engage in vigilante behavior. This may happen, for instance, when an agent 
perceives the institutions or procedures of the state to constrain their capacity to punish perceived violations of the 
state’s laws. 
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defining specific actions. I leave the study of the appropriate methodology for classifying groups 
open to theoretical and empirical debate.  
Second, while incorporating a wide range of actors and behaviors, as Brown (1975) and 
Roseembaum and Sederburg (1974) do, my definition builds on these conceptualizations by 
restricting the concept only to actions intended to castigate violations of the state’s laws. On the one 
hand, this excludes punitive actions against violations of norms not codified by the state and that 
would otherwise not be prosecuted by law enforcement (e.g., heresy, witchcraft, inter-racial 
relations).80 On the other, this highlights the challenge such actions pose to the state’s monopoly 
over the coercive use of force as one of the defining characteristics of vigilante behavior. As Smith 
(2014) highlights, “vigilantism is juxtaposed to and only makes sense in relationship to the state’s 
law” (p.22, 2014). 
Finally, although this chapter focuses on collective vigilantism, I do not restrict my definition 
of vigilantism to collective action. It may be true that collective vigilantism can be more damaging to 
the stability of the state (Silke, 2001) and that this may justify its independent treatment. However, it 
is important to recognize that individual and collective vigilantism share important similarities so as 
to make the significance of the latter insufficient to justify the exclusion of individual attempts to 
punish criminal behavior from the definition of vigilantism.  
In the next section, I analyze how community trust and distrust of law enforcement may 
increase the likelihood of collective vigilantism to emerge. Then, I present an experimental study 
designed to test whether the perceived trustworthiness of community law enforcement affects 
citizens’ level of vicarious support for collective vigilantism.81 
                                                     
80 Scholars interested in gathering event-level data should look at the legal codes of the contexts in which they are 
collecting information for a clearer definition of the actions that would be considered as vigilante justice. 
81 That is, support for the idea that citizens concerned about crime in such a community should engage in collective 
vigilante justice. 
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Trust and Collective Vigilante Justice  
In modern states, the government provides citizens with security in exchange for the 
monopoly of the coercive use of violence. Acting outside these institutions, as vigilantes do, entails 
direct opportunity costs that may result in economic and physical injury (Hine, 1998). Thus, it seems 
that resorting to law enforcement is not only cheaper but also less risky for citizens. Why, then, do 
citizens forfeit the use of these agencies? I propose that distrust of the authorities plays an important 
role in this phenomenon.  
The conceptual study of trust has a long history and some authors have been particularly 
influential in the way trust is seen in today’s literature (e.g. Fukuyama, 1996; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
However, there is no universally accepted definition of trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998). In light of this fact, I define trust as an agent’s expectation that another agent will (or will be 
willing to) perform an action with a sufficient level of competence to obtain a positive outcome.82 
Based on the most recent quantitative and qualitative analysis of the way trust has been 
defined in the last fifty years (Walterbusch, Gräuler, & Teuteberg, 2014), this definition captures the 
most commonly used words to define the concept (subject, expect, action, will, confidence, 
competence, and outcome), acknowledges their empirical relation, and accommodates a wide array 
of objects of evaluation.  
A number of scholars have proposed that the erosion of citizens’ distrust of law 
enforcement reduces their reliance on these actors.83 For instance, an increase in the quantity of the 
police dispatched in an area has been shown to result in an increase in citizens’ trust that the police 
                                                     
82 These authors note that the definition of trust covering most identified word clusters is Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, 
& Werner’s (1998) definition, which states: “First, trust in another party reflects an expectation or belief that the other 
party will act benevolently. Second, one cannot control or force the other party to fulfill this expectation -that is, trust 
involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that the other party may not fulfill that expectation. Third, trust involves 
some level of dependency on the other party so that the outcomes of one individual are influenced by the actions of 
another” (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).  
83 In line with the definition above, I define distrust of law enforcement as an individual’s evaluation of the likelihood 
that law enforcement will intervene with sufficient competence to enforce the law effectively. 
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will intervene effectively after a crime has been committed. This, in turn, has been observed to lead 
to an increase in crime reporting (Levitt, 1998; MacDonald, 2001; Schnebly, 2008; Skogan, 1994). 
Further, both, citizens’ distrust of the procedural justice of the authorities (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler 
& Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and citizens’ perception that police hold values distant from 
those of the community have been shown to be associated with lower cooperation with law 
enforcement (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  
Thus, it seems clear that citizens are less likely to rely on the authorities when they distrust 
their ability to effectively intervene. But, as Malone highlights, “When victimized by a crime, citizens 
must decide to turn to the law, extralegal institutions, or to no one at all” (Malone, 2012b, p. 127). 
What informs citizens’ likelihood of turning to their community as a source of security? I propose 
that, under conditions in which they distrust the authorities, citizens’ social capital and their 
perception of the trustworthiness of their community influence their likelihood of turning to 
vigilante behavior to cope with crime.  
Trust in other members of the community and social capital more generally have been 
observed to foster collective action through a number of mechanisms. On the one hand, citizens’ 
perception that other members of their community are likely to reciprocate makes them more likely 
to participate in collective action even in the absence of a clear individual benefit (Ostrom, 1998; 
Putnam et al., 1994). On the other, community trust has been shown to increase citizens’ estimation 
that they will be successful in solving a specific problem through group behavior (collective efficacy) 
(Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001), and this has been shown to translate into a 
higher likelihood of collective problem solving (Fong & Chang, 2011; Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 
2009). 
Thus, while there is strong evidence for the idea that social capital promotes collective 
behavior (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti, & Pavoncello, 1983) there are few 
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mechanisms linking trust in one’s neighbors to citizens’ state-centric participation. Indeed, even 
since before this literature ever became popular, Gamson (1968) argued that, under circumstances in 
which they distrust government, efficacious citizens may engage in non-institutionalized or even 
anti-institutional political mobilization. Although Gamson did not refer to collective efficacy or 
social capital directly, others have found that, under the right circumstances, community strength 
can translate in counter-state political participation and even be linked to the rise of pro-totalitarian 
movements in democracies going through legitimacy crises (Armony, 2004; Gargiulo & Benassi, 
1997; Graeff, 2007).  
Building from these two strands of literature together, I propose that citizens’ relationship 
with the state moderates their willingness to invest their material, human or social capital within it to 
solve their social problems. For the specific case of security, I argue that, when citizens trust law 
enforcement authorities, they are likely to invest their social capital to co-produce security. 
Conversely, I contend that, when citizens’ distrust law enforcement, the availability of community 
resources will be more strongly linked to the probability of emergence of vigilante organizations. 
In other words, I propose that citizens’ expectation that the authorities will be unlikely to 
intervene with a sufficient level of competence to effectively enforce the law (distrust of law 
enforcement) positively moderates the degree to which citizens’ perception that their neighbors will 
be likely to intervene in confronting crime (trust in their community). This translates into support 
for vigilante justice in response to criminal threats. The following section describes the approach 
that I use to assess this interactive hypothesis. 
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Methods 
Design and Validity  
Although they are valuable in their own right, observational studies like the ones presented 
in Chapters II and III suffer from a significant limitation. Specifically, even when they can give us a 
window into what happens in the real world (and are thus valuable in their own right) they can only 
rarely provide a test that controls for every possible confounder or accounts for reverse causality. 
However, it is more effective to produce to a test of this type through the use of laboratory 
experimentation. This is because, when participants are assigned to groups through a random 
process all measured or unmeasured confounders can be expected to be uncorrelated to the 
expected post-treatment outcomes. 
With this in mind I designed a laboratory experiment in which subjects were assigned to 
read one of four versions of a mock newspaper article and then given the opportunity to express 
their support for collective vigilante justice. The article described the situation of a group of 
concerned citizens in a small town in Guerrero (Mexico) who, being victims of organized crime, are 
considering their options. The four versions of the article were identical in every way except in the 
way they portray how likely the citizens’ neighbors and the police are to intervene. While two 
versions describe the concerned citizens’ neighbors as cooperative and united, the other two portray 
them as divided and unlikely to cooperate. Similarly, while two versions describe the police as 
interested and willing to intervene, the other two describe the authorities as unconcerned and 
generally absent.  
After participants finished reading the assigned version, I asked them about the degree to 
which they agreed that those concerned about crime should attempt to confront criminals directly 
and independently of the authorities. Since the assignment was determined at random, all 
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confounders are expected to remain at the same levels in the four treatment groups. Thus, any 
differences in citizens’ support for collective vigilantism across groups can only be attributed to the 
way in which the trustworthiness of the neighbors and the police was described.  
The experiment was conducted in Mexico during the fall of 2013, only two months after a 
devastating storm (Hurricane Manuel) hit the coasts of southwest Mexico. This storm caused more 
than US$4.2 billion in losses, and the damage to roads alone totaled about US$153 million in 2013. 
Further, amid some of the worst flooding in decades, 59,000 citizens had to be evacuated, and 123 
people lost their lives as a consequence of the storm.84  
In Guerrero, the state most heavily affected by the storm, 24 rivers flooded, at least 32 roads 
sustained damage, and four bridges collapsed. Approximately 30,000 dwellings were damaged, and 
30% of these were completely destroyed. All in all, 20,000 citizens of the state had to be evacuated 
to shelters, and at least 97 people lost their lives.85  
In the aftermath of the storm, the federal government declared a state of national emergency 
and the army and the national and state governments provided aid to the area. The private sector 
and civic society, mobilized to establish donation centers in schools, churches, workplaces, and 
shopping centers and the army and commercial airlines airlifted more than 12,000 items to the area.86 
The extensive media coverage of the floods in Guerrero provided me with an opportunity to 
design a treatment contextualized within a situation with which participants could be familiar. 
Moreover, since one of the many collection centers that opened in Mexico City was located at the 
                                                     
84 Hurricane Manuel passed through Mexico from September 13th to September 20th . For more on the costs of the 
storm see Steve Jakubowski; Adityam Krovvidi; Adam Podlaha; Steve Bowen. "September 2013 Global Catastrophe 
Recap". Impact Forecasting. AON Benefield. Retrieved October 25, 2013. 
85 “MÉXICO – Ingrid y Manuel – septiembre 2013 1 MEXICO – Info Note Remnants of ‘Ingrid’ and ‘Manuel.’" 
National Disaster Response Advisor (ReliefWeb). September 18, 2013. Retrieved May 2, 2014. 
86 "Se entregan 12 mil despensas en Guerrero: Robles". El Universal (in Spanish). September 18, 2013. Retrieved 
September 18, 2013. 
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university where I was conducting the study,87 the situation allowed me to expose participants 
(however vicariously) to a story about a crime to which they could be sensitive (the appropriation of 
the aid sent to a town by organized criminals). 
 By the time of the study it was well known that organized criminal groups such as Los 
Zetas, the Pacific Cartel, and Guerreros Unidos were active in both urban and rural communities in 
the state of Guerrero. The presence of the cartels was so widely known at the time that, only a 
couple of months later, the federal senate voted to remove all state-level elected officials from power 
(including the judiciary, the legislature, and the governor) to bring the state under control 
(Desaparición de Poderes). Thus, the prospect of one of these criminal organizations seizing the aid sent 
to the state by donors from the center of the country was likely to have been considered a realistic 
threat. 
Finally, it is important to note that, at the time of the study, collective vigilante organizations 
had been extensively featured in the national and international media (Malkin & Villegas, 2014), and 
that, by early 2013, a number of municipalities in Guerrero had started their own self-defense 
movements. For example, by January of that year, citizens of the Ayutla de los Libres municipality 
had taken control over law enforcement in their municipality and had even organized popular 
tribunals in which those accused of associating with the drug cartels were tried (Reyes Maciel, 2013). 
In this context, organizing with neighbors to create a collective vigilante group was likely to be 
considered a believable coping strategy.  
In sum, the random assignment of the four different versions of the article generates four 
groups that are identical in every way except for the manner in which the trustworthiness of the 
neighbors and the police was described to them. This strengthens the internal validity of the study 
and takes us closer to the causal effect of interest. For its part, the context in which the study took  
                                                     
87 Excélsior. “Instalan Centros de Acopio En DF, Puebla Y Coahuila Para Afectados Por Ciclones.” Excélsior, September 
18, 2013. http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2013/09/18/919043 
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 place allowed me to produce treatments likely to trigger ecologically valid responses from 
the subjects. Not only is it likely that 
participants were familiar with the disastrous 
situation in the state of Guerrero, it is also 
likely that they considered the possibility of an 
attack by organized criminals to be realistic and 
saw collective vigilantism as a believable 
response. All in all, although the sample was 
not designed to find a population treatment 
effect, the context in which the study took 
place is likely to have helped increased the 
psychological realism of the treatment and, in 
doing so, may help bolster our capacity to 
generalize from these results (Aronson, 
Wilson, & Brewer, 1998).88  
 Sample  
The study took place in December of 
2013. Over the course of two weeks, 475 
voting-age adult students were recruited from 
psychology undergraduate courses in the 
                                                     
88 Although subjects were thoroughly debriefed, one participant approached me to double check whether the articles 
were indeed fabricated. After I explained the study more closely, the participant reported understanding the 
methodology and was convinced that the articles were false.   
Figure 15. Differences Between the 
Experimental Sample and the Population 
(Based on the 2014 AmericasBarometer) 
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largest public university in Mexico.89 Students were invited to report to a laboratory located within 
the department of psychology to participate in a study aimed at understanding public opinion on 
“current affairs” and were informed that they would receive extra-credit in exchange for their 
participation.90  
Figure 15 shows the demographic characteristics of the experimental sample (dark gray) as 
compared to a nationally representative random sample of the Mexican population conducted in 
2014 by LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer (light gray). The sample is, on average, younger (mean: 19.43, 
SD: 0.10), more educated (mean: 13.1, SD: 0.095 years), and had a higher concentration of women 
(78%). Additionally, the sample contains a higher proportion of citizens victimized by crime (37%), 
with a high perception of corruption (85.7, SD: 1.12) and with a stronger feeling of insecurity (54.74, 
SD: 1.3). Finally, although the sample is more supportive of strong leadership (31.2%), it is also 
significantly more left leaning (mean: 39.42, SD: 0.835) and less authoritarian than the general 
population (they had lower scores in the pro-obedience, pro-respect, and pro-discipline 
indicators).91,92 
On arrival at the laboratory, participants were assigned to a computer and asked to answer 
an online pre-experimental questionnaire.93 After responding to these questions, participants were 
                                                     
89 All the participants were Mexican citizens, and the great majority lived in Mexico City. However, since the university is 
affordable and does not have dorms, there is great variation with respect to the neighborhoods in which the participants 
live within Mexico City.  
90 An alternative activity was offered to the students in case they did not want to participate.  However, no participant 
decided to engage in the alternative activity.  
91 All scales were transformed from their original scales (see www.lapopsurveys.org) to 0-100 scales for comparability. 
Although the wording of the questions was identical, note that there might be additional forces behind these differences 
in addition to selection bias. These additional differences include mode of application (face to face vs computer based) 
and setting (house hold vs laboratory). See Appendix III for the full pre-treatment questionnaire. 
92 How do these biases change the sample treatment effect with respect to the population treatment effect? Although the 
study was not designed to answer this question, Appendix II shows the moderating effect of the unbalanced covariates 
on the coefficient of interest. In every case, the analyses suggest that the effects presented here may be conservative with 
respect to what would be observed in a less biased sample.  
93 The study was programed using the Qualtrics survey system. 
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randomly assigned to read one of the four versions of the newspaper article. Then, participants were 
asked to indicate their degree of vicarious support for collective vigilante justice.  
That is, they were asked to report the extent to which they agreed that the citizens concerned 
about crime should attempt to confront criminals directly and independently of the authorities. At 
the end of the study participants were debriefed, and professors received a list of the students who 
participated in the experiment so that they could give them extra credit.94  
Treatments and Variable Operationalization  
The four versions of the article described how the floods exacerbated the preexisting 
problems in the area. They explained that an (unnamed) organized criminal group seized control 
over the water and food supplies sent to the town of Huamuxitlán (in the state of Guerrero) from the 
center of the country. In accordance with the definition of trust presented previously, I modified 
small sections of the mock newspaper articles to manipulate the way they portrayed two different 
agents, the police and the community.95 
Half of the articles (1 and 2) described the police as being highly concerned about the 
problem, available and with a disposition to reestablish the rule of law (henceforth Low Police 
Distrust condition). In contrast, the other two articles (3 and 4) described the police as being 
unconcerned about the problem, unavailable and with little disposition to reestablish the rule of 
law (henceforward High Police Distrust condition). By manipulating only these three key words I 
aimed to produce two articles that were identical in every way except for the way in which they 
                                                     
94 In the debriefing stage participants were told: “During the study you read an article about some actions that have 
occurred in Guerrero. Despite the fact that some organized crime groups are present in Guerrero, and some of them 
may have become active after the recent floods in the state, the newspaper article you read and the information 
contained in it are fictitious. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no organized crime group has stolen any kind of 
aid sent to the community of Huamuxitlán.” 
95 To see the actual treatments, see Appendix I. 
144 
 
portrayed the trustworthiness of the police and community of the concerned citizens of 
Huamuxitlán.96  
In addition, the mock article noted that some citizens, concerned about crime, had started 
calling upon the rest of the people of the town to talk about the situation. In two of the articles (1 
and 3) the rest of the citizens (those being called upon) were described as participatory, empathic, 
and united (hereafter High Community Trust condition). In the other articles (2 and 4) these 
citizens were described as not participatory, not empathic, and divided (hereafter Low 
Community Trust condition). In other words, the two sets of articles were identical in every way 
except for the fact that they described in different ways the likelihood that the rest of the members 
of the community would intervene with sufficient competence to fight the organized criminal group 
that took control over the aid sent to the town. 97 
It is important to note that the treatments were not designed to manipulate citizens’ general 
attitude towards the police nor their disposition towards their own local community. They were 
designed to manipulate citizens’ perception of the trustworthiness of a given community and the 
police from the perspective of “those concerned about crime in the town” in the specific situation 
presented by the articles. Therefore, support for collective vigilante justice was also measured 
vicariously. That is, I asked citizens to locate themselves on a six-point scale in which one represents 
“in strong disagreement” and seven represents “in strong agreement” with the statement: “Given 
                                                     
96 Overall, the modifications across articles amounted only to very small differences across treatments. The article 
portraying both actors (police and community) as trustworthy had 363 words and took participants an average of 1.82 
(0.05) minutes to read. The article portraying both actors (police and community) as untrustworthy had 366 words and 
took participants an average of 1.83 (0.06) minutes to read. The article that portrayed the community as trustworthy and 
the police as untrustworthy had 361 words and took participants an average of 1.96(0.07) minutes to read. Finally, the 
article that portrayed the community as untrustworthy and the police as trustworthy had 368 words and took participants 
an average of 1.77(0.06) minutes to read. That is, the maximum difference in words was 5 words and the maximum 
difference in reading times was 11.4 seconds. 
97 Overall participants read one of the four versions of the mock article. In total, 120 participants read the article in 
which both law enforcement and community were portrayed as trustworthy, 118 read the article that described law 
enforcement to be trustworthy and the community to be untrustworthy, 118 read the article that described law 
enforcement to be untrustworthy and the community to be trustworthy, and the rest (121) read the article that described 
both the community and law enforcement as being untrustworthy.  
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the state of the previously described situation I believe that the people seeking to do something to 
solve the problem should face the criminals directly in order to reestablish security in the town. [In 
strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7)].” 
Finally, before moving to the results, it is worth highlighting that the treatments were 
designed to explore the effect of trust on citizens’ support for collective vigilantism in response to 
the actions taken by an organized criminal group. Note that in Mexico the euphemism “organized 
crime” is used to refer to heavily-armed drug cartels. Since these groups are arguably an exogenous 
source of crime, this allows me to talk about them while holding trust in the community to be 
relatively unaffected. Further, this strategy lets me link the case to some of the events that have led 
to the emergence of the latest self-defense movements in Mexico. However, evaluating citizens’ 
support for vigilantism in response to organized crime also entails a difficult test, as the stakes are 
much higher when a community is set to confront a well-organized drug cartel than when it decides 
to confront petty criminals. In the next section, I describe the way the participants reacted to the 
treatment both in general and across treatment conditions.  
Results  
In general, participants tended to believe that those seeking to do something to solve the 
problem should not face criminals directly (mean: 2.72, SD: 0.062). Across conditions only 30.53% 
of the participants agreed to some extent that the concerned citizens should face the criminals 
directly. This is perhaps due to a serious consideration of the potential risks that the citizens may 
incur in confronting “organized criminals.”98   
                                                     
98 That is, 30.53% responded that they “somewhat agreed,” “agreed,” or “strongly agreed.” 
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Figure 16. Support for Vigilante Justice across Experimental Conditions 
 
 
There were important differences across experimental conditions. Figure 16 shows the 
average levels of agreement with collective vigilantism across conditions. As expected, those who 
read the article in which the community was depicted as trustworthy and law enforcement as 
untrustworthy agreed most strongly with collective vigilantism (3.13 [.124]), while those who read 
the article in which both the community and law enforcement were described as being 
untrustworthy were the least supportive of collective vigilantism (2.48 [.124]).  
 The pattern seems consistent with my conditional hypothesis. However, to test this 
hypothesis directly it is necessary to compare the difference in support for collective vigilantism 
caused by the Community Trust manipulation among those who read the article in which law 
enforcement was described to be untrustworthy (dark bars in Figure 16) with the difference in 
support for collective vigilantism caused by the Community Trust manipulation among those who 
read the article in which law enforcement was described to be trustworthy (light bars in Figure 16). 
To estimate this difference in differences, I specified an OLS regression model in which an 
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individual’s agreement with the idea that citizens should confront the criminals directly is a function 
of the Community Trust Manipulation, the Police Distrust Manipulation, their interaction and 
a random error. 
𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 
3) 
The model yields estimates for the average support for collective vigilantism among those in 
the High Police Distrust and Low Neighbors’ Trust condition (β0), the difference in support for 
collective vigilantism caused by the Community Trust treatment among those who read the article in 
which law enforcement was described to be trustworthy (β1), and, critically, the difference in the 
effect of the Community Trust manipulation across the Police Distrust manipulations (𝛃𝟑).99 
Table 4. OLS Estimates of the Treatment Effects and their Interaction 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Support for  
vigilantism 
  
Community Trust 0.234 
 (0.172) 
Police Distrust -0.0598 
 (0.173) 
Police Distrust x Community Trust 0.442* 
 (0.246) 
  
Constant 2.521*** 
 (0.121) 
  
Observations 471 
r-squared 0.038 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The estimates in Table 4 show that there is a positive and statistically significant interaction 
between the Community Trust and Police Distrust manipulations. It is possible to calculate the 
difference of the Community Trust Treatment effect across Police Distrust Conditions (and its 
                                                     
99 Before the analyses I deleted four subjects from the sample. Four passed through the treatments in less than 15 
seconds and one took more than 15 minutes to go through the treatment. 
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statistical significance) by differentiating the previous equation with respect to Community Trust 
(Kam & Franzese, 2007). As expected, the Community Trust Treatment effect is significantly larger 
(∆high-∆low=0.442, p=0.072) among those who were assigned to the High Police Distrust 
Manipulation (∆high=0.676, p=0.000) than among those who were assigned to the Low Police 
Distrust Manipulation (∆low=0.233, p=0.136).  
All in all, the results show support for the conditional effect of trust in the community and 
trust in law enforcement. That is, I found that describing the community as likely to intervene to 
confront crime effectively caused citizens to be more supportive of collective vigilante justice, 
particularly in circumstances in which the police were described as unlikely to intervene to enforce 
the law.  
Conclusion  
For a long time, scholars have debated the origins of vigilante justice. While some have 
attributed this phenomenon to purely cultural and sociological variables, a new wave of scholarship 
has turned their attention to the role of the state in explaining this phenomenon. The central claim 
of my dissertation is that the authorities play a moderating role in society. While citizens are likely to 
invest their material, human, and social capital state-tropically when the authorities are trustworthy 
(e.g. vote, donate to campaigns, engage in community meetings, participate in security coproduction, 
etc.), I argue that, when trust in the authorities runs low, citizens are more likely to invest their 
resources extra-legally.  
After testing this claim experimentally, I found that, when considering the situation of 
victims of crime, citizens are more likely to be supportive of engaging in vigilante behavior when 
they consider the local community to be trustworthy. Moreover, I found that this effect drops to 
insignificant levels when citizens perceive an alternative agent (in this case the police) to be likely to 
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intervene to enforce the law effectively (i.e., is trustworthy). In other words, consistent with what 
would be expected if my thesis fits the data, I found that the degree to which citizens’ perceptions of 
the trustworthiness of a given community translates into support for vigilante justice is moderated 
by their perception that the police are untrustworthy.  
These findings have implications for our understanding of vigilante justice and, more 
generally, for our assessment of the role of community trust and trust in the authorities. First, they 
validate those who argue that, rather than being a temporary “madness of the masses,” vigilante 
behavior can also be understood as a community-based strategy to cope with crime. Thus, my 
findings suggest that, as other authors have proposed, vigilante justice could be a reflection of the 
deeper conflict between the state, disenfranchised communities, or even citizens disenchanted with 
the democratic system in general (Goldstein, 2012; Seligson, 2003).  
Second, not only do my findings lend support to those arguing that social capital can have a 
“dark side” (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Armony, 2004; Satyanath et al., 2013), they also show that 
citizens’ views of the trustworthiness of state authorities play a significant role as moderators of the 
way social cohesion translates into political behavior. Indeed, they demonstrate that, in conditions in 
which citizen-state relations have eroded to the point that citizens distrust the effective intervention 
of the authorities, citizens invest their social capital to attempt to find solutions that the state cannot 
provide.  
Third, my findings suggest that the deterioration of citizens’ trust in the authorities not only 
has the potential to impede the cooperation necessary for improved security (Arias & Ungar, 2009; 
Sabet, 2014), it can also lead citizens to invest their resources extra-legally in order to attempt to 
solve their problems by themselves. Thus, it follows that the effective reestablishment of citizens’ 
trust in the authorities is likely to bolster democracy not only by improving security but, as Diamond 
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(1999) once put it, by preventing citizens from turning to solutions that would be fatal to democratic 
governance. 
Figure 17. Police Officers Allegedly Looting in San Jose del Cabo 
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Odile  
 
Source: Anonymous, retreived from 
http://noticabos.org/2014/09/27/policias-saqueadores/  
 
To conclude, beyond their theoretical implications my results are also helpful for 
understanding recent developments in Mexico. As if prophesized by the treatments, one year after 
the study, another hurricane (Hurricane Odile) hit the western coast of Mexico. This time, however, 
it hit the remote city of San José del Cabo in the state of Baja California Sur, one of the most 
important tourist destinations in Mexico. Soon after the storm hit the city a number of thieves 
started to loot local stores and houses. In the face of this crisis, a number of citizens joined together 
around the neighborhoods of Los Cabos to patrol the streets and confront any potential thieves 
lurking in their neighborhoods (Excélsior, 2014). Although these actions can be seen as emerging 
out of the ongoing supply crisis in the town, my findings suggest that it is important to consider 
citizens’ distrust of the ability of the authorities to effectively intervene as a key factor that prompted 
citizens to invest their social capital in vigilante behavior.  
Indeed, when looking at this case, the significance of citizens’ expectations of the ability of 
the authorities to intervene becomes evident. On the one hand, the action of the local authorities 
was anything but ideal. Local policemen not only failed to intervene against the thieves who attacked 
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the local stores, as Picture 1 shows many of them participated in the looting and were photographed 
by the local residents. The police’s participation was so deep that later that year, the police 
commander was sent to prison for participating in acts of looting (bcsnoticias, 2014). If this was not 
enough, the mayor of the city was notoriously absent during the storm. Not only did the media 
discover that he was out of the city but that he was gambling in a casino in Las Vegas.100 
On the other, the remoteness of San José del Cabo considerably delayed the intervention of 
the federal government. Located at the extreme end of the Baja California peninsula Los Cabos is 
accessible only by plane or boat. Therefore, while the Mexican Army is usually deployed to 
hurricane-affected areas within one or two days, in this case, the army could not provide aid and 
security services until almost one week after the events (Sandoval, 2014).  
 All in all, to the extent that my findings can shed some light on the psychology of the 
inhabitants of San José del Cabo, it is possible to understand how citizens’ perceptions that the 
authorities were unlikely to intervene to enforce the law could have pushed citizens to look for 
alternative means to provide themselves with security. Had the authorities been more responsive to 
citizens’ needs, perhaps they would have been able to prevent the emergence of vigilantism in the 
city and channel the existing social capital into security co-production.  
  
  
                                                     
100 The scandal was so large that a group of citizens requested his impeachment (Zúñiga-Pacheco, 2014). 
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V. TRUST AND VIGILANTE JUSTICE: A BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 
The very foundations of the state rest on its promise of security in exchange for a monopoly 
over the coercive use of violence. However, at times citizens violate this principle by directly 
confronting suspected criminals in conjunction with their community; we commonly call such 
behavior “collective vigilantism.” 
Although scholars have studied some of the most spectacular manifestations of collective 
vigilantism in Latin America (e.g., Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia (Godoy, 2004), Africa 
(Bangstad, 2005; Owumi & Ajayi, 2013), Asia (Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007; Telle, 2009), and 
Europe (Haas et al., 2013), the micro-foundations of collective vigilante behavior remain 
underexplored. Under what conditions do individuals confront criminals with their community 
rather than relying on state authorities?   
I propose that, to answer this question it is necessary to consider the potential costs and 
benefits associated with vigilante justice and the actors that determine the likelihood of those 
outcomes. On the one hand, vigilantes have the opportunity to reduce the costs of crime (e.g., by 
preventing or recovering losses). On the other, they face the risk of incurring in legal (e.g. fines, jail 
time) or crime-related (e.g. economic losses, physical harm, or even death) costs.101,102 
Given these incentives, I propose first, that citizens are more likely to engage in vigilante 
justice when they are exposed to more severe levels of crime. Second, I contend that, since both the 
likelihood of recovering crime losses and engaging in legal costs for vigilantism are determined by 
the probability of law enforcement to intervene, citizens might be more likely to engage in vigilante 
justice when they estimate the likelihood of law enforcement to intervene to be lower. Thirdly, I 
argue that, because the probability of obtaining a positive outcome is in part determined by the 
                                                     
101 The research for this chapter was reviewed by Vanderbilt’s Institutional Review Board (IRB 141616). 
102 Funding for this study was provided by a grant from the Research in Individuals, Politics, and Society (RIPS) Laboratory at 
Vanderbilt University 
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probability that an individual’s community will intervene effectively, the trustworthiness of one’s 
neighbors is likely to inform the probability that citizens will choose to pursue vigilantism.  
Finally, because the expected benefits from vigilante behavior are more likely to be upset by 
its costs when the authorities are likely to intervene, I propose that citizens’ perceptions that law 
enforcement is trustworthy moderates effect that community trust has on the probability of vigilante 
behavior to emerge.  
To test these claims, I developed the extralegal-confrontation experiment. Building from 
Bosman & Van Winden’s (2002) power-to-take experiment, my experiment allows participants in a 
game-like scenario to have the opportunity of confronting a mock thief who attempts to take part of 
their income.103 However, in addition to these two players (participant and thief), the extralegal 
confrontation experiment incorporates the participant’s community (represented by four neighbors) 
and the police as additional players in the game.  
While the community can help the participant to recover his tokens if he decides to confront 
the thief, the police have a double function. On the one hand, they can recover the tokens the 
participant lost to the thief at a later stage. On the other, they can fine the subject for deciding to 
confront the thief, also at a later stage.104 
In order to assess the effect of crime severity on vigilante behavior I experimentally 
manipulated the amount of tokens stolen by the thief. To assess how trust influences citizens’ 
choice, I experimentally manipulated the information citizens received (at the time of making their 
choice) about the likelihood of the neighbors and police entering the game at later stages.  
                                                     
103 The power-to-take experiment is a behavioral game designed to study a player’s reaction to a situation in which an 
agent can (potentially) appropriate part of her endowment (effort) (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002, p. 149). In this 
paradigm, a player (responder) has part of her endowment taken by a second player (take authority), and given the 
chance to respond.  
104 Note that in this study the only human player was the participant. The thief, the neighbors and the police were not 
real; their moves were determined by dice rolls thrown by the study subject. 
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All in all, 150 voting-age subjects participated in 2,996 rounds of the extralegal-confrontation 
experiment in a laboratory I set up in Mexico City. I find that citizens were more likely to confront 
the thief under the following conditions: when the thief took a larger proportion of income (the 
crime was more severe), when the subject received information that neighbors were more likely to 
help (the community was more trustworthy), and when the subject received information that the 
police would be unlikely to enter the game (law enforcement was more untrustworthy). Further, 
consistent with my thesis, I find that law enforcement untrustworthiness positively moderates the 
effect of the community’s trustworthiness.  
This experiment builds on Chapter III and IV by incorporating the costs and benefits 
inherent to vigilante behavior and providing evidence of causal processes that can lead to collective 
vigilantism. Although it is important to acknowledge that they are specific to the experimental 
context, these findings might more generally help us understand citizens’ behavior across contexts in 
which social capital and the trustworthiness of law enforcement vary. While early literature on 
vigilantism focused on the psychological and sociological forces behind this phenomenon, the 
results of this study suggest that citizens’ trust of the state, as represented by law enforcement, not 
only can have direct effects on the emergence of vigilante behavior, but it can also moderate the 
effect of other determinants of this behavior. More generally, the findings contribute to our 
understanding of the heterogeneous role of social capital. While strong communities can foster 
state-centered (towards the state) behavior under some conditions, in contexts in which the citizen-
state connection has eroded significantly, they can motivate extra-state (outside the state) actions. 
Vigilante Justice 
Citizen-initiated attempts to directly confront alleged criminals have captured the attention 
of scholars for a long time. A growing strand of literature has attempted to explain the emergence of 
155 
 
some of the most spectacular manifestations of vigilantism. Moral outrage (Black, 1976; Senechal de 
la Roche, 2001; Tolnay & Beck, 1995), group conflict (Hepworth & West, 1988; Levine & Campbell, 
1972; Olzak, 1990; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007), culture (Clarke, 1998; Hayes & Lee, 2005; Nisbett 
& Cohen, 1996; Owumi & Ajayi, 2013; Tyson, 2013; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967), and historical 
structures (Bateson, 2013) have all been singled out as important factors for understanding the 
emergence of this phenomenon. However, this scholarship has centered their effort in the studying 
the emergence of vigilantism at the county or community level, the factors that influence an 
individuals’ choice to turn to their community to confront directly confront crime remain largely 
unexplored  
In this chapter, I propose to examine the factors that increase individuals’ tendencies 
towards vigilante behavior in order to build solid ground to understand the emergence of its later 
manifestations.105 Studying this phenomenon at the individual level avoids the selection bias inherent 
in trying to study the most spectacular manifestations of vigilante behavior. 106 
However, before theorizing about the factors that influence the probability of vigilante 
behavior to emerge, it is important to define this phenomenon (Bateson, 2014; Smith, 2014). In the 
next section I briefly discuss what vigilantism is and how my conceptualization builds on previous 
definitions of the phenomenon. 
                                                     
105 A top-down approach would seek to understand the causes of lynchings and, from there, generalize to the causes of 
vigilante behavior. In contrast, a bottom-up approach would seek to understand the causes of early vigilante behavior 
and only later theorize about the factors that cause some vigilante actions evolve into lynchings.  
106 Note that not every vigilante attempt develops into a lynching or the formation of a vigilante militia, and not all of 
these spectacular manifestations emerge from vigilante attempts. Further, there might be incentives for media and/or 
government to misreport the prevalence of these events. Unless we can account for these selection processes, our 
inferences about the causes of vigilante behavior might be biased in an unknown direction. 
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Defining Vigilantism  
Building from previous conceptual work on vigilantism I define a vigilante action as the 
deployment of extra-legal punitive force to castigate violations to the state’s law.107 This definition 
builds on previous literature in three ways.  
First, it accommodates a number of behavioral manifestations but differentiates vigilantism 
from attempts to castigate non-legal violations. Previously, Rosenbaum and Sederburg (1976) 
defined vigilante behavior broadly as “threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an 
established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order 
from some form of subversion.” (1976, p. 542). However, by generalizing vigilantism to any attempt 
to punish a trespass of the social order, this definition included behaviors that otherwise might not 
be regarded as vigilante behavior (e.g., literal witch-hunts, social and religious shunning, and honor 
killings). For this reason, scholars moved to develop more conceptual precision with regard to the 
type of actions to be considered as vigilantism. 
Abrahams (2002), for his part, defined vigilantism narrowly as “an organized attempt by a 
group of ‘ordinary citizens’ to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their 
communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action 
through the police and courts” (2002, 26). Although this definition is much more precise, it also 
incorporates distrust of law enforcement into the very conceptualization of vigilante behavior. This 
makes it impossible to empirically evaluate the relationship between these two variables. 
 My definition, on the contrary, incorporates a wide range of actions while restricting the 
concept to include only behavior against violators of the state’s law. On the one hand, it excludes 
punitive action against violations of norms not codified by the state (e.g. heresy, witchcraft, inter-
                                                     
107 I do not reduce my definition of vigilante action to only non-state actors since policemen may also participate in 
vigilantism if they use extra-legal procedures that employ punitive force to castigate alleged violations to the state’s law.  
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racial relations) and that would otherwise not be prosecuted by law enforcement. On the other, it 
highlights the challenge to the state’s monopoly over the coercive use of force as one of the defining 
characteristics of vigilante behavior. After all, as Smith points out “vigilantism is juxtaposed to and 
only makes sense in relationship to the state’s law” (p.22, 2014). 108 
Second, my definition accommodates a wide array of actors who can engage in vigilante 
actions. While Brown (1975) and Rosenbaum and Sederburg (1976) accommodate such flexibility, 
more recent conceptualizations do not. Smith (2014), for example, defines vigilantism as “the 
collective deployment of extra-legal punitive force,” disallowing the use of vigilantism in reference to 
acts performed by individuals. Moreover, Abrams (2002) goes even further and restricts the use of 
the word to groups of “ordinary citizens.”  
Although it might be the case that individual vigilantism is less of a threat to the stability of 
the state when compared to collective vigilantism (Silke, 2001), I believe that restricting the scope of 
the concept from the start ignores the important similarities between collective and individual 
vigilantism. Additionally, while most actors engaging in vigilantism are indeed ordinary citizens, it is 
possible for state officials to disregard their social function and the rule of law to participate in 
vigilante actions themselves. My definition conceptualizes the phenomenon broadly in order to 
accommodate actions conducted by both individual and groups independently of their social role.109 
Finally, my conceptualization of vigilantism defines behavior rather than subjects. One 
approach to this topic is to focus on the emergence and evolution of vigilante groups and 
individuals (Asfura-Heim & Espach, 2013; Tyson, 2013). However, categorizing groups and/or 
                                                     
108 The idea of restricting vigilantism to attempts to punish legal violation has been in the literature for a while. For 
example Brown defined vigilante behavior as “the taking of the law into one’s own hand” (e.g. Brown, 1975, p. 22). In 
doing so, this author clarifies the concept by incorporating the term “law” into our understanding of vigilantism. 
Unfortunately, translating the term into metaphorical language makes the definition ambiguous. 
109 Here, I focus on collective vigilantism emerging from individual initiative. This can reflect the behavior of citizens 
and leaders; however, it is also possible for collective vigilantism to emerge from alternative mechanisms. I limited the 
scope of this study for parsimony; however, there is no reason why future studies could not extend my work to 
investigate these alternative mechanisms.  
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individuals as vigilantes is controversial and empirically complicated in particular because actors can 
engage in different actions simultaneously and can modify their behavior over time (Smith, 2014). 
So, under what conditions do citizens engage in vigilante behavior? As any other action, 
vigilantism can have potential costs and benefits for those engaging in it. Thus, I argue that in order 
to theorize about this phenomenon it is important to look at the incentives faced by those engaging 
in this behavior and the agents upon whom achieving these positive or negative outcomes depends. 
In doing so, in the following section I note that the outcomes citizens can expect from vigilante 
actions are, at least in part, dependent upon the intervention of their neighbors and law 
enforcement. Thus, I conclude that a citizen’s perception about the trustworthiness of these two 
agents plays a critical role in his or her likelihood of engaging in vigilantism.  
Costs and Benefits of Vigilantism  
Vigilante justice often captures the public’s attention when gruesome or lethal punishments 
are applied to its victims, and its costs in terms of human rights and life are undeniable. However, to 
understand its causes, it is important to carefully consider the incentives (potential costs and 
benefits) faced by citizens who ultimately decide to engage in these actions. 
First, crime generates both material and immaterial negative utility among its victims. 
Therefore, victims may expect an immediate or long-term benefit from engaging in vigilantism. In 
the simplest example, if they are able to confront criminals successfully, citizens may expect to 
immediately recover property or income lost to crime. Additionally, vigilantes may expect to deter 
future crime and hence reduce future costs of crime (Ceobanu et al., 2010; Cohen, 2008; McCollister 
et al., 2010; Miller et al., 1996).110 
                                                     
110 By material costs, I refer to the loss of income, property, and land, among other things. By immaterial costs I refer to 
the loss of life satisfaction, the presence of negative emotions, stress, etc.  
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Second, to varying degrees, citizens may expect to experience positive emotions (and thus a 
psychological benefit) after successfully engaging in vigilante actions. These may come from a 
multitude of mechanisms, including the satisfaction associated with altruistic retaliation (de Quervain 
et al., 2004; Maitner et al., 2006), collaborative interaction (Jung et al., 2002), obtaining a fair 
outcome (Tyler, 1988), or expressing a message to the offender (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009). 
The costs of vigilante behavior can come from direct and indirect sources. By direct costs I 
refer to those that come from vigilantism itself and which usually cannot be avoided. On the one 
hand, they include the psychological distress that citizens may experience when engaging in 
vigilantism and the material costs that citizens may have to pay to confront criminals.111 On the 
other hand, citizens engaging in vigilante behavior may face opportunity costs. That is, by engaging 
in vigilante justice participants may forfeit the opportunity to engage in productive activities and this 
trade off can significantly diminish their economic prospects (Bates et al., 2002).  
Indirect costs refer to losses that may come from external actors like the criminals, law 
enforcement agents, or from society in general. First, in addition to the original cost of crime 
citizens who attempt to confront criminals but fail may incur additional material or immaterial losses 
immediately or in the long run. For example, citizens unsuccessfully attempting to engage in 
vigilante behavior against thieves risk being economically, physically, or psychologically injured 
during or after the confrontation. Similarly, citizens being extorted by organized criminals may put 
their lives and livelihoods at risk if they decide to defend themselves but are unsuccessful (Contreras, 
2014).  
Second, vigilante behavior implies an intrusion into the state’s monopoly over the coercive 
use of violence. As such, it can be considered as illegal or socially deviant behavior and thus be 
                                                     
111 Material costs can vary greatly but are almost always greater than zero. While in some cases vigilantism may only take 
the effort to engage in it, it other situations citizens may need to invest resources to purchase weapons and equipment. 
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subject to a variety of legal and social sanctions.112 Therefore, citizens engaging in vigilante actions 
risk significant economic fines, imprisonment, and social stigmatization that may result in significant 
direct and reputational costs.  
In sum, there are potential benefits and risks from engaging in vigilante action. On the one 
hand, citizens may derive psychological, social, and material benefits from successfully confronting 
crime. On the other, they also risk incurring in severe losses, either by being unsuccessful in 
confronting crime or by being sanctioned for violating the rule of law. What influences citizens’ 
likelihood of deriving benefits from engaging in vigilante behavior? 
I propose that, holding potential costs and benefits constant, an individual’s expectation that 
his/her community is likely to intervene in his/her favor (community trust) and his/her expectation 
that the authorities will not intervene to enforce the law (law enforcement distrust) play an 
important role in this phenomenon by shaping the expected likelihood of benefiting from or being 
harmed by participating in vigilantism. In order to explain and justify these expectations in the 
context of this study, I first provide an overview of the experimental design developed to shed light 
on individuals’ tendencies toward vigilantism and, then, I derive a set of hypotheses within the 
context of that design. 
Although by design they do not attempt to incorporate the full complexity of human reality, 
in my laboratory study I first provide an overview of the experimental design developed to shed 
light on individuals’ tendencies toward vigilantism, and then I derive a set of hypotheses within the 
context of that design. 
                                                     
112 These sanctions may vary, depending on the nature of the vigilante actions, the legal context, and the nature of public 
opinion about vigilantism.  
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Study Design 
The behavioral experiments allow us to make ceteris paribus observations of individual agents 
that might otherwise be very difficult to obtain (C. Camerer, 2011; Levitt & List, 2007). In brief, the 
main strategy behind the approach applied here is to identify a set of potentially important 
influences on a particular type of behavior and then develop a laboratory task that contains features 
analogous to the circumstances an individual might confront in the real world. To draw out realistic 
behavior during the task, real money is used to entice participants to participate in an engaged 
manner. 
Other scholars have studied topics such as altruism, negotiation, and other economic 
behavior using the dictator, ultimatum, and power-to-take experimental games (Bosman & Van 
Winden, 2002; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). 
Although the first two are by far the most popular behavioral experiments (Engel, 2011; 
Oosterbeek, Sloof, & Kuilen, 2004), the third is particularly interesting in that it is designed to study 
a player’s (responder’s) reaction to a situation in which another agent (take authority) proposes to 
take part of her income (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002, p. 149). 
In the classic power-to-take game (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002), two players are 
randomized into two roles: a “take authority” and a “responder”. In the first stage, the responder 
receives an endowment and the “take authority” makes a proposal on the so-called “take rate”. The 
take rate is the part of the responder's income that will be transferred to the take authority. In the 
second stage, the only action that the responder can take is to decide on the part of his income that 
will be destroyed to prevent the take authority form taking it. Finally, payoffs are assigned. To 
evaluate the influence of neighbors and law enforcement on the probability of vigilante behavior to 
emerge, I built on this protocol to create a novel behavioral game (the extralegal-confrontation 
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experiment) that incorporates some of the most important actors and incentives at play in vigilante 
justice.  
Figure 18 shows the decision tree faced by the participant113 in my extralegal-confrontation 
experiment. First, the participant receives some information the other actors in the game. Then, a 
thief114 takes a proportion of the total income of the participant115. Thirdly, the participant decides 
whether or not to illegally confront the thief. This choice opens two branches.  
If the participant decides not to confront the thief (branch A in Figure 18), a law enforcer 
(here referred as the police) has a chance to intervene. If the police intervene, the participant 
recovers the tokens taken by the thief, and the game ends. If the police do not intervene, the 
proposal stands, and the game ends. 
If the participant decides to confront the thief (branch B) she has a chance to receive 
support from the members of her community in the confrontation. If the participant is successful in 
confronting the thief, then he recovers the tokens stolen by the thief. If the participant is not 
successful, she engages in additional “losing costs” (e.g. material losses, injury or even death) and the 
game ends. Finally, the police have a chance to enter the game. If the police enter the game, the 
participant incurs “legal costs” (e.g. legal defense, fines, or even jail time). 
  Note that, although by necessity this game is only a model of the real conditions faced by 
citizens when considering whether or not to engage in vigilante justice, it incorporates a number of 
important features. First, it gives the participant the opportunity to attempt to directly confront a 
thief after losing real utility. Second, it incorporates the community, in the form of four neighbors, 
as a potential source of support when confronting criminals. Finally, it incorporates the double role 
that law enforcement authorities play in society. On the one hand, the police offer a potential avenue 
                                                     
113 Equivalent to Bosman & Van Winden’s (2002) respondent. Here also referred as participant, subject, or citizen. 
114 Equivalent to Bosman & Van Winden’s (2002) take authority. 
115 Equivalent to Bosman & Van Winden’s (2002) take-proposal. 
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for reducing the cost of crime. On the other, they establish vigilantism as an illegal action and 
sanction the participant if she is found engaging in this type of behavior. What hypotheses can be 
assessed using this experimental game? 
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Figure 18. Diagram of the Incentives Faced by the Participant in the Extralegal-Confrontation Experiment 
             Police 
Intervention 
 
             
Legal Costs 
          Successful 
○ 
 
~ Police 
Intervention 
       
Community 
support 
  
 
  
      Income 
Recovered   
Income 
Stolen  
  
A. Confront  
  
 
  
Police 
Intervention 
   
○ ○ 
  
          
Losing Costs 
Participant 
Receives 
Information 
  
 
 
 
 
~Successful 
  
~ Police 
Intervention 
   
○ 
 
○ □ 
       
Losing Costs 
           
Police 
Intervention 
    
 
 
 
      
      Income 
Recovered     
B.~ Confront  
     
~ Police 
Intervention 
    
○ 
   
            
Income Lost 
              
               
□ Choice Event, ○Random event, ~ Negation 
165 
 
Hypotheses  
One factor that may influence the probability of vigilante behavior to emerge is the severity 
of the crime. Results from power to take experiments show that subjects demonstrate higher levels 
of negative emotions (Bosman & Van Winden, 2002), anger (Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & 
van Winden, 2007), and behavioral aggression (McDermott, Tingley, Cowden, Frazzetto, & 
Johnson, 2009) after a higher proportion of income has been taken from them. Finally, some crimes 
might generate a moral outrage that may lead citizens to engage in vigilantism (Black, 1976; Senechal 
de la Roche, 2001; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). Further, a formal analysis of the game shows that, as the 
theft increases, so does the marginal utility of attacking the thief.116 
H1. As the amount of tokens stolen by the thief increases, so will the likelihood that a 
participant will engage in vigilante behavior  
A second factor that may increase the likelihood of a citizen to engage in vigilante behavior 
is trust. The conceptual study of trust has a long history, and some authors have been particularly 
influential (e.g. Fukuyama, 1996; Morgan & Hunt, 1994); however, to date, there is no universally 
accepted definition of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
In line with a recent meta-analysis of literature on trust (Walterbusch et al., 2014), I define 
trust as an agent’s expectation that another agent will (or will be willing to) perform an action with a 
sufficient level of competence to obtain a positive outcome. This definition captures the most 
commonly used words to define the concept (subject, expect, action, will, confidence, competence 
and outcome), acknowledges their empirical relation across definitions, and accommodates a wide 
array of objects of evaluation. 
                                                     
116 For more details on the formal analysis of the game see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from 
this analysis see Figure A4. 
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The first object of trust that may influence the emergence of vigilante action is citizens’ trust 
in their community.117 Community trust has been shown to be linked to citizens’ perception of 
collective efficacy (Kim et al., 2011; Putnam, 1995; Welch et al., 2001), and previous correlational 
research has shown that citizens who trust in their neighbors are more likely to join with them to 
attempt to defend themselves from crime (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).  
Further, when one considers the risks and opportunities present in the extralegal-
confrontation game, it is clear that, all other things being equal, as the average probability of the 
neighbors to enter the game increases, so does the expected likelihood that the participant will defeat 
the thief and recover the stolen tokens. Therefore, this variable is likely to increase the utility 
differential between engaging and not engaging in vigilante behavior and ultimately increase the 
likelihood of this behavior.118, 119 Thus, I expect that holding incentives constant: 
H2. When a participant is embedded in a more trustworthy community, her 
likelihood of engaging in vigilante behavior will increase. 
A third factor that might influence the likelihood of citizens to engage in vigilante actions is 
the trustworthiness of law enforcement. However, the nature of the direct effect of trust in law 
enforcement is disputed. On the one hand, survey research has found a positive association between 
this variable and support for vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2012). On the other, experimental 
evidence has found a null or negative effect on perceptions of the trustworthiness of law 
enforcement and support for vigilante justice (Haas et al., 2013).  
This inconsistency may come from the threats to internal validity common to survey 
research (omitted variable bias or simultaneity bias) or our inability to extrapolate the inferences 
                                                     
117 Here, I understand community simply as the collection of citizens surrounding a particular individual in his 
neighborhood. 
118 For more details on the formal analysis of the game, see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from 
this analysis see Figure A3. 
119 However, in real life, vigilantes may expect the likelihood of legal punishment if they have more support from their 
communities. Here, I did not incorporate the “protection of the crowd effect” for parsimony. Thus, this study is likely to 
present a conservative estimate of the real effect of trust in one’s neighbors. 
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coming from experimental research to the overall population. However, it may also come from a 
heterogeneous understanding of trust in the police.  
Since trust refers to an agent’s expectation of obtaining “positive outcomes,” which is a 
result that can be interpreted in multiple ways, it is possible for citizens to understand trust in at least 
two different ways. On the one hand, citizens may interpret trust as the expectation that another 
actor will act benevolently towards them regardless of the other actor’s social role. On the other, the 
trustworthiness of an actor may be understood as the expectation that he/she will act with sufficient 
competence to produce an outcome consistent with his/her social role in society. 
Since law enforcement has a double role in society, this distinction is particularly important 
when attempting to understand citizens’ trust towards this actor. On the one hand, law enforcement 
has the role of protecting citizens’ lives and livelihoods against crime. On the other, it has the role of 
admonishing citizens in cases in which they trespass on other citizens’ rights or otherwise violate the 
rule of law.  
Operationalizing trust as citizens’ expectation that law enforcement will intervene to produce 
a result favorable to them (even if this involves violating their social role) may help us understand 
the emergence of vigilante justice in some contexts.120 However, this approach risks incorporating 
corruption and criminal collusion into the picture before establishing the effect of citizens’ trust in 
the effectiveness of law enforcement. Thus, in this piece I define trust in law enforcement simply 
as citizens’ perception that law enforcement will intervene with sufficient competence to enforce the 
law even if this produces a negative outcome towards them.  
                                                     
120 For example, in studying the American South, some may argue that white supremacist lynch mobs often trusted or 
were in part formed by law enforcement agents. Although it is unclear to what extent these actors believed that the 
police were trustworthy, in this cases it seems clear that they did not expect law enforcement to admonish them for or 
interfere with their actions. Thus, understanding trust simply as an expectation of benevolence may lead to a more 
complicated relation between these two variables.  
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Defining trust in law enforcement in this way, and considering the incentives for vigilante 
behavior, there are reasons to expect a positive direct effect of citizens’ trust in law enforcement on 
vigilante action. First, as the probability of police intervention increases, the expected cost of 
engaging in vigilante behavior also increases. This is because the probability that the participant will 
incur some cost derived from the illegal nature of vigilante justice is directly increased.  
Second, as the police’s probability of intervention increases so does the expected probability 
that the participant will recover his/her lost tokens even if he/she decides not to confront the 
thief.121 Thus, since this variable is likely to have a simultaneous effect on the costs of vigilante 
justice and the potential effectiveness of inaction I expect that, holding the potential costs and 
benefits of vigilantism constant:  
H3: As the likelihood of police intervention decreases, citizens’ likelihood of 
engaging in vigilante behavior will increase.  
But just as the trustworthiness of law enforcement can directly affect the emergence of 
vigilante behavior; it can also moderate the effect of citizens’ trust in their community. Distrust of 
law enforcement has been shown to reduce crime reporting (Levitt, 1998) and citizen-police 
collaboration (De Cremer & Tyler, 2007). Moreover, as I have shown in Chapter III, correlational 
evidence suggests that trust in the community linked to collective anti-criminal action is stronger 
among those who distrust the police.  
Finally, a formal analysis of the effects of manipulating the likelihood that the police and the 
neighbors will enter the game shows that the likelihood of the police intervention moderates the 
degree to which the trustworthiness of the community translates into an increase in the overall 
expected utility of engaging in vigilantism.  
                                                     
121 For more details on the formal analysis of the game, see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from 
this analysis, see Figure A2. 
169 
 
Although the full analytical results are displayed in Appendix I, they can be summarized as 
follows. First, the overall utility of engaging in vigilantism depends on the utility of either engaging 
in vigilantism or not engaging in vigilantism.  
Second, these two utilities depend on two outcomes in the game. On the one hand, they 
depend on the participants’ ability to successfully defeat the thief. On the other, they depend on the 
likelihood of police intervention in the final stage of the game.  
Therefore, when there is only a low probability that the police will intervene, as the 
neighbors’ likelihood to intervene increases, so does the utility of engaging in vigilantism while 
potential costs remain low. Further, the utility of not engaging in vigilantism also remains low. Thus, 
changes in the neighbors’ trustworthiness translate into the overall utility of engaging in vigilantism 
almost directly. 
However, when there is a high probability that the police will intervene, as the neighbors 
become more likely to intervene, the expected benefits of engaging in vigilantism increase but costs 
remain high and constant. Moreover, the utility of the alternative (not engaging in vigilantism) also 
remains high.  
Therefore, the increase in the expected benefits derived from a trustworthy community 
become muted by the expected costs from vigilante behavior.122 All in all, I expect that: 
H4: There will be a significant positive interaction between the trustworthiness of the 
community and the untrustworthiness of the police. That is, the effect of a 
trustworthy community on vigilante behavior will be stronger in contexts in which 
police intervention is perceived as unlikely.  
 
                                                     
122 For more details on the formal analysis of the game, see Appendix I. For a figure of the expectations derived from 
this analysis see Figure A5. 
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Methods  
To evaluate the impact of the severity of the crime, citizens’ trust in their community and 
citizens’ distrust of law enforcement, I recruited a sample of voting-age citizens to play a series of 
repeated iterations of the extralegal-confrontation experiment. In each round, I experimentally 
manipulated the amount of tokens stolen by the thief and the information that participants received 
about a) the probability that their neighbors would enter the game and b) the probability that the 
police would enter the game.  
Participants who came to the laboratory signed an informed consent form, completed a pre-
study questionnaire, and saw a pre-recorded video that explained the instructions to the game.123 
During the instructions, participants were told the dynamics of the activity and that their final 
compensation would be determined by the number of tokens that they retained at the end of the 
activity. To avoid termination effects (see Normann & Wallace, 2012), participants were told that 
they would repeat the activity a number of times but were blinded to the actual number of rounds in 
the game.124 After the twentieth round, the game was terminated, the participants were compensated 
(at a pre-disclosed rate of US$.40 per ten tokens), and they were thanked for their participation.  
After the instructions and before starting the game participants were given 100 tokens as an 
endowment (US$4). Each iteration of the game consisted of seven actors and six stages. In this 
                                                     
123 In addition to demographic questions, the pre study questionnaire included questions such as the DOSPERT risk 
aversion scale in Spanish and questions about participants’ trust in the police, trust in the neighbors, perceptions of 
insecurity, crime victimization and mathematical ability. See Appendix IV. 
124 Participants were told that they would not know how many rounds were in the study. They were told that they would 
play for a maximum of one-and-a-half hours and that the game would end without warning. The few participants who 
asked whether the researcher had knowledge or control over the termination of the study (about 2) were told that the 
computer was programed to finish the game at random. At the end of the study, these participants were fully debriefed. 
They were told that the computer was programed to finish after 20 rounds and that the researcher had knowledge of this 
all along.  
171 
 
version of the study the participant was the only human player involved, and the actions of the rest 
of the players were determined by the role of a ten sided die.125  
In the first stage of each round (including the very first round), the participant received a 
random number (between one and ten) of additional tokens. In the second stage the participant 
received information about the likelihood of the neighbors and police entering the game at later 
stages. This was done through one of nine visual images displayed in Table 5.  
Table 5. Treatment Images 
 
Low  
Police Trustworthiness 
Medium  
Trustworthiness 
High Police  
Trustworthiness 
High 
Neighbors’ 
Trustworthiness 
  
 
Medium 
Neighbors’ 
Trustworthiness 
  
 
Low 
Neighbors’ 
Trustworthiness 
 
  
Only one image was displayed to the participant in any given round round 
 
The images showed four neighbors of one of two types: blue (identified as trustworthy 
neighbors) and grey (identified as untrustworthy neighbors).126 The participants were told that the 
                                                     
125 This was done to be able to experimentally manipulate their entrance into the game. Future implementations may 
want to assign real players to the different roles in the game. To increase the realism of the game, the take authority was 
called “the thief,” and the police were referred as “the police” during the game.  
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probability that blue neighbors would enter the game was 0.90 and the probability that grey 
neighbors would enter the game was only 0.10, with those odds having been selected in the design 
of the study for realism – no neighbor is perfectly trustworthy or perfectly untrustworthy. 
All in all, one third of the images produced contained four blue (trustworthy) neighbors, one 
third contained four gray (untrustworthy) neighbors, and one third of the images contained one blue 
and three gray neighbors.  
Further, the images displayed the probability of the police entering the game.127 One third of 
the images showed that the police had a probability of 0.20 of entering the game, one third displayed 
a probability of 0.50, and the rest showed a probability of 0.80. One of the nine images displayed in 
Table 5 was displayed at the beginning of the round.  
After seeing one of these nine figures, the thief stole at random 20%, 50%, or 80% of the 
total tokens in the participants’ pocket (total wins plus endowment). Then, while seeing one of the 
nine images in Table 5, the participant was asked to choose whether she wanted to confront the 
thief or not. After the participant’s choice was recorded, the subject continued through the stages 
shown in Figure 18, deciding each of the outcomes with a ten sided die. For a detailed description of 
the rest of the process, see Appendix II.  
Before moving on to the results section, it is important to note that, within the particular 
context of this game, a participant’s attempt to confront the thief constitutes the deployment of 
extra-legal punitive force to castigate violations of the state’s law (i.e., vigilante behavior). Stealing 
income from the participant is a violation of the state’s law since, if it is discovered by the police, it 
is prevented. Moreover, a participant´s choice to confront the thief is extra-legal since this action is 
independent of the police, and if it co-occurs with its intervention it leads to legal costs.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
126 Blue neighbors were described as trustworthy neighbors during the instruction. A trustworthy neighbor was defined 
as one who has 90% chance of entering the game and an untrustworthy neighbor as one who has 10% chance of 
entering the game. 
127 See Appendix II to see the nine different images to which the participants were exposed before making their choice. 
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Data 
I recruited my participants from 150 residents of a middle-class apartment complex located 
in the southern part of Mexico City.128,129 The sample is composed of 52.05% female participants, of 
participants with an average age of 30.54 years old (SD. 12.3), and with an average income between 
$9,500 and $11,999 pesos a month (about US$830 a month). 37.31% of the sample had been 
victimized by crime in the previous year, and, on a 1 to 4 scale, participants trusted “little” in the 
police (mean: 2.05 SD: 0.77) and “somewhat” in their neighbors (mean: 3 SD: 0.68). Finally, on a 1 
to 4 scale of insecurity, participants felt “somewhat” insecure in their neighborhood (mean: 3.04 SD: 
0.95). 
Overall I analyze a total of 2,996 rounds. With respect to the neighbors’ trustworthiness 
manipulation, in 34.15% of the rounds participants were assigned to be among four trustworthy 
neighbors, in 34.11% of the rounds participants were assigned to have one trustworthy and three 
untrustworthy neighbors, and in 31.74% of the rounds participants were assigned to have four 
untrustworthy neighbors.  
With respect to the police trustworthiness treatment, in 32.48% of the rounds, participants 
were informed that the police had a probability of 0.8 of entering the game at the end of the round, 
in 34.85% of the rounds they were told that the police had a probability of 0.5 of entering the game, 
and in 32.68% of the rounds, participants were told that the police’s likelihood of entering the game 
was only 0.2. Finally, with respect to the severity of the crime treatment, in 34.45% of the rounds the 
thief took 20% of the participant’s winnings, in 33.04% of the rounds the thief took 50%, and in 
32.56% of the rounds the thief took 80% of the participant’s income.  
                                                     
128 In total, 150 people consented and started the study. However, four rounds were lost due to technical difficulties. 
This represents a data loss of 0.13% of the total sample. 
129 The apartment complex has 904 apartments. To recruit participants, I set up posters on each of the buildings, 
delivered flyers to each apartment of the complex and engaged in snowball sampling.  For a more detailed description of 
the sample, see the results section and Appendix III. 
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Results  
Since within the context of the game vigilante behavior is operationalized in terms of the 
likelihood that a participant will confront the thief, this is the outcome in which I focus in the 
following analyses. In total, in about 34.74% (0.87) of the rounds participants decided to confront 
the thief. I found that younger and older participants were slightly more likely to confront the thief 
and that participants were more likely to confront the thief in earlier rounds rather than later 
rounds.130 However, I could not find differences in rates of confrontation across genders, income, 
crime victimization histories, and preexisting levels of distrust of the police. A fully specified subject 
and round fixed effects logistic regression model (in which every subject and every round is 
represented by a dichotomous variable) could not increase the adjusted pseudo r-squared to more 
than 0.10.  
This high degree of within-subject volatility (about 90% in the response variance occurred 
within subject) suggests that participants engaged with the game. That is, that they responded to the 
shifting circumstances within the study rather than responding on the basis of their predispositions 
or by taking a single strategy.  
But how was citizens’ behavior affected by the varying intensity of crime? And more central 
to this chapter, how did the shifting levels of police and community trustworthiness influence 
citizens’ likelihood of confronting the thief directly? To answer these questions, I specified a 
multivariate logistic regression model in which the probability that a participant will choose to 
confront the thief in a given round is a function of the following equation:  
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑈𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑈𝑇 𝑥 𝑁𝑇 + 𝜱𝑹𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑫
+ 𝚿𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑱𝑬𝑪𝑻 + 𝑒𝑟 
4) 
 
                                                     
130 In a round-fixed-effects logistic regression model with standard errors clustered around the individual I found this to 
be the only significant individual predictor of confrontation. βage= -.0581* (0.031) βage2 = 0.0007*(0.00038) 
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In this model, Income represents the number of tokens that the participant had at the 
beginning of the round, Gain represents the amount of tokens won by the participant at the 
beginning of the round, and Take represents the proportion of the participant’s income stolen by the 
thief at the beginning of the round. For their part, PUT (Police Untrustworthiness) represents the 
probability that the police will not intervene given by 1-Pr(Police Intervention), NT (Neighbors’ 
Trustworthiness) represents the proportion of trustworthy to untrustworthy neighbors, and the 
term PUT x NT represents the product from multiplying both variables. Recall that if the 
interactive trust theory fits the data, we should find a positive and significant coefficient associated 
with this term. Finally, the terms ROUND' and SUBJECT' represent a vector of dummy variables. 
I included these variables to account for any unbalances or correlations that might threaten the 
exchangeability assumptions on which my inferences rely.  
Table 6. Effect of Treatments on the Probability of Confronting the Thief 
 (1) (2) 
 Confront Confront 
   
Proportion of Trustworthy Neighbors 2.758*** 1.990*** 
 (0.208) (0.406) 
Police Untrustworthiness[1-Pr(Police Intervention)] 7.116*** 6.406*** 
 (0.518) (0.601) 
Proportion of Trustworthy Neighbors x Police 
Untrustworthiness 
 1.420** 
 (0.627) 
Proportion of Income Taken 2.482*** 2.499*** 
 (0.318) (0.318) 
Gain (2014 USD) 0.0139 0.0117 
 (0.0501) (0.0505) 
Income (2014 USD) -0.00046 -0.00132 
 (0.0136) (0.0137) 
Constant -5.603*** -5.164*** 
 (0.522) (0.550) 
   
Participants 150 150 
Observations 2,996 2,996 
Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Round and 
subject fixed effects included but not shown.  
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Column 1 in Table 6 shows the overall direct effect of each of the treatments on the 
probability that a respondent will choose to confront the thief. The coefficients presented in the 
table show that the proportion of trustworthy neighbors, the police’s untrustworthiness and the 
proportion of income taken have positive and statistically significant effects on the participant’s 
probability of confronting the thief.  
Figures 19a through 19c show the substantive importance of the treatment effects. Figure 
18a shows that the likelihood of the intervention of the police had by far the largest substantive 
effect of the variables manipulated in the study. Everything else being equal, participants are much 
more likely to confront a thief when a third party is anticipated to be unlikely to intervene to enforce 
the law. As Figure 19a shows, in rounds in which the police had a high probability of intervening at 
the end of the round (Pr(Police Intervention=0.8)) participants are only expected to confront a thief 
with a probability of 0.10. However, in rounds in which the police have a low probability of 
intervening (Pr(Police Intervention)=0.2) participants are expected to choose to confront the thief 
with a probability of 0.63. 
Figure 19b, for its part, shows that participants are more likely to confront a thief when they 
perceive themselves to be inserted into a more trustworthy community. All other things being equal, 
when participants are surrounded by four untrustworthy neighbors, they are expected to confront 
thieves with a probability of 0.20. However, when they are surrounded by four trustworthy 
neighbors, they can be expected to confront a thief with a probability of 0.54.  
Finally, Figure 19c shows that, as participants have larger proportions of their income taken, 
they are more likely to attempt to confront the thief. Indeed, ceteris paribus, when participants lose 
20% of their income they can be expected to confront thieves with a probability of 0.26. Yet, when 
losing 80% of their income, they are expected to attempt to confront a thief with a probability of 
0.44. 
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Overall, the three manipulations have statistically significant and substantively important 
effects. In particular, citizens’ expectation that the law will be enforced by a third party seems to play 
a role in citizens’ willingness to attempt to confront criminals directly. But to what extent did this 
variable moderated the effect of the information provided about the neighbors’ likelihood of 
intervention?  
Figures 19a.-19c. Police Trustworthiness, Community Trustworthiness, and Severity of 
Crime Treatment Effects on the Likelihood of a Participant to Confront the Thief 
                        Figure 19a                                 Figure 19b                                  Figure 19c 
 
 
Expected Probabilities and Confidence Intervals Derived from Model 1  
 
Column 2 in Table 6 introduces a multiplicative term between the trust in the neighbors and 
Police untrustworthiness variables. As expected, the police’s untrustworthiness positively moderates 
the degree to which the neighbors’ trustworthiness translates into an increased likelihood that the 
participants will confront the thief.  
Figures 20a and 20b show the police’s untrustworthiness moderates the effect of the 
trustworthiness of the participants’ neighbors. Figure 20a shows the relation between neighbors’ 
trustworthiness and the probability that a participant will confront a thief in contexts in which the 
police is likely, moderately likely, and unlikely to intervene (light, mid, and dark respectively). Figure 
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20b, for its part, shows the marginal effect of trust in the neighbors over the range of the police’s 
likelihood of intervening at the end of the turn.  
Figures 20a. and 20b. Interaction Between the Police-Trustworthiness Treatment and the 
Neighbors-Trustworthiness Treatment (The Dependent Variable is the Participant’s 
Likelihood of Choosing to Confront the Thief) 
Figure 20a Figure 20b 
  
Untrustworthiness of the Police 
 
 1-Pr(Police Intervention)=0.2  1-Pr(Police Intervention)=0.5  1-Pr(Police Intervention)=0.8 
  
As the figures show, in contexts in which the police are very likely to intervene (Pr.=0.8), 
exchanging four untrustworthy for four trustworthy neighbors only increases a participant’s 
likelihood of confronting a thief by 0.15. However, in contexts in which the police are only 
moderately likely to intervene (Pr.=0.5), exchanging four untrustworthy for four trustworthy 
neighbors is associated with a change of 0.41 in the likelihood of a participant confronting the thief. 
Finally, in a situation in which the police are unlikely to intervene (Pr.=0.2), exchanging four 
untrustworthy for four trustworthy neighbors is associated with an increase of 0.46 in the probability 
that a participant will directly confront the thief.  
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Conclusion  
Vigilantism exerts costs on a society and its political system, and it also exposes participants 
to risks and losses. Yet, across countries and communities, some individuals display a willingness to 
participate in such behaviors. From the perspective of those suffering from intense crime 
victimization, there are potential costs and benefits from circumventing the state to engage in 
vigilante behavior. Under which circumstances do the opportunities associated with this type of 
behavior outweigh the potential risks associated with this sort of action? 
 I place a spotlight on the role of trust and the severity of the crime. With respect to the 
former, the focus here on the trustworthiness of law enforcement to capably execute its job places 
the state back into a dynamic that has frequently been studied from apolitical perspectives. In the 
meantime, the focus on trust among neighbors moves us beyond a framework that attributes 
vigilante behavior (especially collective) to particular cultures. Instead of tagging the behavior to 
particular peoples, the framework here identifies a generalizable condition of a community 
(trustworthiness) that might result from culture but is not specific to any one group.  
To assess the relevance of these factors and, in the case of trust, their relationship to one 
another, in this chapter I developed the extralegal-confrontation experiment, a behavioral game that 
incorporates some of the main actors and incentives faced by someone considering engaging in 
vigilante behavior. Applying a cost-benefit framework, I argued that crime severity, citizens’ trust in 
their community, and citizens’ expectation that law enforcement will not intervene to enforce the 
law can have a positive effect on the probability that citizens will engage in vigilante behavior. 
Moreover, I proposed that citizens’ distrust of law enforcement can positively moderate the effect of 
citizens’ trust in their community, a dynamic that I call the Interactive Trust Hypothesis (ITH). 
To test these hypotheses, I implemented the extralegal-confrontation experiment among a 
convenience sample of adults from Mexico City and found that participants were more likely to 
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confront a mock robber (thief) when a) the latter took more of the participant’s income, b) the 
police were less likely to intervene, and c) participants had more neighbors likely to help them in a 
confrontation against the thief. Further, I found support for the ITH. That is, I found that the 
probability that the police would not intervene (Police Untrustworthiness) positively moderated the 
effect of the proportion of neighbors who were likely to intervene (Neighbors’ Trustworthiness).  
The extralegal-confrontation experiment (as portrayed in Figure 18) is a behavioral model 
inspired by the conditions faced by citizens considering engaging in vigilante justice, and, therefore, 
the degree to which we can translate these insights to the real world is uncertain. That said, this 
methodology contributes in a number of ways. Frist, it allows us to derive unbiased inferences 
resistant to simultaneous causation or endogeneity. Second, it allows us to observe behavior rather 
than collect self-reported retrospections or attitudes. Finally, since the participants were playing with 
real money, the results of this experiment can tell us something about citizens’ behavior in situations 
in which they face real risks and opportunities from attempting to confront criminals. And, indeed 
they tell us something else by affirming a framework that might help identify the circumstances 
under which, ceteris paribus, vigilantism is more likely to appear: those in which individuals are 
confronted with the threat of crime while embedded within trustworthy communities that distrust 
the ability of law enforcement to carry out its role effectively. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the last ten years, highly insecure countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
seen the emergence of groups of citizens who try to castigate or prevent legally sanctioned norms 
independently of the state — what I call Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE). In this 
dissertation, I have asked, under what circumstances are citizens more likely to engage in ECLE? 
While early scholars argued that this phenomenon is an expression of culture, group conflict, or a 
form of social control, a more recent strand of literature has seen the ECLE phenomenon as an 
offshoot of the recent wave of crime and insecurity in the region.  
In line with this scholarship and building on insights from security-coproduction, crime 
reporting, and social capital literature, I have argued for and analyzed evidence in support of the idea 
that, in contexts in which authorities are regarded as untrustworthy, citizens are more likely to invest 
their social capital in ECLE. The general methodological strategy behind this dissertation has been 
that of triangulation. That is, I have implemented a diverse range of methodological and analytic 
approaches in order to put my main theoretical contribution to the test.   
In the first empirical chapter, I looked more closely at the case of Cherán, a town in western 
Mexico in which citizens confronted a band of illegal loggers that devastated the surrounding 
forests. From an analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted with the citizens of the town and 
a comparative analysis of the number of community organizations in the town, I found that 
community cohesion and pre-existing social capital in the context of an illegitimate government 
played an important role in each of the stages of Cherán’s self-defense movement. Further, as 
indicated by the number of community associations per capita, Cherán seemed to have stronger 
social capital even before the 2011 movement.  
To test the extent to which insights from this chapter translated into more general political 
behavior, I looked at individual-level data coming from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and 
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Geography (INEGI) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). I found citizens’ 
distrust of the police to significantly moderate the link between citizens’ trust in their neighbors and 
citizens’ likelihood of engaging in collective anti-criminal actions. Moreover, I found that 
participation in s translates into citizens’ willingness to reach out to their neighbors (rather than the 
state) as an ultimate source of justice. However, I found this to be the case only among those who 
strongly distrust the police.  
In Chapters IV and V, I went beyond correlational evidence to test my main argument 
experimentally. In a laboratory-in-the-field study conducted among undergraduate students in 
Mexico City I found that, when reading about a group of citizens victimized by organized crime in a 
community with an untrustworthy police force, participants were more likely to think that concerned 
citizens should reach out to their community to confront criminals when they read that the 
community was trustworthy. However, in line with my argument, I found this effect was diminished 
or absent among citizens who read an article describing the law enforcement as trustworthy.  
Finally, I presented the results of a behavioral experiment designed to incorporate the main 
actors and incentives associated with real vigilante behavior. I found that, in the context of the 
study, citizens were more likely to confront a mock thief when the latter stole more income, when 
the players’ neighbors were more likely to enter the game, and when the police were less likely to 
enter the game. Consistent with the evidence presented in previous chapters, I found the effect of 
the neighbors to be muted by the probability of the police to enter the game.  
All in all, I found support for the idea that Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement emerges 
in part as a result of citizens’ willingness to turn to their community when the state-established law 
enforcement agencies are perceived to be absent or unlikely to intervene effectively.  
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Specific Theoretical Contributions 
These results make specific contributions to our understanding of Extralegal Collective Law 
Enforcement and public policy across the Americas. In the context of the literature on vigilantism, 
my results lend support to the logic previously suggested (but not fully articulated) by Mendoza 
(2006), Malone (2012) and Goldstein (2012). My findings bring some validation for Mendoza’s 
speculation about the mechanisms driving the correlation between the number of indigenous co-
ethnics in Guatemalan municipalities and lynching. Indeed, as Mendoza suggests, my findings are 
more consistent with the idea that ECLE is a reflection of solidarity among citizens whom the state 
has historically not provided with basic services (including security) rather than with the idea of this 
phenomenon emerging out of indigenous culture.  
Further, my findings support Malone’s more general conjecture about the link between 
distrust in the justice system, social cohesion, and ECLE.131 Indeed, the positive interaction between 
distrust of the police and social capital not only implies that the effect of social capital is activated by 
police distrust, but it also implies that, as Malone proposes, for distrust of the authorities to translate 
into ECLE certain amount of citizen solidarity is pre-required.  
Finally, my results lend support to Goldstein’s view on the emergence of vigilante justice in 
Bolivia. Although my research was not explicitly designed to distinguish whether citizens use ECLE 
to fulfill security needs or expressive needs, my results are consistent with Goldstein’s general 
perspective that, in contexts in which the law not only is absent but also actively criminalizes 
citizens, vigilante justice can become a space in which citizens can display their community’s 
strength and social cohesion.  
                                                     
131 “In order for the perceived failure of the justice system to translate into collective action, citizens would need to have 
some sense of solidarity with other members of their community and view citizen action as a viable means for achieving 
their goals” (p.117). 
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Policy Implications 
In addition to these theoretical implications, my findings also have something to say to 
policymakers. First, over the years, we have seen a surge of development and crime prevention 
programs that have, as part of their objective, set out to strengthen local communities’ human and 
social capital. The core idea behind these programs is to generate economic development and 
democratic governance through their effect in communities’ local capacity. Although my findings do 
not directly challenge the expectations or effectiveness of these measures, they provide a mechanism 
by which they could bring about important and perhaps unexpected challenges for democracy.  
Namely, in contexts of high insecurity and virtual state failure (like the ones present in some 
areas of Latin America) governmental and NGO attempts at strengthening social capital, without a 
serious commitment from the government to reestablish its lost bond with citizenry, can translate 
into citizens attempting to invest their newly acquired social resources to substitute for an absent or 
incompetent state.  
As empathic as one must be towards citizens going through a security crisis, it must be noted 
that, at times, this type of role substitution can develop into movements for secession, autonomy, or 
self-determination that, like in the case of Cherán, can institutionalize the conflict between 
communities and the larger democratic system.132 In order to reduce the risk of this type of 
reactions, developing countries must accompany developing and crime prevention efforts with a 
strengthening and extension of police professionalization and security co-production programs.  
In Mexico City, for example, the government currently promotes and subsidizes 
neighborhood alarms as an attempt to fight crime and ELCE in some of the city’s most dangerous 
districts. While providing citizens with a mechanism through which they can alert each other about 
                                                     
132 Although I leave the discussion of this specific dimension for future studies, I found that some of the women directly 
involved in the uprising of Cherán were participants in the Oportunidades cash transfer program and were frequently 
asked by the government to participate in group activities to strengthen the social capital of the community.  
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the presence of criminal activity in their community, the alarms are also connected to the closest 
emergency services.  
As long as the connection between these alarms and the emergency services of the state is 
well maintained and the police respond to these calls professionally, they are likely to help restore 
the link between law enforcement authorities and local communities. However, as demonstrated in 
Chapter III, if these efforts are not taken seriously by the police and judicial system, far from 
decreasing ECLE they might very well increase the prevalence of violent attacks on alleged 
criminals. More generally, the argument and results presented in this dissertation have implications 
for our understanding of the way trust and social capital work in society.  
General Implications 
Why Is Vigilante Justice Like my Church’s Soup-Kitchen? 
My findings have implications for our understanding of social capital and how it influences 
democratic governance. For a long time, Putnam (1994b) and other scholars have made very strong 
claims about the normative effects of social capital. In reaction, Armony (2004), Satyanath et al. 
(2013), and other authors have noted cases and contexts in which social capital can have adverse 
effects. My findings not only contribute to this debate by identifying yet another case in which social 
capital can manifest itself negatively, they also identify trust in the state authorities as a significant 
factor that determines how social capital will express itself.  
When the state can establish itself as a legitimate, credible, and efficient service provider, 
citizens are likely to invest their latent capacity for collective action (social capital) into rallying 
others to participate with the state to co-produce services. It is under these conditions where we are 
likely to observe, in line with Putnam, social capital making democracy work. However, when the 
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state fails to establish itself (or loses its capacity to be seen) as a trustworthy service provider, we are 
likely to see social capital translate into collective extra-legal service substitution.  
Indeed, not all forms of collective extra-legal service substitution are regarded as deleterious 
for democracy. For instance, a soup-kitchen started by a group of citizens who distrust the state’s 
capacity to provide welfare to the poor is unlikely to trigger serious concerns among the media and 
public. However, to the extent that other forms (like ECLE) can challenge the monopoly over the 
use of violence, one of the very foundations of the democratic state, my theory contributes by giving 
us a framework for understanding the circumstances in which the dark side of social capital is likely 
to emerge.  
Trust as a Social Mediator 
Additionally, my findings have implications for the existing scholarship focusing on 
government trust. In some way, they could be seen as a validation of Gamson’s long held hypothesis 
that trust in government moderates the way in which citizens’ efficacy translates into political 
behavior. However, they also extend this framework by showing its applicability to citizens’ coping 
strategies. This is, they show that trust not only moderates the ways citizens attempt to influence 
government but also the ways in which they seek to invest their social capital to substitute for the 
services that the state fails to provide.  
This is, however, not the first time that trust has been suggested to influence investment. 
Students of policy preferences (Hetherington, 2006), security co-production (Jonathan Jackson, 
Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2012), and police cooperation (Tyler & Fagan, 2008) have all, explicitly or 
implicitly, suggested that trust informs citizens’ investment preferences. For example, when arguing 
that “Declining trust should not affect support for all things that government does… people need to 
trust the government when they pay the costs but do not receive the benefits” (p.4) Hetherington 
(2006) foreshadows the effect that trust can have on citizens’ return on investment expectations. Yet 
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this is the first time, to my knowledge, that this moderating force has been explicitly theorized and 
empirically applied to explain the emergence of Extralegal Collective Law Enforcement (ECLE).  
 Although I have focused here on trust in law enforcement as a critical moderator of 
citizens’ social capital investment in ECLE, if generalized, my theory could have implications for 
citizen investment across a wider range of politically relevant outcomes. Indeed, I propose that trust 
can explain why availability of resources (or conditions that incentivize the investment of such 
resources) sometimes translate into actual investments and sometimes do not. 
Staying on the topic of security, for example, my framework could be used to understand 
how trust moderates the effect of income in citizens’ likelihood of hiring private security. But 
moving beyond this specific outcome, my theory could also be used to understand the role of trust 
as a moderating factor that determines the impact of income on private education investment133 and 
even in the dynamics of campaign contributions.134  
Research Limitations and Avenues for Future Inquiry 
This study offers a multi-method examination of the interactive role of trust in the 
government and social capital on the emergence of ECLE in a sample of citizens from Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. As a direct consequence of this methodology, it encounters a 
number of limitations that need to be considered. First, in implementing a multi-method approach, I 
acknowledge that each of the chapters of this dissertation has important methodological limitations.  
While Chapter II provides an in-depth look at a case of ECLE, it can tell us little about the 
causal validity or generalizability of the events occurring in the town. While Chapter III was 
designed to address the generalizability question it cannot, on its own, eliminate the internal validity 
                                                     
133 To this respect, for example, my framework could be used to predict a larger gap in private education investment 
between rich and poor in countries where public education is deemed inefficient and untrustworthy. 
134 If applied to political activism in the developed world, for example, my general framework could be used to predict 
that, all other things being equal, political activists collecting donations stand to increase their collections more when 
moving from a poor neighborhood to a wealthier neighborhood when they are perceived as more trustworthy. 
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threats inherent to observational studies. Although the methodology implemented in Chapter IV 
allows us to be more confident about the causal link between the variable of the studies, the degree 
to which vicarious support translates into action when real costs and benefits are on the line is 
uncertain. Even when Chapter V was designed to address this question, in itself it cannot tell us to 
what extent the behavior manifested in the laboratory can be generalized to real-world actions.  
This being said, my hope in engaging in this methodology is that the accumulated evidence 
across the chapters serves as an indicator of the validity of my thesis. Future research could test 
some of the methodological assumptions left unchallenged through the implementation of field 
experiments or the analysis of potentially-exogenous variance in police distrust introduced by police 
reform or police corruption scandals. 
Second, by studying general and early manifestations of ECLE, the contributions of this 
study to the subject of the emergence of later and more spectacular manifestations of ECLE are 
only limited. That is, I have theoretically linked social capital to general ELCE and empirically to the 
emergence of collective anti-criminal actions and vicarious support for vigilante justice; however, the 
link between ECLE, lynching, paramilitary militias, and other types of group violence was only 
tangentially explored.  
Linking these two related but distinct phenomena needs further theoretical development 
and, empirically, would require a different approach. Specifically, to test ideas linking these two 
outcomes, it would be necessary to take a conditional comparative approach. That is, an approach 
that would compare cases within a subpopulation of ECLE groups to explore the factors that might 
trigger or reduce the use of violence.  
Finally, the current project has focused on providing a framework for understanding the role 
of trust in the government and social capital in the emergence of ECLE; however, as presented 
before, my framework, when taken more generally, has implications for a broader set of outcomes 
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left unexplored here. Future research avenues could involve at least two main lines of research. On 
the one hand, an extension of this study could focus on additional political and psychological forces 
that could influence or distort the incentives associated with ECLE (e.g. institutions, emotions, 
social norms, legal sanctions, and even personality). On the other, research building on this project 
could focus on the more general idea that trust in the government moderates citizens’ investment. 
Then, it could derive and test implications for other outcomes dependent on citizen investment (e.g., 
campaign collections, private health insurances, or private education) to derive and test expectations 
regarding other politically relevant outcomes.  
All in all, inspired by the recent spike of vigilante violence in Latin America, this research 
project asks, under what circumstances do citizens engage in extralegal collective law enforcement? 
Looking at this particular outcome, I proposed that citizens are more likely to invest their social 
capital on ECLE when they distrust state law enforcement authorities. Then, I took a multi-method 
approach to test this thesis and found support for it across four qualitative, correlational, and 
experimental studies. Overall, my findings imply that there is, as a number of scholars have 
suggested, a strategic logic behind the emergence of ECLE. Indeed, this logic is currently putting the 
foundations of emerging democracies going through security crises to the test. 
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
 
I. Question Wording 
 
Table A1. Question Wording 
 ENSI 2010 ENVIPE 2011 AmericasBarometer 2004-2014 
Collective Anti 
Criminal 
Action/Organization 
In the previous year, to protect itself from crime. 
Were any of the following actions taken in this 
household?  
 
Engage in joint actions with the neighbors. No, 
Yes 
In the previous year, to protect itself from crime. 
Were any of the following actions taken in this 
household?  
 
Engage in joint actions with the neighbors. No, 
Yes 
VIC44. Out of fear of being a crime victim, 
in the last 12 months have you organized 
with the neighbors of your community? 
No, Yes 
Support for Vigilante 
Justice 
  E16. Of people taking the law into their 
own hands when the government does not 
punish criminals. How much do you 
approve or disapprove? (1) Strongly 
disapprove – (10) Strongly approve 
Trust in the Neighbors Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in 
your neighbors? A lot, some, little, or none?  
Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in 
your neighbors? A lot, some, little, or none?  
IT1. And speaking of the people from 
around here, would you say that people in 
this community are...? (1) Untrustworthy (2) 
Not very trustworthy (3) Somewhat trustworthy 
(4) Very trustworthy 
Trust in the Police 
(inverted when 
referred as distrust) 
Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in  
1. The municipal police?  
2. The state police?  
3. The federal police? 
 A lot, some, little, or none? 135 
Please tell me the degree of trust that you have in  
1. The police?  
 
A lot, some, little, or none?  
B18. To what extent do you trust the 
National Police? (1) Not at all – (7) A lot 
 
 
Justice System 
Punishes Criminals 
  AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery 
or assault how much faith do you have that 
the judicial system would punish the guilty?  
(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None 
Administration 
Improves Safety 
  N11. To what extent would you say the 
current administration improves citizen 
safety? (1) Not at all – (7) A lot 
                                                     
135 Only 1.74% of interviewees responded to only one item, 4.62% of the interviewees responded to two items and 92.56% responded to all the items. The 1.08% of 
respondents who didn´t respond to any items was deleted from the analyses. 
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Neighborhood 
Criminality 
Do you know, or have you heard, if around your 
home the following situations occur? 
1. Drug is used (yes or no) 
2. Alcohol is consumed in public (yes or no) 
3. There have been gun shots (yes or no) 
4. There are sites selling firearms (yes or no) 
5. There are gangs or group who commit 
crimes (yes or no) 
6. There are frequent assaults (yes or no) 
7. There is youth who neither work nor go to 
school (yes or no) 
8. There are frequent assaults on women, 
children and elderly (yes or no) 
9. There is illegal sale of alcohol (yes or no) 
10. There are sites selling counterfeit goods 
(yes or no) 
11. There are sites selling drugs (yes or no) 
12. There have been kidnappings (yes or no) 
13. There have been extortions (yes or no) 
14. There have been charges for “the use of 
floor” (yes or no) 
Do you know, or have you heard, if around your 
home the following situations occur? 
1. Alcohol is consumed on the street (yes or 
no) 
2. There are gangs or bands (yes or no) 
3. There are arguments between neighbors 
(yes or no) 
4. There is illegal sale of alcohol (yes or no) 
5. Pirate products are sold (yes or no) 
6. There has been police violence against 
citizens (yes or no) 
7. There is invasion of land (yes or no) 
8. Drug is used (yes or no) 
9. There are frequent assaults or robberies 
(yes or no) 
10. Drug is sold (yes or no) 
11. There have been frequent shootings (yes 
or no) 
12. Firearms are sold (yes or no) 
13. There is prostitution (yes or no) 
14. There have been kidnappings (yes or no) 
15. There have been killings (yes or no) 
16. There have been extortions (yes or no) 
17. There have been charges for “the use of 
floor” (yes or no) 
 
Trend of Crime 1. For what you have noted in (State), ¿Do you 
consider that during last year crime has... 
decreased, remained the same or increased? 
2. For what you have noted in (City), ¿Do you 
consider that during last year crime has... 
decreased, remained the same or increased? 
1. For what you have noted in (State), ¿Do you 
consider that during last year crime has... 
decreased, remained the same or increased? 
2. For what you have noted in (City), ¿Do you 
consider that during last year crime has... 
decreased, remained the same or increased? 
 
Security 1. Do you consider that living in your 
neighborhood is safe or unsafe? 
2. Do you consider that living in your 
municipality is safe or unsafe? 
3. Do you consider that living in your state is 
safe or unsafe? 
1. Do you consider that living in your 
neighborhood is safe or unsafe? 
2. Do you consider that living in your 
municipality is safe or unsafe? 
3. Do you consider that living in your state is 
safe or unsafe? 
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood 
where you live and thinking of the 
possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do 
you feel (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) 
Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe? 
Safety in places 1. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... your 
home  
2. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... the street  
3. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... the 
1. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... your 
home  
2. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... the street  
3. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... the 
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public transport ... 
4. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... an 
ATM located in public 
public transport ... 
4. Tell me if you feel safe or unsafe in ... an 
ATM located in public 
Crime Victimization During 2009, any person who lives or lived in 
your household was the victim of a crime in this 
state? 
During 2010, in (STATE) or in another state, did 
any person who live or lived in your household 
suffered any of the situations listed? (list of 
crimes) 
VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, 
have you been a victim of any type of 
crime in the past 12 months? That is, have 
you been a victim of robbery, burglary, 
assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent 
threats or any other type of crime in the 
past 12 months? 
Pro-Coup in case of 
Crime 
  JC10. Some people say that under some 
circumstances it would be justified for the 
military of this country to take power by a 
coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion 
would a military coup be justified when 
there is a lot of crime? 
Support for 
Democracy 
  ING4. Changing the subject again, 
democracy may have problems, but it is 
better than any other form of government. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with 
this statement? 
Size of Town Rural, Suburban, Urban Rural, Suburban, Urban Size of place. (1) Rural Area  (2) Small City 
(3) Medium City (4) Large City  (5) National 
Capital (Metropolitan area) 
Ethnic Identity INEGI censo de población y vivienda 2010 
 
INEGI censo de población y vivienda 2010 ETID. Do you consider yourself white, 
mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of 
another race? (1) White (2) Mestizo (3) 
Indigenous (4) Black (5) Mulatto (7) Other 
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I.I Full Results from Table 1 
 
Table A2. Determinants of Anti Criminal Action (Full Results) 
 (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES INEGI AmericasBarometer 
 Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
     
Trust in Neighbors 0.784*** (0.131) -0.208** (0.0972) 
Distrust in the Police -0.563*** (0.140) -0.00625 (0.0953) 
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police 0.525*** (0.168) 0.320** (0.141) 
Crime Victimization 0.377*** (0.0338) 0.456*** (0.0310) 
Insecurity (Neighborhood) 0.0915** (0.0375) 0.752*** (0.0506) 
Age 0.124* (0.0731) 0.0122*** (0.00247) 
Female 0.0435 (0.0286) -0.0887*** (0.0239) 
Education 1.119*** (0.0999) 0.0340* (0.0193) 
% Indigenous speakers/ Indigenous vs White -0.475*** (0.159) 0.523*** (0.0699) 
Size of Town 0.226*** (0.0263) -0.0365*** (0.0131) 
Insecurity (Municipality) 0.104** (0.0447)   
Insecurity (State) 0.0523 (0.0429)   
Trend of Crime (State) 0.176*** (0.0633)   
Trend of Crime (City) 0.0521 (0.0606)   
Alcohol Consumption in the Neighborhood -0.0673* (0.0367)   
Illegal Alcohol Sales in the Neighborhood 0.0727* (0.0399)   
Drug Consumption in the Neighborhood 0.00832 (0.0386)   
Gunfire in the Neighborhood 0.0692* (0.0365)   
Gangs in the Neighborhood 0.116*** (0.0370)   
Gun Sale in the Neighborhood -0.146* (0.0828)   
Assaults in the Neighborhood 0.321*** (0.0353)   
Extortions in the Neighborhood 0.351*** (0.0400)   
Floor Charges in the Neighborhood 0.178*** (0.0579)   
Drug Stores in the Neighborhood -0.0649 (0.0407)   
Kidnap in the Neighborhood 0.0966** (0.0478)   
Piracy in the Neighborhood 0.0364 (0.0371)   
Wealth   0.0190* (0.0110) 
Support for Vigilante Justice   0.176*** (0.0408) 
Support for Democracy   0.0276 (0.0508) 
Justice System Punishes Criminals   0.119*** (0.0426) 
Administration Improves Security   0.114** (0.0528) 
Pro-Coup in Case of Crime   0.182*** (0.0271) 
     Mestizo vs White   -0.00487 (0.0387) 
     Black vs White   0.0911 (0.0601) 
     Mulato vs White   0.222*** (0.0754) 
     Other vs White   0.162 (0.107) 
     
Constant  -2.901*** (0.175) -2.363*** (0.171) 
     
Fixed Effects 64 State-Years 40 Country-Years 
Observations  115,727  51,787 
Standard errors account for the complex nature of the sample.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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II. Separating ENSI-2010 from ENSI-2011  
 
To what extent do the results in Table 1 represent an effect concentrated in a single year? To answer 
this question I specified the model in equation 1 for each year independently.  
 
Table A1. Determinants of Anti-Criminal Action 
 ENSI- 
2010 
ENVIPE-
2011 
 (1) (2) 
 Anti-Crime Anti-Crime 
   
Trust in Neighbors 0.815*** 0.642*** 
 (0.187) (0.186) 
Distrust in the Police -0.593*** -0.565*** 
 (0.203) (0.190) 
Distrust in the Police x Trust in Neighbors 0.612** 0.465** 
 (0.249) (0.226) 
Household Crime Victimization 0.247*** 0.523*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0452) 
Crime Perception State 0.0287 0.248*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0830) 
Crime Perception City 0.0605 -0.0303 
 (0.0554) (0.0721) 
Neighborhood Drug Consumption -0.0478 0.0865 
 (0.0521) (0.0572) 
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption -0.0744 -0.0717 
 (0.0521) (0.0520) 
Neighborhood Gunfire 0.00560 0.139** 
 (0.0472) (0.0566) 
Neighborhood Gun Sale -0.301*** 0.120 
 (0.103) (0.136) 
Neighborhood Gangs 0.187*** 0.0341 
 (0.0530) (0.0527) 
Neighborhood Assaults 0.334*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0505) 
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales -0.00907 0.0820 
 (0.0534) (0.0621) 
Neighborhood Piracy 0.103** -0.161*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0593) 
Neighborhood Drug Stores -0.0199 -0.146** 
 (0.0545) (0.0613) 
Neighborhood Kidnap -0.0768 0.159** 
 (0.0637) (0.0738) 
Neighborhood Extortions 0.366*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0633) 
Neighborhood Floor Charges 0.109 0.225** 
 (0.0734) (0.0962) 
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Neighborhood Non-occupied -0.000469  
 (0.0522)  
Neighborhood Aggressions 0.208***  
 (0.0557)  
Neighborhood Fights  0.0869 
  (0.0582) 
Neighborhood Police Violence  0.0935 
  (0.0570) 
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions  0.237*** 
  (0.0779) 
Neighborhood Prostitution  -0.108 
  (0.0801) 
Neighborhood Homicide  0.0770 
  (0.0621) 
Security in Neighborhood -0.0405 -0.186*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0525) 
Security in Municipality -0.101 -0.130** 
 (0.0621) (0.0626) 
Security in State -0.107* 0.0907 
 (0.0590) (0.0597) 
Age 0.00424*** 0.567*** 
 (0.00135) (0.112) 
Female 0.0814** 0.0127 
 (0.0384) (0.0429) 
Education 0.0680*** 1.098*** 
 (0.00497) (0.103) 
Municipal Proportion Indigenous (Source: INEGI 2010) -1.094*** -0.174 
 (0.211) (0.200) 
Constant -2.991*** -3.049*** 
 (0.211) (0.234) 
   
Observations 56,575 59,152 
Design-based standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
State fixed effects included but not shown. 
 
Table A1 shows that the coefficient associated with the multiplicative term Distrust in the Police x 
Trust in the Neighbors is not only significant in the pooled model but also significant within each 
of the years.  
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III. Controlling for Occupation 
 
Since none of the surveys included citizens’ socioeconomic status I included their occupation as a 
control in order to account for differences in respondents’ income. The following model includes a 
dummy variable for each of the occupational categories included in both surveys. If my findings are 
spurious, we should expect for the interactive trust effect to drop to insignificance. 
 
Table A2. Determinants of ECLE (controlling for occupation) 
 ENSI-2010 ENSI-2010 
 (1) (4) 
VARIABLES ECLE ECLE 
   
Indirect-ECLE   
   
Trust in Neighbors 0.823*** 0.605*** 
 (0.187) (0.184) 
Distrust in the Police -0.606*** -0.596*** 
 (0.202) (0.189) 
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police 0.609** 0.508** 
 (0.249) (0.225) 
Household Crime Victimization 0.252*** 0.528*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0455) 
Crime Perception State 0.0539 0.237*** 
 (0.108) (0.0838) 
Crime Perception City 0.130 -0.0309 
 (0.111) (0.0724) 
Neighborhood Drug Consumption -0.0474 0.0863 
 (0.0522) (0.0585) 
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption -0.0785 -0.0807 
 (0.0521) (0.0526) 
Neighborhood Gunfire 0.00925 0.149*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0575) 
Neighborhood Gun Sale -0.304*** 0.123 
 (0.104) (0.139) 
Neighborhood Gangs 0.187*** 0.0429 
 (0.0529) (0.0530) 
Neighborhood Assaults 0.336*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0507) 
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales -0.0189 0.0767 
 (0.0533) (0.0624) 
Neighborhood Piracy 0.106** -0.159*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0595) 
Neighborhood Drug Stores -0.0214 -0.155** 
 (0.0546) (0.0623) 
Neighborhood Kidnap -0.0769 0.155** 
 (0.0636) (0.0753) 
Neighborhood Extortions 0.375*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0643) 
Neighborhood Floor Charges 0.107 0.217** 
 (0.0736) (0.0982) 
Neighborhood Non-occupied 0.000872  
 (0.0523)  
Neighborhood Aggressions 0.202***  
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 (0.0554)  
Neighborhood Fights  0.0926 
  (0.0586) 
Neighborhood Police Violence  0.0821 
  (0.0581) 
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions  0.233*** 
  (0.0788) 
Neighborhood Prostitution  -0.110 
  (0.0811) 
Neighborhood Homicide  0.0926 
  (0.0629) 
Security in Neighborhood -0.0405 -0.177*** 
 (0.0528) (0.0527) 
Security in Municipality -0.105* -0.135** 
 (0.0619) (0.0635) 
Security in State -0.108* 0.0930 
 (0.0588) (0.0610) 
Age 0.295** 0.627*** 
 (0.116) (0.128) 
Female 0.113*** 0.0759 
 (0.0424) (0.0496) 
Education 6.696*** 1.017*** 
 (0.509) (0.106) 
Employee 0.284*** 0.113 
 (0.1000) (0.113) 
Self 0.321*** -0.00967 
 (0.106) (0.117) 
Employer 0.237 0.353* 
 (0.173) (0.189) 
Worker 0.381** -0.00958 
 (0.184) (0.190) 
Student 0.0349 -0.0278 
 (0.143) (0.160) 
Home 0.159 -0.114 
 (0.109) (0.120) 
Retired 0.256* -0.0679 
 (0.146) (0.165) 
Disabled 0.260 -0.424 
 (0.244) (0.294) 
Unemployed 0.200 -0.0819 
 (0.130) (0.164) 
Constant -3.186*** -3.060*** 
 (0.228) (0.259) 
   
Observations 56,574 59,152 
Design-based standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ^p<0.11 
State fixed effects included but not shown.  
The omitted occupation category is Farmer.  
 
As can be seen in the figure, I find that the interaction remains significant and with almost the same 
strength as the one displayed in the main body of the text. 
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IV. Does Insecurity Bounds the Interactive Trust Hypothesis? 
 
To answer this question I specified a model in which I aggregated a triple interaction between the 
interactive trust term and citizens perception that the neighborhood is safe or not. Additionally, I 
included independent interaction terms between citizens’ perception of the safety of their 
neighborhood and both Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police. If perceptions of security 
constrain the interactive trust hypothesis we should expect a significant effect in the triple 
interaction.  
 
Table A3. Triple Interaction With Perceptions of Security in The Neighbors 
 ENSI-2010 ENVIPE-2011 
 (1) (2) 
 Anti-Crime Anti-Crime 
   
Trust in Neighbors 0.824*** 0.774*** 
 (0.286) (0.290) 
Distrust in the Police -0.791*** -0.507* 
 (0.281) (0.274) 
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police 0.768** 0.368 
 (0.368) (0.348) 
Security in Neighborhood -0.253 -0.0583 
 (0.311) (0.313) 
Security in Neighborhood x Trust in Neighbors 0.132 -0.198 
 (0.375) (0.375) 
Security in Neighborhood x Distrust in the Police 0.536 -0.0579 
 (0.399) (0.389) 
Security in Neighborhood x Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police -0.546 0.105 
 (0.493) (0.474) 
Household Crime Victimization 0.254*** 0.524*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0452) 
Crime Perception State 0.0552 0.251*** 
 (0.108) (0.0829) 
Crime Perception City 0.128 -0.0315 
 (0.111) (0.0722) 
Neighborhood Drug Consumption -0.0422 0.0874 
 (0.0522) (0.0573) 
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption -0.0779 -0.0737 
 (0.0521) (0.0520) 
Neighborhood Gunfire 0.00948 0.140** 
 (0.0472) (0.0567) 
Neighborhood Gun Sale -0.298*** 0.120 
 (0.104) (0.136) 
Neighborhood Gangs 0.187*** 0.0355 
 (0.0530) (0.0528) 
Neighborhood Assaults 0.339*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0505) 
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales -0.0228 0.0793 
 (0.0535) (0.0619) 
Neighborhood Piracy 0.113** -0.162*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0593) 
Neighborhood Drug Stores -0.0186 -0.145** 
 (0.0547) (0.0614) 
Neighborhood Kidnap -0.0785 0.159** 
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 (0.0637) (0.0738) 
Neighborhood Extortions 0.375*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0633) 
Neighborhood Floor Charges 0.111 0.226** 
 (0.0738) (0.0961) 
Neighborhood Non-occupied 0.00162  
 (0.0522)  
Neighborhood Aggressions 0.205***  
 (0.0556)  
Neighborhood Fights  0.0871 
  (0.0582) 
Neighborhood Police Violence  0.0918 
  (0.0569) 
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions  0.237*** 
  (0.0779) 
Neighborhood Prostitution  -0.108 
  (0.0801) 
Neighborhood Homicide  0.0774 
  (0.0622) 
Security in Municipality -0.111* -0.132** 
 (0.0618) (0.0627) 
Security in State -0.106* 0.0920 
 (0.0587) (0.0597) 
Age 0.368*** 0.574*** 
 (0.106) (0.112) 
Female 0.0853** 0.0124 
 (0.0384) (0.0429) 
Education 6.978*** 1.108*** 
 (0.491) (0.102) 
Constant -2.931*** -3.142*** 
 (0.264) (0.288) 
   
Observations 56,575 59,152 
Design-based standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
State fixed effects included but not shown. 
 
For the case of Anti-Criminal Action in 2010 the effect is in the expected direction. However, for 
the 2011 data, the interaction effect goes in an unexpected direction. In both cases the triple 
interaction is not statistically distinguishable from zero; thus, little can be interpreted from this 
result. 
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V. Results for Hiring Private Security 
 
In addition to looking at citizens´ support for vigilante justice other authors have analyzed the 
privatization of security as an indicator of indirect ECLE (Malone, 2012a; Ungar, 2007). The 
privatization of security is a particularly good indicator of ECLE when citizens pool together their 
economic resources to police a space that should otherwise be policed by the state’s authorities (a 
public park, their street, or their neighborhood as a whole). Thus, to further assess the validity of my 
results, I specified a logistic regression model in which a citizens’ likelihood to join together with 
their neighbors to hire private security for a public space (their street or neighborhood) is a function 
of equation 1 presented in the text. Once more, if the data is consistent with my hypothesis I should 
find a positive and significant coefficient associated with the term Trust in Neighbors x Distrust 
in the Police. 
 
Table A4. Determinants of Hiring Private Security for Public Places  
 ENSI-2010 ENVIPE-2011 
 (1) (2) 
 Hiring 
Private Security 
Hiring 
Private Security 
   
Trust in Neighbors -0.496 -0.462 
 (0.328) (0.429) 
Distrust in the Police -0.920*** -0.660 
 (0.343) (0.409) 
Trust in Neighbors x Distrust in the Police 1.287*** 0.949* 
 (0.442) (0.521) 
Household Crime Victimization 0.0820 0.816*** 
 (0.0923) (0.122) 
Crime Perception State -0.134 0.206 
 (0.106) (0.232) 
Crime Perception City 0.182* -0.346** 
 (0.105) (0.161) 
Neighborhood Drug Consumption -0.334*** -0.0716 
 (0.105) (0.128) 
Neighborhood Alcohol Consumption -0.338*** -0.284** 
 (0.0980) (0.124) 
Neighborhood Gunfire 0.0636 0.0214 
 (0.0919) (0.124) 
Neighborhood Gun Sale -0.0650 0.209 
 (0.238) (0.330) 
Neighborhood Gangs -0.0452 0.121 
 (0.0988) (0.132) 
Neighborhood Assaults 0.373*** 0.460*** 
 (0.0909) (0.111) 
Neighborhood Illegal Alcohol sales 0.0233 -0.330** 
 (0.0999) (0.140) 
Neighborhood Piracy 0.191* -0.446*** 
 (0.0995) (0.139) 
Neighborhood Drug Stores -0.0847 -0.142 
 (0.110) (0.146) 
Neighborhood Kidnap 0.279*** 0.443*** 
 (0.106) (0.152) 
Neighborhood Extortions 0.248*** 0.0831 
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 (0.0944) (0.136) 
Neighborhood Floor Charges 0.195 0.0656 
 (0.134) (0.210) 
Neighborhood Non-occupied -0.265***  
 (0.102)  
Neighborhood Aggressions 0.201**  
 (0.100)  
Neighborhood Fights  0.137 
  (0.135) 
Neighborhood Police Violence  0.0339 
  (0.142) 
Neighborhood Illegal Invasions  0.415** 
  (0.173) 
Neighborhood Prostitution  -0.412** 
  (0.205) 
Neighborhood Homicide  -0.0905 
  (0.161) 
Security in Neighborhood 0.272*** -0.105 
 (0.103) (0.116) 
Security in Municipality -0.211* -0.0209 
 (0.126) (0.144) 
Security in State -0.164 0.0853 
 (0.119) (0.140) 
Age 0.0117*** 0.779*** 
 (0.00256) (0.238) 
Female 0.0221 0.0868 
 (0.0718) (0.0990) 
Education 0.187*** 2.351*** 
 (0.0109) (0.311) 
Municipal Proportion Indigenous 
(Source: INEGI 2010) 
-2.512*** -2.364*** 
 (0.903) (0.688) 
Constant -5.749*** -5.138*** 
 (0.554) (0.574) 
   
Observations 56,575 59,161 
Design-based standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 State fixed effects included but not shown. 
 
Once more, I find support for the interactive trust hypothesis. That is, distrust in the authorities 
activates degree in which trust in the neighbors translates into an increased likelihood of a citizen to 
join with the neighbors to invest in hiring private security for the public space. 
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VI. Lagged Variable Analysis Using Mexican Municipalities 
 
Although the cross-sectional analyses are consistent with the interactive trust hypotheses, 
they do not allow me to isolate the effect of citizens’ Trust in the Neighbors on Collective Anti-Criminal 
Action from the effect that the latter can have on the former. To address concerns about reverse 
causality it is necessary to use measures of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police that are 
temporally antecedent to my measure of participating in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action in 2011.  
It is possible to produce a test of the interactive trust hypothesis robust to reverse causality 
by conducting a joint analysis of the ENSI-2010 and ENVIPE-2011 surveys. Specifically, I can test 
whether the effect of the 2010’s Municipal-Average Trust among Neighbors is more strongly associated 
with the 2011’s Percentage of Citizens That Engaged in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action among 
municipalities that distrusted the police more strongly in 2010.136 In other words, if my hypothesis is 
robust to accounting for reverse causality I expect that Distrust in the Police2010 will positively and 
significantly moderate the effect of Trust in the Neighors2010 on both measures of Collective Anti-Criminal 
Action in 2011. 137 
To conduct this test I calculated the Average Trust among Neighbors and the Average Trust 
in the Police for 2010, as well as the percentage of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal 
Action in 2011. Then, I replicated the analyses in Table 1 using an OLS regression model of the 
following form:  
 
 
 
Here, the percentage of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Action in 2011 
(AntiCrime2011) is modeled as a function of the proportion of citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-
Criminal Action in 2010 (AntiCrime2010), 2010’s Municipal Average Trust among Neighbors, 2010´s 
(Trust in the Neighbors2010), Municipal Average Distrust in the Police (Distrust in the Police2010), and their 
interaction.138 Controls include Crime Victimization variables, a number of Insecurity Perception 
variables, Socio-Demographic variables and State Fixed Effects. 139   
                                                     
136 ENSI 2010 surveyed 851 municipalities and ENVIPE 2011 surveyed 896 municipalities. Of these, 799 municipalities 
were sampled in both surveys. 
137 Note that proportions and percentages are 0 to 1 and 0 to 100 bounded, thus OLS may yield nonsensical predictions 
or biased estimates. To test whether the results were robust to alternative models, I replicated the models using a Tobit 
model bounded from 0 to 100 and a Generalized Linear Model of the binomial family with a Logit link function (See 
Section VIa below). 
138 It is important to note that the survey is not representative in all municipalities. However, aggregation error in the 
municipal estimates will bias the estimate of the interaction only if it is negatively correlated with both the 2010-2011 
change in average the proportion of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions and trust in the police.  All the same, to 
validate the results I performed two robustness tests. First, I repeated the analysis using only the municipalities in which 
more than 200 interviews (N=56) were conducted. Second, I aggregated the information at the state level (N=32)(See 
Table A7).  
139 As control variables I included: The 2010’s municipal level of insecurity, derived from an additive “perceptions of 
insecurity index” constructed from identical variables referring to the country, state and neighborhood. The 2011’s 
municipal proportion of citizens who feel insecure: at home, in the street, in the public transport and in the ATMs. 
Additionally, I included the 2011’s municipal average Trust in the Neighbors, the municipal average Distrust in the 
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Table A5. Municipal Level Lagged Analysis 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Anti-Crime 
(2011) 
Hiring Private Security 
(2011)  
   
Hiring Private Security 2010 --- 130.4*** 
  (23.16) 
Anti-Crime2010 12.09* --- 
 (6.427)  
Trust in the Neighbors2010 -81.56*** 20.90 
 (28.79) (14.75) 
Distrust in the Police2010 -71.05*** 25.79* 
 (26.59) (14.17) 
Trust in the Neighbors2010 x Distrust in the Police2010 113.4*** -19.38 
 (37.90) (20.47) 
Perception of Insecurity 2010 -20.59** -1.458 
 (9.940) (7.842) 
Trust in the Neighbors 0.622 17.30 
 (5.778) (15.17) 
Distrust in the Police -3.731 11.94 
 (6.691) (13.95) 
Vehicle Accessory Thefts 33.72*** 9.649 
 (12.91) (13.10) 
House Thefts 22.55* 1.400 
 (13.49) (8.243) 
Street Thefts 27.27** 7.291 
 (12.59) (8.925) 
Extortion -8.157 -4.007 
 (9.476) (3.440) 
Education 12.27** 5.498 
 (6.005) (7.260) 
Female -3.210 0.00610 
 (4.448) (2.506) 
Urban -0.674 1.414 
 (1.361) (4.147) 
Home Insecurity 9.990* 2.275 
 (6.012) (4.497) 
Street Insecurity 8.134** 1.051 
 (3.495) (2.223) 
Transport Insecurity -7.009** 0.713 
 (3.386) (1.060) 
ATM insecurity 3.213 0.549 
 (2.184) (1.210) 
   
Fixed Effects State State 
   
Constant 64.09*** -26.77** 
 (20.94) (12.31) 
Observations 760 760 
R-squared 0.441 0.306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Police, the municipal average education, the municipal proportion of females, and the municipal proportion of 
interviews conducted in an urban area. Finally, I included a variable for the municipal proportion of citizens that 
suffered thefts of their vehicle accessories, house, and street. (See Appendix I for question wording) 
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The results from in Table A4 bring further support for the interactive trust hypothesis. That 
is, Distrust in the Police seems to significantly moderate the effect of Trust in the Neighbors on the 
municipal proportion of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions.  
Columns 1 shows that the proportion of interviewees reporting vehicle accessory thefts, 
house thefts, and street thefts are positively correlated with the percentage of citizens reporting 
Collective Anti-Criminal Actions. Additionally, the average home and street insecurity, as well as the 
average level of education, seem to be significant predictors of the 2011’s municipal percentage of 
citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions. Interestingly, once insecurity in 2011 is 
accounted for, perceptions of insecurity in 2010 seem to be negatively associated with the 
percentage of citizens who engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011.  
Furthermore, the results are consistent with the interactive trust hypothesis. That is, other 
thing constant, as the average trust among neighbors increased in 2010 so did the percentage of 
citizens that engaged in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011, particularly among police 
distrusting municipalities.  
To further test my hypothesis I re-specified the mode to attempt to explain citizens’ 
likelihood of joining together with their neighbors to hire private security for a public space (see 
column 2). However, the interaction between trust in the neighbors and distrust of the police as 
predictors of hiring private security is not significant for 2011. 
 
Figure A1. Marginal Effect of Municipal-level Trust in the Neighbors (2010) on 
Municipal % Anti-Crime in (2011) over the Range of Municipal-level Distrust in the 
Police (2010) 
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Figure A1 shows the marginal effect of the average Trust in the Neighbors in 2010 on the 
prevalence of Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011 over the range of municipal Distrust in the 
Police 2010. A pattern similar to the one shown in the main text emerges. Among municipalities that 
distrust the police, as the average trust in the neighborhood increases, so does the proportion of 
citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 2011. However, this effect drops to 
insignificance or is reversed in communities that trust strongly the police. Other things constant, in 
municipalities in which all the citizens reported to have trusted the police in 2010, going from the 
minimum to the maximum average of Trust in the Neighbors in that year is associated with a 
81.56% decrease in the percentage of citizens who engage in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 
2011. In contrast, in municipalities in which all the citizens reported to Distrust the Police in 2010, 
going from the minimum to the maximum average of Trust in the Neighbors in 2010 is associated 
with a 31.84% increase in the percentage of citizens engaging in Collective Anti-Criminal Actions in 
2011. 
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VI.A Robustness of Pseudo Panel Analysis Using a Diversity of Model Specifications.  
  
Because percentages and proportions are bound from 0 to one there is no consensus about how to 
precisely model this type of variables. Although OLS tends to yield consistent estimates when the 
majority of the observations are in the middle of the distribution, these estimates may be biased in 
other circumstances. I re-specified the models in Table A5 using both, a Tobit model in which the 
dependent variable is assumed to be bounded from 0 to 100 and a Generalized Linear Model with a 
logit link function. As can be seen, the results are consistent with the ones found in Table A5.  
 
Table A6. Robustness of lagged variable analysis using a diversity of model specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Anti-Crime  % 
 (0-100) 
Tobit 
Anti-Crime % 
 (0-100) 
Tobit 
Anti-Crime 
proportion 
GLM 
Anti-Crime 
proportion 
GLM 
     
ECLE2010 45.79*** 14.33** 2.951*** 0.851** 
 (6.843) (7.298) (0.364) (0.427) 
Trust in the Neighbors2010 -107.1** -104.4*** -10.42*** -9.075*** 
 (44.26) (37.14) (3.778) (2.458) 
Distrust in the Police2010 -82.91** -82.65** -8.553** -7.727*** 
 (40.19) (33.48) (3.481) (2.312) 
Trust in the Neighborst-1  
x Distrust in the Policet-1 
122.8** 144.8*** 12.83** 13.10*** 
(58.05) (50.08) (5.213) (3.552) 
Perception of Insecurity t-1  -31.31**  -2.092** 
  (13.35)  (1.053) 
Trust in the Neighbors  46.22***  2.790*** 
  (15.30)  (0.954) 
Distrust in the Police  24.74  1.678* 
  (16.17)  (0.967) 
Vehicle Accessory Thefts  31.46**  1.630** 
  (14.66)  (0.820) 
House Thefts  -5.114  -0.511 
  (13.17)  (0.895) 
Street Thefts  20.09**  1.529*** 
  (8.127)  (0.578) 
Extortion  -4.586  -0.497 
  (5.997)  (0.398) 
Education  10.10  0.852 
  (7.599)  (0.522) 
Female  14.73***  1.008*** 
  (4.834)  (0.342) 
Urban  -5.843  -0.680 
  (9.038)  (0.687) 
Home Insecurity  -1.805  -0.460 
  (7.504)  (0.534) 
Street Insecurity  -10.24**  -0.561* 
  (4.741)  (0.338) 
Transport Insecurity  -0.617  -0.0299 
  (1.857)  (0.137) 
ATM insecurity  7.130**  0.291 
  (3.486)  (0.255) 
Sigma 16.62*** 13.03***   
 (0.830) (0.561)   
Fixed Effects  32 States  32 States 
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Constant 74.40** 71.97*** 4.209* 3.664** 
 (31.01) (26.56) (2.549) (1.839) 
     
Observations 799 760 799 760 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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VI.b Robustness of Lagged Variable Analysis to Different Aggregation Levels and Different Functional Assumptions. 
 
Are the results included in the chapter consistent with the results that would be obtained if only representative units were used? To 
address this question I conducted twelve different analyses. In the first six, I aggregated each variable at the municipal level in the 
municipalities that: a) Had more than 200 observations within them and b) Where surveyed in both 2010 and 2011. Using this data, I 
replicated model 1 in Table A5 (1-3) using OLS, a 0 to 100 bounded Tobit model and a Generalized Lineal Model assuming a binomial 
distribution and a logit link function. I then repeated the procedure for Model 2 in Table A4 (4-6). Finally, I replicated the previously 
mentioned procedure aggregating the variables at the state level. Results are presented in models (7-12). Although the coefficient of the 
multiplicative term Trust in the Neighborst-1 x Distrust in the Policet-1 is not significant in every specification, in every case is in the expected 
direction.   
 
Table A7. Robustness of Lagged Variable Analysis Across Aggregation Levels and Model Types 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
LEVEL OF AGREGATION +200 level Analyses State Level Analyses 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE % Anti-
Crime 
% Anti- 
Crime 
Proportion  
Anti- 
Crime 
% 
Anti- 
Crime 
% Anti-
Crime 
Proportion  
Anti- 
Crime 
% Anti- 
Crime 
% Anti- 
Crime 
Proportion  
Anti- 
Crime 
% Anti- 
Crime 
% Anti- 
Crime 
Proportion  
Anti- 
Crime 
SPECIFICATION  OLS 0-100 Tobit GLM OLS 0-100 Tobit GLM OLS 0-100 
Tobit 
GLM OLS 0-100 Tobit GLM 
             
Anti Crime2010 77.14*** 77.62*** 6.509*** 65.49** 66.39*** 8.525*** 242.7*** 244.2*** 7.113*** 197.9** 198.5*** 5.620*** 
 (10.72) (10.46) (0.878) (23.33) (8.326) (1.303) (54.58) (51.71) (0.997) (72.32) (47.78) (1.280) 
Trust in the Neighbors2010 -373.0*** -370.6*** -36.16*** -100.9 -46.51 -20.61 -1,807* -1,841** -57.19** -1,048 -1,059 -35.13 
 (118.5) (114.6) (12.25) (279.5) (119.3) (14.77) (886.9) (864.5) (27.11) (1,165) (767.9) (38.44) 
Distrust in the Police2010 -324.8*** -323.0*** -31.22*** -129.1 -103.7 -26.45** -1,643* -1,673** -51.65** -1,074 -1,083 -34.81 
 (108.0) (104.3) (11.12) (223.5) (89.37) (11.18) (803.3) (781.7) (24.06) (1,040) (685.1) (34.83) 
Trust in the Neighborst-1 x 
Distrust in the Policet-1 
497.1*** 491.5*** 47.90*** 170.1 116.4 37.27* 2,483* 2,527** 78.01** 2,042 2,069* 66.79 
(79.10) (76.38) (17.68) (356.9) (146.6) (19.37) (1,212) (1,177) (37.25) (1,690) (1,119) (55.63) 
Perception of Insecurity t-1    -1.909 -7.047 9.111**    -129.4 -133.1 -5.454** 
    (42.07) (16.03) (3.924)    (149.3) (100.7) (2.702) 
Trust in the Neighbors    36.69 52.88* 9.316**    -212.6** -212.4*** -6.644*** 
    (66.99) (26.47) (4.535)    (87.25) (56.73) (2.370) 
Distrust in the Police    114.0 124.9*** 10.92**    424.0 414.4 16.83** 
    (85.90) (33.42) (4.416)    (402.1) (271.8) (7.531) 
Vehicle Accessory Thefts    120.1 130.5*** 10.12***    442.2 447.1** 18.23*** 
    (70.61) (25.77) (3.284)    (258.2) (173.2) (5.621) 
House Thefts    -11.28 3.761 0.942    99.24 94.79 4.337 
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    (62.06) (30.24) (4.465)    (212.1) (142.4) (4.543) 
Street Thefts    -14.12 -26.71 -2.577    129.3 133.8 2.630 
    (49.88) (21.73) (2.796)    (180.3) (121.9) (3.105) 
Extortion    -18.77 -19.50 5.027    622.7* 630.3*** 21.00*** 
    (50.72) (19.05) (4.104)    (299.5) (203.3) (5.099) 
Education    -13.57 -26.24 -5.820*    -131.5 -131.4 -4.397 
    (40.22) (19.76) (2.989)    (117.9) (77.61) (3.035) 
Female    -4.544 6.632 -3.764    108.0 112.1 4.537** 
    (35.23) (16.43) (2.610)    (100.0) (69.54) (2.022) 
Urban    -55.23 -58.92*** -11.91***    -33.00 -36.67 -2.591 
    (52.38) (17.68) (2.683)    (164.8) (110.6) (3.038) 
Home Insecurity    13.85 8.236 -2.838*    -217.7 -222.8* -5.835** 
    (30.86) (13.58) (1.692)    (175.7) (120.3) (2.545) 
Street Insecurity    -3.913 -1.433 2.575*    -240.7 -247.6* -7.786*** 
    (43.25) (16.48) (1.318)    (175.5) (121.9) (2.581) 
Transport Insecurity    4.045 0.667 -1.758    -2.262 -2.368 0.00577 
    (26.64) (10.33) (1.279)    (69.00) (45.59) (1.332) 
ATM insecurity    37.08 26.10 8.842***    121.4 125.1 3.525 
    (33.42) (15.46) (3.212)    (157.4) (106.4) (2.897) 
             
SIGMA  5.397***   1.278***   15.28***   10.57***  
  (0.674)   (0.115)   (3.937)   (2.408)  
Constant 244.8*** 244.3*** 20.27*** 87.11 72.89 7.953 1,194* 1,217** 34.60** 359.9 363.9 9.305 
 (163.4) (158.3) (7.815) (185.3) (73.06) (9.075) (586.3) (572.5) (17.56) (732.7) (481.0) (22.78) 
             
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.579   0.975   0.436   0.730   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
211 
 
VI.c Lagged Variable Analysis as a Hierarchical Logistic-Regression Model (HLM): A 
Random Intercept Approach 
 
To further test the robustness of the findings I specified a random intercept HLM in which the 
probabilities of participating in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action reported in 2011(1 and 3) and 
Hiring Private Security for a Public Space reported in 2011(2 and 4) were modeled as a function of 
individual variables, the Average Distrust in the Police in 2010, the Average Trust in the Neighbors 
in 2010 and their interaction. The expectation was to find a significant interaction between Average 
Distrust in the Police in 2010 and Average Trust in the Neighbors in 2010. 140 
 
Table A8. Determinants of Anti Criminal Actions and Hiring Private Security for a Public Space (HLM-
Lagged Approach)  
Second Level Municipal State 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Anti-
Crime 
Neighborhood  
Private 
Security 
Anti-
Crime 
Neighborhood  
Private 
Security 
     
Trust in Neighbors 1.030*** 0.441*** 0.943*** 0.387*** 
 (0.0493) (0.111) (0.0473) (0.108) 
Distrust in the Police -0.160*** -0.132 -0.109** -0.0650 
 (0.0529) (0.127) (0.0506) (0.123) 
Household Crime Victimization 0.494*** 0.685*** 0.540*** 0.773*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0742) (0.0303) (0.0728) 
Crime Perception City 0.0384 -0.170* 0.0506 -0.184* 
 (0.0440) (0.100) (0.0426) (0.0980) 
Neighborhood Assaults 0.408*** 0.320*** 0.461*** 0.379*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0734) (0.0302) (0.0717) 
Neighborhood Extortions 0.337*** 0.298*** 0.313*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0814) (0.0361) (0.0793) 
Age 0.306*** 0.751*** 0.372*** 0.880*** 
 (0.0792) (0.187) (0.0758) (0.181) 
Female -0.00303 0.133** -0.00660 0.135** 
 (0.0291) (0.0679) (0.0282) (0.0665) 
Education 0.855*** 2.586*** 1.017*** 2.909*** 
 (0.0671) (0.166) (0.0624) (0.158) 
Av. Trust in the Neighbors 2010 -7.810*** -11.85** -53.76** -30.32 
 (2.598) (5.900) (26.96) (31.90) 
Av. Distrust in the Police 2010 -6.140** -6.129 -47.59* -23.61 
 (2.407) (5.177) (24.85) (29.30) 
Av. Trust in the Neighbors 2010 x Av. Distrust in the 
Police 2010 
9.308** 14.87* 70.73* 35.25 
(3.721) (8.271) (37.78) (44.64) 
Variance (intercept) 1.188*** 1.538*** 0.345*** 0.436*** 
 (0.105) (0.2384) (0.09) (0.123) 
                                                     
140 Where an average citizen is one in which individual level variables are accounted for.  
212 
 
     
Constant 0.919 -2.033 31.91* 13.16 
 (1.724) (3.761) (17.84) (21.07) 
     
Observations 60,101 60,116 62,017 62,033 
Number of groups 799 799 32 32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Overall the results are again supportive of the central prediction of my interactive trust hypothesis. 
That is, the average Distrust in the Police (2010) positively moderates the effect of the average trust 
among neighbors (2010) on the averages’ citizen likelihood of reporting having engaged in Collective 
Anti-Criminal Actions or having collaborated with neighbors to hire private security for a public 
place in 2011.  
 
213 
 
VI.d. Lagged Variable Analysis as a Hierarchical Logistic-Regression Model (HLM): A 
Random Slope Approach 
 
Finally, I also tested the robustness of the results in Table A4 to taking a random slope approach. 
Overall, the general idea is to let the effect of a citizen’s trust in his/her neighbors on the Dependent 
Variable ( βTrust in the Neighbors[2011] ) vary randomly across second level units (municipality in 1, 2  and 
States 3, 4). Then, I interact βTrust in the Neighbors [2011] with the average Distrust in the Police in 2010. If the 
data is consistent with the interactive trust hypothesis we should expect the cross-level interaction 
effect Trust in the Neighbors 2011 x Distrust in the Police 2010 to be positive and statistically 
significant.  
 
Table A9. Determinants of Anti Criminal Actions and Hiring Private Security for a Public 
Space (HLM Random Slope Approach) 
 Municipal  State  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Anti-Crime Neighborhood  
Private Security 
Anti-Crime Neighborhood 
 Private Security 
     
Trust in Neighbors 0.0208 -0.655 0.259 -0.109 
 (0.498) (1.238) (0.840) (1.781) 
Distrust in the Police -0.160*** -0.133 -0.108** -0.0620 
 (0.0530) (0.127) (0.0506) (0.123) 
Household Crime Victimization 0.494*** 0.681*** 0.540*** 0.769*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0744) (0.0303) (0.0729) 
Crime Perception City 0.0391 -0.173* 0.0509 -0.187* 
 (0.0440) (0.101) (0.0426) (0.0981) 
Neighborhood Assaults 0.410*** 0.324*** 0.459*** 0.377*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0735) (0.0302) (0.0718) 
Neighborhood Extortions 0.338*** 0.301*** 0.314*** 0.267*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0815) (0.0361) (0.0793) 
Age 0.308*** 0.737*** 0.375*** 0.870*** 
 (0.0794) (0.187) (0.0759) (0.181) 
Female -0.00353 0.131* -0.00734 0.135** 
 (0.0292) (0.0680) (0.0282) (0.0665) 
Education 0.857*** 2.593*** 1.016*** 2.908*** 
 (0.0673) (0.167) (0.0624) (0.158) 
Distrust in the Police 2010 -0.521 2.854* 0.0828 2.115 
 (0.738) (1.527) (2.098) (2.765) 
Trust in the Neighbors 2011 x 
Distrust in the Police 2010 
1.299* 1.314 0.979 0.715 
(0.737) (1.741) (1.254) (2.629) 
VAR (intercept) 1.128*** 1.435** .4033*** .476*** 
 (0.112) (0.2477) (0.109) (0.1485) 
VAR (βTrust in the Neighbors[2011]) .173 .3439** .0611*** .199** 
(0.080) (0.184) (0.034) (0.125) 
     
Constant -3.771*** -9.148*** -4.045*** -8.241*** 
 (0.500) (1.088) (1.393) (1.858) 
     
Observations 60,101 60,116 62,017 62,033 
Number of groups 799 799 32 32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Although the results are only statistically significant when the second level is the state (perhaps due 
to the low number of states), they are consistent with the interactive trust hypothesis in every case. 
That is, the average Distrust in the Police in 2010 seems to increase the positive association between 
an individuals’ 2011 levels of Trust in his/her neighbors and the probability that he/she will engage 
in a Collective Anti-Criminal Action.  
VII. Moderating Effect of Social Capital over Citizens’ Distrust in the Police. 
 
Figure A2. Moderating effect of Citizens’ Trust in their 
Neighbors on the Effect of Distrust on  the Police 
 
 
Figure A3. Moderating effect of Citizens’ Trust 
in their Neighbors on the Effect of Distrust on  
the Police 
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VIII. Interactive effect of Trust in the Neighbors and Distrust in the Police as Determinants 
of Citizens’ Willingness to Turn to their Neighbors for Justice.  
 
Table A10. Determinants of Citizens’ Willingness to Turn to Their Neighbors as 
Sources Of Criminal Justice (VICZIZ14) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
   
Distrust in The Police 1.873*** 2.455*** 
 (0.312) (0.735) 
Trust in the Neighbors 0.482 1.171 
 (0.388) (0.879) 
Distrust in The Police x Trust in the Neighbors  -0.905 
  (1.015) 
Support for Vigilante Justice 0.944*** 0.940*** 
 (0.282) (0.281) 
Insecurity -0.210 -0.214 
 (0.442) (0.444) 
Victimized by Crime -0.0601 -0.0572 
 (0.226) (0.226) 
Women -0.124 -0.122 
 (0.212) (0.212) 
Wealth -0.183** -0.183** 
 (0.0814) (0.0815) 
Education -0.232 -0.229 
 (0.157) (0.156) 
Age -0.00535 -0.00217 
 (0.0692) (0.0689) 
Size Of Town -0.0374 -0.0350 
 (0.110) (0.110) 
Indigenous 0.479* 0.477* 
 (0.258) (0.259) 
Constant -3.239*** -3.716*** 
 (0.705) (0.840) 
   
Observations 1,264 1,264 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Region fixed effects included but not shown. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV  
I. Treatments 
 
Key Manipulations 
Distrust in the Police 
LOW HIGH 
(Nonetheless) (For their part), the police 
(rarely monitors the area) (has intensified the 
monitoring of the area, and the chief of the 
police) (and has done little) (has said 
publically that they will show zero tolerance 
towards any criminal group) or (nothing to 
solve the problem and, in general, they seem to 
have little interest in maintaining the control 
over) (any) trespassers of the public order in 
the area.... 
 Given the (lack of) great unity existent in the 
community and the (increase in) (little) 
presence. What do you think the people 
affected by the problem should do? 
(Nonetheless) (For their part), the police 
(rarely monitors the area) (has intensified the 
monitoring of the area), and (the chief of the 
police) (and has done little) (has said 
publically that they will show zero tolerance 
towards any criminal group) or (nothing to 
solve the problem. In general, they seem to 
have little interest in maintaining the control 
over) (any) trespassers of the public order in 
the area.... 
 Given the (lack of) great unity existent in the 
community and the (increase in) (little) 
presence. What do you think the people 
affected by the problem should do? 
 
Trust in the Community 
LOW HIGH 
(In this context) (At the same time), some 
people who worry about the situation, have 
organized secret community meetings to 
face the problem. (However), things are 
(not) going (fairly) well (at all) due to the fact 
that these meetings have encountered (great) 
(little) resonance within the community and 
have exposed the great (division) (unity) 
existing in the town. (Only a handful of 
people) (Hundreds of neighbors) have come to 
the meetings and most of the assistants are 
(not) very enthusiastic about participating.  
.... 
Given the (lack of) great unity existent in the 
community and the (increase in) (little) 
presence. What do you think the people 
affected by the problem should do? 
(In this context) (At the same time), some 
people who worry about the situation, have 
organized secret community meetings to 
face the problem. (However), Things are 
(not) going (fairly) well (at all) due to the fact 
that these meetings have encountered 
(great) (little) resonance within the 
community and have exposed the great 
(division) (unity) existing in the town. (Only 
a handful of people) (Hundreds of 
neighbors) have come to the meetings and 
most of the assistants are (not) very 
enthusiastic about participating.  
.... 
Given the (lack of) great unity existent in the 
community and the (increase in) (little) 
presence. What do you think the people 
affected by the problem should do? 
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Actual Treatments (Spanish) 
A. High Community, Low Distrust in The Police Treatment  
Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto 
problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se 
relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se 
encuentra activo. 
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor 
económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las 
comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos. 
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que 
grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que 
han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país. 
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o 
tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, 
sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias 
contra la población civil. 
Por su parte, la policía ha intensificado su vigilancia en esa población, y el jefe de zona ha señalado 
que mostrarán cero tolerancia con cualquier grupo criminal o violación al orden público en el área. 
Al mismo tiempo, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones 
comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Las cosas van bastante bien, ya que estas 
reuniones han encontrado gran resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto la 
gran unidad que existe en la población. Cientos de vecinos ya han asistido a las juntas y participan en 
ellas activamente. 
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la 
salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que 
representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley. 
Dada la gran unidad que existe en la comunidad y el aumento en la presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué 
cree que debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema? 
Words. 363  
Average reading time in minutes: 1.82 (0.05) 
B. High Community, High Distrust in The Police Treatment (Spanish) 
Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto 
problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se 
relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se 
encuentra activo. 
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor 
económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las 
comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos. 
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que 
grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que 
han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país. 
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o 
tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, 
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sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias 
contra la población civil. 
 
Sin embargo, la policía vigila muy poco la zona, y ha hecho poco o nada para solucionar el 
problema, y en general parece tener muy poco interés en mantener el control sobre el orden público. 
Al mismo tiempo, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones 
comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Las cosas van bastante bien, ya que estas 
reuniones han encontrado gran resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto la 
gran unidad que existe en la población. Cientos de vecinos ya han asistido a las juntas y participan en 
ellas activamente. 
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la 
salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que 
representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley. 
Dada la gran unidad que existe en la comunidad y la poca presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué cree que 
debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema? 
(361 words) 
Average reading time in minutes: 1.96 (0.07) 
C. Low Community, Low Distrust in The Police Treatment (Spanish) 
Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto 
problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se 
relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se 
encuentra activo. 
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor 
económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las 
comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos. 
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que 
grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que 
han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país. 
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o 
tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, 
sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias 
contra la población civil. 
Por su parte, la policía ha intensificado su vigilancia en esa población, y el jefe de zona ha señalado 
que mostrarán cero tolerancia con cualquier grupo criminal o violación al orden público en el área. 
En este contexto, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones 
comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Sin embargo, las cosas no van nada bien, ya que 
estas reuniones han encontrado poca resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto 
la gran división que existe en la población. Solo un puñado de personas ha asistido a las juntas 
vecinales y no participan muy activamente. 
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la 
salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que 
representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley. 
Dada la poca unidad que existe en la comunidad y el aumento en la presencia de las autoridades, 
¿qué cree que debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema? 
 Words: 368 
219 
 
Average reading time in minutes: 1.77(0.06) 
 
D. Low Community, High Distrust in The Police Treatment (Spanish) 
Además de afectar directamente a la población, las recientes lluvias en el sur del país han expuesto 
problemas inesperados en muchas de las comunidades de la región. Uno de estos problemas se 
relaciona con la llegada de víveres a comunidades de Guerrero en donde el crimen organizado se 
encuentra activo. 
Específicamente, el problema reside en que grupos criminales se han dado cuenta del gran valor 
económico que representan las toneladas de alimentos, agua y otras provisiones que han llegado a las 
comunidades, y han intentado hacerse del control de los mismos. 
La población de Huamuxtitlán (Guerrero), por ejemplo, es una de las comunidades en las que 
grupos asociados al crimen organizado han logrado apoderarse de una buena parte de los víveres que 
han llegado a la comunidad desde el centro del país. 
Las autoridades han manifestado que estos grupos no deben ser confrontados directamente o 
tomados a la ligera. No solo porque tomar la justicia por propia mano se encuentra fuera de la ley, 
sino porque muchos de estos grupos se encuentran bien armados y podrían llegar a tomar represalias 
contra la población civil. 
Sin embargo, la policía vigila muy poco la zona, y ha hecho poco o nada para solucionar el 
problema, y en general parece tener muy poco interés en mantener el control sobre el orden público. 
En este contexto, algunas personas preocupadas por el problema han convocado a reuniones 
comunitarias en secreto para enfrentar el problema. Sin embargo, las cosas no van nada bien, ya que 
estas reuniones han encontrado poca resonancia dentro de la comunidad, y han puesto de manifiesto 
la gran división que existe en la población. Solo un puñado de personas ha asistido a las juntas 
vecinales y no participan muy activamente. 
La gente preocupada por el problema en la comunidad se encuentra en un dilema. Por un lado, la 
salud de sus hijos y de su familia empeora día a día. Por el otro, están conscientes del peligro que 
representa el crimen organizado y la posibilidad de ser castigados por la ley. 
Dada la poca unidad que existe en la comunidad y la poca presencia de las autoridades, ¿qué cree que 
debería hacer la gente afectada por el problema? 
Words: 366 
Average reading time in minutes: 1.83 (0.06) 
 
II. Unbalances with Respect to the General Population and the Interactive Trust Effect 
 
The experimental sample was not designed to be nationally representative and therefore, the 
treatment effects cannot be fully extrapolated to the general Mexican population.   That said, the 
pre-treatment questionnaire allowed me to identify some key aspects in which the sample differs 
from the overall Mexican population. Particularly, the sample seems to have bias in gender 
composition, authoritarian personality, preference for strong leaders, perceptions of corruption, 
crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. Although it is impossible to find the population 
treatment effect with this information, it is possible to use the within-sample variation in these 
variables to get a rough sense of how conservative or liberal the treatments I found are.  
220 
 
To do this, I first created a triple interaction between the two treatments and the biasing variables 
𝑉𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑥 𝑩𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 
+ 𝛽4 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑥 𝑩𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑥 𝑩𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 + 𝑒 
where the direction of the rough direction and significance of the bias of the biasing variable on the 
interactive coefficient of interest is indicated by 𝛽5. I ran this triple interaction model for each of the 
variables for which there seemed to be an imbalance between AmericasBaromenter’s sample and the 
sample I collected (see Figure 1). Only sex, perceptions of corruption and preference for child 
discipline showed a moderating effect significant to a level of significance lower than 0.2.  
Treatment Effects as Moderated by Unbalanced Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Trust in the Community 
0.0774 -1.547** 0.323 0.214 0.393* 0.193 0.404* 0.338* 
(0.369) (0.695) (0.425) (0.223) (0.215) (0.235) (0.214) (0.192) 
Distrust in the Police 
-0.618* -1.031 0.240 -0.113 -0.1000 0.0537 -0.000305 0.129 
(0.362) (0.702) (0.417) (0.225) (0.214) (0.227) (0.209) (0.194) 
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police 
1.176** 1.578 -0.0697 0.489 0.506* 0.409 0.173 0.121 
(0.524) (0.981) (0.580) (0.325) (0.306) (0.329) (0.301) (0.273) 
Female 
-0.577**        
(0.286)        
Trust in the Community x 
female 
0.233        
(0.417)        
Distrust in the Police x female 
0.748*        
(0.411)        
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x 
female 
-0.993*        
(0.592)        
Corruption 
 -0.0165***       
 (0.00590)       
Trust in the Community x 
Corruption 
 0.0212***       
 (0.00777)       
Distrust in the Police x 
Corruption 
 0.0121       
 (0.00785)       
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x 
Corruption 
 -0.0147       
 (0.0110)       
Insecurity 
  -0.00215      
  (0.00536)      
Trust in the Community x 
Insecurity 
  -0.000510      
  (0.00721)      
Distrust in the Police 
  -0.00341      
  (0.00688)      
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x 
Insecurity 
  0.00642      
  (0.00954)      
 Crime Victimization 
   -0.135     
   (0.273)     
Trust in the Community x 
Crime Victimization 
   0.248     
   (0.378)     
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Distrust in the Police x Crime 
Victimization 
   0.449     
   (0.381)     
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x Crime 
Victimization 
   -0.569     
   (0.531)     
Iron Fist 
    0.436    
    (0.289)    
Trust in the Community x Iron 
Fist 
    -0.435    
    (0.390)    
Distrust in the Police x Iron Fist 
    0.371    
    (0.396)    
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x Iron Fist 
    -0.551    
    (0.549)    
Pro-Respect 
     -0.291   
     (0.269)   
 Trust in the Community x Pro-
Respect  
     0.311   
     (0.370)   
 Distrust in the Police x Pro-
Respect  
     0.0331   
     (0.376)   
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x Pro-
Respect  
     -0.401   
     (0.527)   
Pro-Obedience 
      -0.0949  
      (0.292)  
Trust in the Community x Pro-
Obedience  
      -0.297  
      (0.398)  
Distrust in the Police x Pro-
Obedience 
      0.200  
      (0.416)  
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x Pro-
Obedience 
      0.300  
      (0.575)  
Pro-Discipline 
       0.0849 
       (0.393) 
Trust in the Community x Pro-
Discipline  
       -0.305 
       (0.547) 
Distrust in the Police x Pro-
Discipline  
       -0.542 
       (0.534) 
Trust in the Community x 
Distrust in the Police x Pro-
Discipline  
       1.266 
       (0.781) 
Constant 
2.964*** 3.923*** 2.580*** 2.507*** 2.350*** 2.562*** 2.488*** 2.454*** 
(0.251) (0.535) (0.317) (0.154) (0.147) (0.156) (0.147) (0.135) 
         
Observations 475 434 434 434 431 434 434 434 
R-squared 0.056 0.055 0.039 0.038 0.060 0.043 0.040 0.042 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure A1. Gender and The Interactive Trust Effect.  
 
  = Male,  =Female 
 
The figure on the left shows the marginal treatment effect across trust in the police conditions. 
Overall, figure A1 (on the right) shows that my conditional hypothesis seemed to be validated more 
strongly among male than among female. To the extent that my experimental sample is heavily 
female-biased, it seems that the interactive treatment effect presented in Table 4 is a conservative 
estimate of the effect that could be found in a more balanced sample.  
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Figure A2. Perceptions of Corruption and the Interactive Trust Effect.  
 
  = Corruption at AmericasBarometer levels 
(76.5) 
 = Perceptions of Corruption at sample 
levels (85.8)  
 
Once more, the figure on the left shows the marginal treatment effect across trust in the police 
conditions. For its part Figure A2 (on the right) shows that my conditional hypothesis seems to be 
validated more strongly among those who have lower perceptions of corruption. This second piece 
of evidence also supports the idea that the interactive effect shown in Table 4 is a conservative 
estimate. As the gray line shows the model estimates that the moderating effect would be larger if 
the sample had similar levels of perception of corruption as the ones displayed in the 2010 
AmericasBarometer.  
  
-.5
0
.5
1
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y'
s 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
   UntrustworthyTrustworthy
Description of the Police
-.5
0
.5
1
   Trustworthy Untrustworthy
Description of the Police
224 
 
Figure A3 Anti-Authoritarian Personality and The Interactive Trust Effect.  
 
  = Discipline 
 = Creativity 
 
Finally, the participants in my sample were more in favor of Creativity than Discipline in child 
upbringing than the general population found by the AmericasBarometer sample. Since Figure A3 
(on the right) shows that the interaction between treatments was stronger among those who 
answered that discipline was preferable to creativity in child upbringing, there are reasons to think 
that my estimates are conservative. Once more, the figure on the left shows the marginal treatment 
effect across trust in the police conditions. 
All in all, most of the pre-treatment variables do not seem to moderate the interactive coefficient in 
Table 4. However, each and every one of the three variables: 
a) Indicate that my sample is biased with respect to the AmericasBarometer’s sample and  
b) Moderate the interaction among treatments (however slightly) 
 
This suggests that the estimate of the interaction between trust in the community and trust in the 
neighbors is but an underestimation of what could be found on an unbiased random sample of the 
population.  
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III. Pre-Treatment Questionnaire 
 
SEX. Sex 
 Male - Female 
 
AGE. Age in Years  
 18-99 
 
INCOME. Family income in my home, including remittances and income from all adults and 
children who work: 
 Less than $2,000 (1) 
 Between $2,001 and $3,499 (2) 
 Between $3,500 and $4,999 (3) 
 Between $5,000 and $6,499 (4) 
 Between $6,500 and $7,999 (5) 
 Between $8,000 and $9,499 (6) 
 Between $9,500 and $11,999 (7) 
 Between $12,000 and $14,999 (8) 
 Between $15,000 and $19,999 (9) 
 Between $20,000 and $44,999 (10) 
 $45,000 or more (11) 
 
HIGH In which system did you study high school? 
 CCH (1) 
 UNAM High school (2) 
 Public High school (other) (3) 
 Private High school (4) 
 Other (5) ____________________ 
 
ED ¿In which semester of college are you? 
 0 (1) -11 (27) 
 
AREA In which area of psychology are you most interested in? 
 Social Psychology (1) 
 Educational Psychology (2) 
 Clinical Psychology (3) 
 Neuropsychology (4) 
 Organizational Psychology (5) 
 Other (6) ____________________ 
 
STATE. In what state of the country do you live? 
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MUNI. In which delegation or municipality do you live? 
 
AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you lives and thinking about the possibility of 
being victim of a robbery or assault, do you feel:  
 Very insecure (1) 
 Somewhat insecure (2) 
 Somewhat secure (3) 
 Very secure (4) 
 
VICTOT. Have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent 
threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
AGE. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? 
 0-99 
 
EXC7 The corruption of the public officials of the country is 
 No generalized (1)-Very generalized (4) 
 
AUT. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the 
vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the 
popular vote, is always best. What do you think?  
 We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (1) 
 Electoral democracy is the best (2) 
 
Aut1. For a child, what is most important? 
 Independence (1) 
 Respect of his/her elders (2) 
 
Aut2. For a child, what is most important? 
 Obedience (1) 
 Self-sufficiency (to be able to fend for him/herself) (2) 
 
Aut3. For a child, what is most important? 
 Creativity (1) 
 Discipline (2) 
 
Leftright. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of 
your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? 
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 left 0  (1)-- right 10  (11) 
 
PER1. I am a sociable and active person. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER2. I am a cynic and contentious person  
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER3. I am a trustworthy and disciplined person.  
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER4. I am an anxious and easily annoyed person. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER5. I am a person open to new experiences and intellectual. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER6. I am a quiet and timid person. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER7. I am a generous and caring person. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER8. I am a disorganized and careless person. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER9. I am a calm and emotionally stable person. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
 
PER10. I am an uncreative person and with little imagination. 
 In strong disagreement (1)—In strong agreement (7) 
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C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 
 
I. Analytic Results 
After receiving a proposal of the amount of income to be taken by the thief in my game, participants 
must make a choice. It is possible to derive expectations about the behavior of the participants 
across the different experimental conditions by assuming that they are rational maximizers of the 
income that they expect to preserve at the end of the turn.   
To begin, let ∆ represent expected proportion of income preserved if a participant decides to 
confront a thief (𝜑│𝐴) and the proportion of income he would expect to preserve if he decided not 
to confront a thief (𝜑|𝐴𝑐), and ranges from -1 to +1.  
𝐸(∆) = 𝐸(𝜑|𝐴) − 𝐸(𝜑|𝐴𝑐) 
Where the expected proportion of income preserved 𝜑  conditional to confronting or not 
confronting is given by: 
𝐸(𝜑|𝐴, 𝐴𝑐) = ∑ Pr(𝑅𝑘) ∗ (𝜑 │𝑅𝑘)
6
𝑘=1
 
Where (𝜑 │𝑅𝑘) represents the proportion of income preserved associated with each of the six 
potential results,141 and Pr(𝑅𝑘) represents the probability of the k
th potential result to occur. From 
Bayes Theorem, note that the probability of occurrence of the kth potential result is given by: 
Pr(𝑅𝑘) = {∥ {[Pr(𝑅𝑘|𝐴|𝑊|𝐸) ∗ Pr(𝐸)] + [Pr(𝑅𝑘|𝐴|𝑊|𝐸
𝑐) ∗ Pr(𝐸𝑐)]} ∗ Pr(𝑊) ∥ +∥
{[Pr(𝑅𝑘|𝐴|𝑊
𝑐|𝐸) ∗ Pr(𝐸)] + [Pr(𝑅𝑘|𝐴|𝑊
𝑐|𝐸𝑐) ∗ Pr(𝐸𝑐)]} ∗ Pr(𝑊𝑐) ∥ ∗ Pr(𝐴)} +
{[Pr(𝑅𝑘|𝐴
𝑐|𝐸) ∗ Pr(𝐸)] + [Pr(𝑅𝑘|𝐴
𝑐|𝐸𝑐) ∗ Pr(𝐸𝑐)]} ∗ Pr (𝐴𝑐)}.  
Where 𝑅𝑘 is the k
th potential result, A is the probability of confronting a thief (or “Attack”), E is the 
probability of the enforcer to enter the game, and W is the probability of wining. W, then, is given 
by:  
 
Pr(𝑊) = 1 −
∑ 𝑘∑ Pr (𝑁𝑗)
4
𝑗=110
𝑘=1
10⟦
∑ Pr (𝑁𝑗)
4
𝑗=1 ⟧+1
 
 
Where  𝑃r (𝑁𝑗) represents the probability of the j
th neighbor to enter the game.  
From these formulas, I calculated the change in the expected differential of preserved income (∆) at 
different levels of the variables experimentally manipulated. If one assumes that the probability of 
choosing to confront a thief 𝜃 is a logistic function of ∆, then it is possible to generate expectations 
about the probability of confronting a thief at different levels of the variables of interest.  
 
                                                     
141 1) losing a confrontation with the take –authority (1%); 2) having 80% of income taken by the take authority (20%); 
3) having 50% of income taken by the take authority (50%); 4)  having 20% of income taken by the take authority (80%); 
5)  wining a confrontation but being fined (30%); 6)   wining a confrontation and not  being fined 100%.   
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𝐸(𝜃) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑘[𝐸(∆)−∆0]
 
Here, I assume that participants are indifferent to attacking when 𝐸(𝜑|𝐴) = 𝐸(𝜑|𝐴𝑐) and thus, that 
the probability of confronting is 0.5. Therefore I fixed the point of indifference ∆0 to 0. 
Additionally, I assume that when ∆ reaches 1 and -1, 𝜃 reaches 0.99 and 0.01 respectively. Therefore, 
I fixed the constant 𝑘 at 5. The resulting function can be seen in Figure A1. 
 
Figure A1. Probability of Observing a Confrontation (𝜃) at 
different levels of Utility Differentials Δ 
 
 
 
A2 and A3 show the results from manipulating the enforcer’s probability to enter the game and the 
proportion of trustworthy neighbors surrounding the participant. Figure A4, shows the results from 
manipulating the proportion of income taken by the thief. A5 Show the results from manipulating 
the expected probability that the surrounding neighbors will enter the game at different levels of 
probability that the enforcer will intervene. 
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Figures A2-A5. Changes in the Expected Probability of Observing a Confrontation (𝜃) at Different 
Levels of The Experimental Variables 
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II. Information Treatments 
 
After making a choice two different possibilities open to the respondent. If the participant 
decided not to confront, in the fourth stage (a.4), the participant threw a ten sided die to 
determine if the police would enter the game.142 If the police entered the game the participant 
recovered the tokens stolen by the thief and that iteration of the game ended.  
If the participant decided to confront after the third stage then, in the fourth stage (b.4), 
she threw a ten sided die for each of the neighbors in order to decide whether they would enter the 
game.143 Then, in the fifth stage (b.5) the participant threw a ten sided die for each player in the 
game to decide the outcome of the confrontation. If the number in the thief die was surpassed by 
the participant’s die or the die of one of the neighbors, the participant recovered the tokens 
stolen by the thief and continued to the next stage. If this was not the case, she lost 99% of her 
tokens and that iteration of the game ended.144 
In the sixth stage (b.6) the participant threw a ten sided die to determine if the police 
would enter the game. If the police entered the game, the participant lost 70% of her tokens. If 
the police did not enter, the participant remained unpunished. 145 After this stage the iteration ended 
and losses were applied.  
 
See diagram on the next page...
                                                     
142 When the image at the beginning said that the police had a probability to enter the game of 0.2, they entered the game 
if the die landed on 9 or 10. When the probability was 0.5 the police entered the game if the die landed on 6 or more. 
When the probability was 0.8 the police entered the game if the die landed on 3 or more.  
143 Blue (trustworthy) neighbors entered the game if the die landed in any number except 1. Grey (untrustworthy) 
neighbors entered the game only if the die landed on a 10.   
144 I made the cost of losing against the take authority 99% because I wanted to punish the participants as harshly as I 
could without having any participant leave the laboratory without compensation. I did suspend the game if the 
participant lost a confrontation since this would severely hurt the external validity of the experiment. Specifically, it 
would increase the proportion of observations coming from surviving participants making the treatment effect 
generalizable only to “surviving players”.   
145 I included this fine in order to model the potential legal risks associated with engaging in vigilantism. I fixed the 
sanction to 70% for three reasons. First, this was done to acknowledge that the legal sanctions for vigilantism (e.g. fines 
or jail) are likely to be less expensive than the potential consequences of losing a confrontation against crime (e.g. 
physical injury of death). Second, I did not fixed this sanction any lower because participants did not seem to be strongly 
deterred by sanctions in pilots. Finally, I kept it below 80% so that I could have conditions in which the severity of the 
crime was higher than the expected sanction. 
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Figure A6. Incentives Faced by the Participant in the Extralegal-Confrontation Game   
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III. Sample Characteristics  
III.I. Demographics 
 
Table A1. Sample Descriptive Characteristics 
 
N Mean/Proportion SD 
Female 150 52.67% 
 Income 149 6.637584 2.684326 
Age 150 30.54667 12.3019 
Crime Victim 150 37.31%  
Trust in the Police 149 2.053691 0.77795 
Trust in the 
Neighbors 147 3.013605 0.682325 
Confronted 2,996 34.73% 
 Insecurity 150 3.04 0.954537 
 
Figure A7. Sample Demographic Characteristics 
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III.II. Winnings 
 
Figure A8. Distribution of Winnings in the Experiment 
 
 
 
Table A2. Winnings in the Experiment 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Winnings (Mexican Pesos) 150 73.173 68.74618 0.5 323.5 
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IV. Pre-Game Questionnaire 
 
1. Sex 
 Male - Female 
 
2. Age in Years  
 18-99 
 
3. Family income in my home, including remittances and income from all adults and children who 
work: 
 Menos de $2,000 (1) 
 Entre $2,001 y $3,499 (2) 
 Entre $3,500 y $4,999 (3) 
 Entre $5,000 y $6,499 (4) 
 Entre $6,500 y $7,999 (5) 
 Entre $8,000 y $9,499 (6) 
 Entre $9,500 y $11,999 (7) 
 Entre $12,000 y $14,999 (8) 
 Entre $15,000 y $19,999 (9) 
 Entre $20,000 y $44,999 (10) 
 $45,000 o más (11) 
 
4. In what state of the country do you live? 
 
5. In which delegation or municipality do you live? 
 
6. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being 
victim of a robbery or assault, do you feel:  
 Very insecure (1) 
 Somewhat insecure (2) 
 Somewhat secure (3) 
 Very secure (4) 
 
Now, we would like to ask you about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday 
life.... 
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7. Have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or 
any other type of crime in the past 12 months?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
8. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? 
 0-99 
 
9. Tell me the degree of confidence that you have in the Police. 
 A lot (1) 
 Some (2) 
 Little (3) 
 None (4) 
 
10. Tell me the degree of confidence that you have in your neighbors. 
 A lot (1)…None (4) 
 
11. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do 
you approve or disapprove? 
 Strongly disapprove (0)  - Strongly Approve (10)    
 
12. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or 
disapprove? 
 Strongly disapprove (0)  - Strongly Approve (10)    
 
13. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How 
much do you approve or disapprove? 
 Strongly disapprove (0)  - Strongly Approve (10)    
 
14. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. 
How much do you approve or disapprove?  
 Strongly disapprove (0)  - Strongly Approve (10)    
 
15. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified? 
 It’s not justified (0)  - Its justified (10)     
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the 
described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation.  Provide a rating from 
Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely 
 
16. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. 
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 Extremely Likely (1)             
 Moderately Likely (2) 
 Somewhat Likely (3)       
 Not Sure  (4)        
 Somewhat Unlikely (5) 
 Moderately Unlikely (6) 
 Extremely Unlikely (7) 
 
17. Going camping in the wilderness 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
18. Betting a day’s income at the horse races.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
19. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F/I)   
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
20. Drinking heavily at a social function. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
21. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
22. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
23. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
24. Having an affair with a married man/woman.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
25. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
26. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
27. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
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28. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
29. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event.   
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
30. Engaging in unprotected sex.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
31. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
32. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
33. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
34. Taking a skydiving class.  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
35. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
36. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
37. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work  
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
38. Sunbathing without sunscreen. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
39. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
40. Piloting a small plane. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
41. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town 
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 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
42. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
43. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
44. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
45. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200 
 Extremely Likely (1)… Extremely Unlikely (7)         
 
46. ¿How much is 9/27 + 1/3? 
 2/3  
 10/30 
 21/27 
 27/9 
 7/8 
 
47. ¿How much is 80% x 50%? 
 400% 
 40% 
 130% 
 60% 
 20% 
 
48. ¿How much is 30% out of 200? 
 30 
 60 
 50 
 40 
 70 
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V. Round Distribution  
 
Figure A9. Round Distribution 
 
 
 
Table A3. Distribution of Rounds Across Treatment Conditions 
  Distrust in the Police 
Total 
  Low (0.2) Med (0.5) High (0.8) 
Trust in the Neighbors 
High (1) 
332 
(11.08%) 
366 
(12.22%) 
325 
(10.85%) 
1,023  
(34.15%) 
Med (0.25) 
348 
(11.62%) 
337 
(11.25%) 
337 
(11.25%) 
1,022  
(34.11%) 
Low (0) 
299 
(9.98%) 
341 
(11.38%) 
311 
(10.38%) 
951  
(31.74%) 
Total  
979 
(32.68%) 
1,044 
(34.85%) 
973 
(32.48%) 
2,996  
(100%) 
 
  
299 341 311 
348 337 337 
332 366 325 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Low Medium High
Trust in the Police 
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Medium
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Trust in the 
 Neighbors 
241 
 
 
Table A4. Distribution of Rounds Across Crime Severity Treatment conditions 
 N 
High (80%) 983 
(32.81%) 
Medium (50%) 981  
(32.74%) 
Low (20%) 1,032  
(34.45%) 
Total 2,996 
(100%) 
 
VI. Effects of Neighbors’ Trustworthiness Over Police Untrustworthiness Conditions 
 
Table A5. Effects of Neighbors’ Trustworthiness Over Police Untrustworthiness Conditions 
 
Proportion of 
Trustworthy 
Neighbors 
Pr. Confront 
Standard 
 Error 
Change 
High Police 
Untrustworthiness  
(0.8) 
High (1) 0.88 0.01 
Δ(βNT): 0.455 (0.023)*** 
Δ(PrCONFRONT): 0.459 
Mid (0.25) 0.56 0.01 
Low (0) 0.42 0.02 
Medium Enforcer 
Untrustworthiness  
 (0.5) 
High (1) 0.56 0.02 Δ(βNT): 0.368 
(0.0144)*** 
Δ(PrCONFRONT): 0.413 
Mid (0.25) 0.23 0.01 
Low (0) 0.15 0.01 
Low Enforcer 
Untrustworthiness  
 (0.2) 
High (1) 0.19 0.02 
Δ(βNT): 0.146 (0.017)*** 
Δ(PrCONFRONT): 0.154 
Mid (0.25) 0.05 0.01 
Low (0) 0.03 0.01 
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